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Abstract 
This thesis examines what kinds of guanxi are resorted to and how guanxi networks 
are mobilized by Chinese private entrepreneurs for their business start-ups. It does so 
with special reference to the private IT sector. 
Guanxi are personal relations that can be resorted to for certain ends based on the 
norm of reciprocity. It is argued that guanxi is a similar concept to social capital in the 
West. Like social capital, guanxi has an instrumental function, and is used for personal 
ends. Guanxi overlaps with the three main streams of social capital theory. They have 
common ingredients. Nevertheless, there are some differences between the two terms. 
It is further argued that research on guanxi can contribute to social capital theory in 
terms of how social capital is brought into being. 
Much has been made of the advantages of those who have been cadres in entering the 
private sector in post-communist societies. It is argued that a well-defined cadre 
concept is the precondition to do further analysis of whether being a cadre or having 
close cadre connections confers advantage in private business operations, as it has 
several meanings in different contexts in China. The thesis utilizes both quantitative 
and qualitative methodologies and uses several different research sources. These 
include the unpublished 1995 national survey data set on private enterprises in China 
and an original analysis of thirty private IT companies situated at Beijing 
Zhongguancun Hi-tech Park. 
An analysis of the unpublished national survey data set on private enterprises in China 
suggests that being a cadre or having close cadre connections does not confer 
significant advantage in private enterprise start-up financing. This is not in 
accordance with power conversion theory. The popular practice of guanxi may have 
contributed to this finding. 
At a theoretical level, it is argued that the power conversion theory oversimplifies 
social capital theory and neglects the subjective dynamics of human beings, by which 
social capital can be created. Guanxi is seen to come from several channels. Some 
types of guanxi come from endowment, and some from saving. If entrepreneurs do 
not have guanxi at hand, they will establish certain guanxi, and then invest to develop 
and maintain guanxi. There are two other strategies to have guanxi: by subcontracting 
and linking to the elite. 
A particular feature of the thesis is the adoption of a reflective methodology in 
researching the case studies. In this way, the researcher made use of guanxi in the 
process of field research and thereby offers a contribution to the understanding of 
guanxi and social capital. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 The under-researched sector 
As a witness to one of the most significant outcomes of the reform in China over the last 
two decades -- the emergence of private sector', I was attracted to research China's private 
enterprises. However, when I started to look at the relevant literature in 1998,1 found that 
the sector was largely neglected, compared to state owned enterprises (SOEs), township 
and village enterprises (TVEs), and foreign direct investment (FDI). Scholars researching 
China believe that FDI and TVEs have been the major driving force for China's fast 
growth in the past as SOEs have not only performed badly in terms of productive 
efficiency but also have been a burden on the economy, since the government has to 
subside loss-making SOEs (e. g., Shan, et al., 1997; Chen, 1996; Chen, et al., 1995; Child, 
1996; Naughton, 1995; WaIder, 1995; Warner, 1995; Woo et al., 1994). However, with the 
outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, FDI has been eroded and the export volume 
of TVEs has plunged. The Chinese economy has now to rely more on domestic capital and 
private business (China News Digest, March 23,1998; South China Morning Post, March 
19,1998). 
1 In this research, private sector is defined as domestic private businesses under the effective control of 
Chinese citizens. It included 1.2 million private enterprises (siying qiye) and 31.2 million individual economy 
(getihu) in 1998, providing about 20 per cent of employment and industrial output of China (China Statistical 
Yearbook, 1998). Private enterprises are the main concern here. See Chapter 2 about the rapid expansion of 
private enterprises. 
1.2 A fundamental question 
Initially only allowed on the margin of the Chinese economy, the private sector has grown 
out of the plan (Naughton, 1995). The private sector has played a more and more important 
role not only in the economy but also in social life. The development of the private sector 
has forced changes in policies and regulations (Young, 1995). Wank (1999) argues that 
private business is widely considered the most far-reaching departure from the Chinese 
communist order, with profound consequences for economy and polity. 
The Chinese literature on the private sector mainly concerns the characteristics of private 
entrepreneurs and their class character and social status (e. g., Jia et aL, 1994; Zhang and 
Liu, 1995). The Western research on the Chinese private sector considers the development 
of the sector in terms of the process of reform (e. g., Kraus, 1990), and how this process has 
affected the outcome for both private business and the course of development in China 
(e. g., Bruun, 1993; Young, 1995). But neither literature has investigated the very 
2? fundamental question: how do private entrepreneurs start up their businesses . 
1.3 The question in its context 
It is impossible for the researcher to approach the question of how Chinese private 
2 Though Wank (1999) does mention start-ups in Chapter 6, when he looks at how commercial advantage in 
private business is constrained by family background and life experience of particular entrepreneurs, how to 
start-up is beyond his main concern. 
2 
entrepreneurs start up their businesses innocently. As pointed out previously, there is no 
existing research on China's private enterprise start-ups, and the researcher is therefore 
likely to be guided by the existing literature developed in other post-communist societies. 
In practice, there is little existing literature specifically on private business start-ups in 
other transitional economies, either. Erutku and Vallee (1997) look at business start-ups in 
Poland, but they simply give a description of entrepreneurs, such as their age, what 
businesses they are in and what problems they are facing. Although not developed in China, 
there are, however, theories on other transitional economies that try to explain the 
development of a private sector and these provide the researcher with an initial research 
agenda. One main concern of this literature is who these people are and how they take 
advantage in the transition from socialism to capitalism, and as a result, how this transition 
will change the social structure of the fonner socialist societies (e. g., Szelenyi, 1988; 
Kolankiewicz, 1996; Rona-Tas, 1994). A main stream of the research believes that 
cadre-related entrepreneurs have an advantage in their business operations. This is termed 
power conversion theory (Rona-Tas, 1994). Another theory that sounds contradictory to 
this argument claims that the main beneficiaries of the transition will be those who were in 
less privileged positions before the transition and that cadres become losers. This is 
labelled the circulation of elites (e. g., Szelenyi, 1988; Nee, 1989,1991). Either way, cadre 
appears as a key concept in both theories. 
On the other hand, research on the post-communist countries implicitly uses the concept of 
social capital. One of my contentions is that this is more or less similar to the notion of 
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guanxi in China, which, many researchers, in particular non-Chinese ones, seem to occupy 
themselves with. The thesis has been constructed in such a way as to enable this concern to 
be addressed. 
Looked at in broad terms the logic behind the thesis is as follows. It starts, in this chapter, 
with a critical examination of the existing literature. After pointing out some deficiencies in 
the existing research, the question is posed of whether the theories developed in other 
communist countries can be applied to the China case, which has a different reform 
approach. In due course this leads us on to look at, firstly, whether cadre-related 
entrepreneurs have an advantage in business start-up (here empirical data on China's 
private sector is used); and, secondly, the apparent lack of advantage for cadres to be 
explained. The second point is itself two-sided. It tries to address on the one hand why 
cadre-related entrepreneurs do not have a significant advantage and on the other hand how 
entrepreneurs with different backgrounds actually do start up their businesses. This 
analysis is supported by both quantitative and qualitative original empirical data. 
For a better understanding of the different reform approach and the emerging of a private 
sector in China, the thesis firstly describes the policy changes and the development of the 
sector in an early chapter. This also provides the background for the current research 
(Chapter 2). 
This research then examines the origin and the broad usage of the term cadre in the 
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Chinese setting, arguing that a clear definition is ignored by the existing research. We see 
that one cadre concept encompasses all personnel with authority or expertise in party, state, 
army, or units of economic production, be they party members or no (Strauss, 1999). We 
also see, though, that cadre is sometimes understood as a social class, in contrast to worker 
and peasant (e. g., Li et al., 1991; Lin and Bian, 1991). Yet again, we see that cadre also 
refers to someone in certain leading positions (Bums, 1985). Thus a well-defined cadre 
concept is the precondition to further analysis of whether cadre has advantages in private 
business operation. 
Based on a clearly defined cadre concept, the thesis analyses a unique unpublished national 
survey data on private enterprises in China (Chapter 3). Such an analysis allows us to see 
whether as the power conversion theory claims being a cadre or having a close connection 
with cadres provides the entrepreneurs with any advantage in business start-up. Backed by 
cadre experience or close cadre connections, the entrepreneurs with cadre background or 
close cadre social relations should be more likely to have higher start-up capital. Also, they 
should also appear more likely to finance their start-ups from public funding. We 
systematically test this hypothesis. 
Following the survey data analysis, is an examination of the key concepts to the thesis: 
guanxi and social capital (Chapter 4 and 5). This thesis presents the first systematic 
research on the relationship between guanxi and social capital. After an explanation of the 
two concepts and their respective usages, it critically applies guanxi and social capital to 
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the question of business start-up. Unlike most available research focusing on existing 
social capital, the thesis endeavors to investigate of how social capital is brought into being. 
The available research suggests that being a cadre or being born into a cadre family is 
important. We see that there can be some other alternative forms of social capital. Social 
capital is dynamic. It can be created. 
The methodology for the case studies of this thesis, which is a chapter of the case studies 
(Chapter 6), partially demonstrates this. It describes how the researcher conducted his field 
research by a guanxi snowball sampling approach, i. e., exploiting guanxi to conduct field 
research by using the initial guanxi to 'snowball' and gather additional contacts as 
informants. This first hand experience is itself unique. The autobiographic account 
provides a reflective research method, which could offer sociologists the chance to 
understand the social envirorunent: the guanxi network, in which the individuals act as 
social beings. Moreover, based on the experience, the researcher explores the relationship 
between him and the guanxi ties that helped him roll the snowball. As such, the thesis 
reveals that guanxi and social capital are multi-dimensional. Guanxi and social capital in 
the field research are much richer than the available literature suggests. 
As little empirical research on business start-up in other transitional economies has been 
conducted, this attempt to focus on business start-ups in the Chinese private sector fills a 
gap and contributes to the literature more generally. With respect to guanxi and start-up, an 
important objective is to examine what guanxi ties are resorted to for business start-up 
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(Chapter 7). It further seeks to tackle the question of how these guanxi ties come into 
being, which is neglected by the existing research on social capital (Chapter 8). The 
findings in these two chapters seek to justify the assumption in the previous chapters that 
social capital is dynamic and social capital can be produced in several different ways. 
The thesis is not simply about business start-up in China, it focuses specifically, by means 
of case studies, on start-up in the private IT sector in China. It examines how the private IT 
companies mobilize social networks for their business start-ups, shedding a light on the 
so-called new economy. 
Today, it seems that 'new economy' has replaced 'knowledge economy' to become the 
most popular and most frequently used term at international symposiums, within media, 
and in market analysis. In the so-called new economy, information technology together 
with economic globalization enables a state of high growth, low inflation and low 
unemployment. Business cycles are abolished (e. g., Weinstein, 1997). The Federal Reserve 
Board chairman Alan Greespan believes that it has become clear that this business cycle 
differs in a very profound way from the many other cycles before (Federal Reserve Bank, 
2000). Later, with the soar of Internet stocks, many people labeled information technology 
and the Internet industries as 'new-technology industries' or 'new-economy industries' 
(Fan, 2000). 
China boasts to have become one of the top ten countries in information technology 
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industries. In the last ten years, the information technology industries have a very high 
growth rate, three times the country's GDP growth rate (Xinhua News Agency, December 9, 
2001). In China, to many, this wave of new economy, the ongoing information and 
scientific technological revolution will provide China with new opportunities for catching 
up with developed countries (e. g., Lau, 2000). The CEO of Intel Craig Barrett advised that 
China's businesses needed to implement e-business strategies to gain a competitive 
advantage in today's new Internet-driven economy (China Daily, October 29,2000). The 
Chinese leadership knows that in addition to the wealth generated and jobs created for 
China by successful new Internet companies, the web can help reform the economy. The 
Chinese leadership has described e-conunerce as the future of business. Wall Street has 
seized on China and the Internet as a golden combination of the world largest emerging 
market and the biggest technological revolution in global business (Financial Tines, 
August 2,1999). 
The collapsing dot-com stocks have impact on the Chinese IT sector, too. The backlash of 
the burst dotcom bubble and pronounced worldwide technology ebb stormed Comdex 
(Computer Distributor Exhibition) China in Beijing in April 2002, leaving a lacklustre 
turnout, few marque names and innovations, and even fewer freebies at the much-touted 
computer trade show. Analysts with the China Centre of Information Industry 
Development (CCID) believe that the lull that the trade show industry is now experiencing 
points to the downward spiral dogging the IT industry (China Daily, April 30,2002). 
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The Chinese economy has been closely connected with the world economy. For example, 
the downturn of the world economy resulted in the declining growth of China's exports in 
the first three quarters of 2001, a drop from the 33.1 per cent in the same period of 2000 
(China Daily, December 18,2001). This is in particular the case for the IT sector (China 
Daily, November 13,2001; April 30,2002). It is expected that the terrorist attacks on New 
York have a negative impact on China's economy. As a major exporter to the United States, 
China is likely to suffer should a recession hit the United States, as it would weaken 
purchasing power of US consumers (China Daily, September 18,2001). China finally 
became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, after 15 years of 
arduous negotiations. This means that China will have become much more interdependent 
on the world business. 
There are good reasons, then, to examine those entrepreneurs who operate in the IT sector, 
which is most market-oriented in China, and find out to what extent China's business 
system has changed and how it will develop in the globalisation of economic activities. 
1.4 Two contradictory theories: literature review 
It has been pointed out that researchers on transitional economies put forward two 
contradictory theories about who will benefit most from the transition and how the 
consequence will transform the social structure of these societies (Rona-Tas, 1994; 
Szelenyi and Szelenyi, 1995). The first argument suggest that the main beneficiaries of the 
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transition will be those who were in less privileged positions before the transition (e. g., 
Szelenyi, 1988; Nee, 1989,1991, and 1996). The second theory claims that the old elite in 
the communist regime can benefit from their advantageous positions and are therefore the 
primary winners of the transition (e. g., Kolankiewicz, 1996; Rona-Tas, 1994; Staniszkis, 
1991). The first theory is termed the circulation of economic elites (Szelenyi, 1988; 
Szelenyi and Szelenyi, 1995). Rona-Tas (1994) labels the second argument 'power 
conversion theory'. In Szelenyi and Szelenyi's (1995) words, it is an elite reproduction 
theory. 
Szelenyi (1988) draws on the circulation of elite theory, based on the study of household 
farming in Hungary. Szelenyi finds that the amount of land held by the head of the 
household or his parents before the communist came to power had a positive association 
with the income the household produced on its private land plot in 1980. He concludes that 
the emerging market in agriculture is a continuation of a long-term historical trend of 
embourgeoisement, interrupted by the communist revolution. Szelenyi further predicts 
that a new economic elite will emerge from below, from a group in disadvantageous 
positions in the communist regime. This is because people most active in private farming 
were those whose families were already acquainted with market production and who could 
draw on pre-communist memories of market culture transmitted by their families. On the 
contrary, the few who became cadres were less likely to participate in market-oriented 
private farming. 
10 
By contrast, according to the second argument (e. g., Rona-Tas, 1994; Kolankiewicz, 1996; 
Clark, 2000), during the transition from socialism to capitalism, the primary beneficiary of 
marketisation is the old elite in the centrally planned state economies. Power accumulated 
during state socialism is converted into assets of high value in a market economy. Cadres 
are at an advantage not only in starting up but also in operating companies, because they 
can transfer state assets into quasi or real ownership for business. Alternatively, they can 
use their social relations (networks) to get access to credit and valuable information. As a 
consequence, as the argument goes, cadre entrepreneurs are more successful. 
For example, it is claimed that in Hungary, being a cadre helps entrepreneurs to start their 
corporate companies and helps them to be financially successful in terms of their incomes, 
compared with the entrepreneurs with non-cadre experience (Rona-Tas, 1994). In the 
Czech Republic, the nomenklatura enterprise founders have a privileged position in tenns 
of access to scarce resources, information, knowledge and experience of other members, 
and money and other material resources that are not generally available. When lacking 
economic capital for business start-up, nomenklatura enterprise founders could use their 
contacts to sort out Communist Party property for themselves (Clark, 2000). In Poland, 
private entrepreneurs who themselves have cadre background are also reported to have an 
advantage in business. Cadres suppressed the official price at which enterprises were 
marketed and, given the shortage of capital in the country, legally purchased these 
properties at incredibly discounted prices. Ilus a substantial portion of Poland's 
productive capital fell into the hands of well-positioned insiders. Out of office, the 
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ex-cadres can still make use of their insider knowledge and personal network endowments 
as brokers among various key segments and actors of the economy (Staniszkis, 1991). 
According to Kolankiewicz (1996), in Poland, those who have a close relationship with 
cadres have the advantage, too. Nomenklatura networks are mobilised for economic gains. 
The rather sparse research on the Chinese private sector also offers two contradictory 
theses. It mostly draws on power conversion theory. According to Wank (1999), 
entrepreneurs born into cadre families, have the most supportive ties with officialdom and 
thick transaction networks. The vast resources controlled by the state were transferred to 
the primitive accumulation that stimulates business start-up, drives subsequent growth, and 
provides security. Odgaard (1992) argues that former cadres and party members seem to be 
able to evade government control and such political backgrounds matter greatly for the 
development of the largest and most profitable private enterprises. 
On the contrary, the market transition theory put forward by Nee (1989; 1991) is in the 
similar vein with Szelenyi's (1988) argument of the circulation of economic elites. Built on 
the data for Chinese private family farms from Fujian province in the 1980s, Nee claims 
that the most privileged class of state socialism, cadre, lost some of their advantages, while 
those at the bottom of the state socialism hierarchy, the direct producers, such as peasants, 
benefited. After 1977, Chinese peasants received land, their production targets were less 
strictly regulated by the government, and they were allowed to sell their products in urban 
markets. As a result they expanded their production, increased their productivity, and their 
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incomes and living standard increased. Cadres are relatively disadvantaged, as they have 
little or net advantage in entering private entrepreneurship. 
According to Nee (1989; 1991), this is the result of the reform that changes the 
mechanisms. Under the state redistributive economy, the price of labour is set 
administratively by the state, the allocation and distribution benefit cadres, since cadres, as 
redistributors, tend to favour their own. In contrast, on the market transition, as markets 
replace state redistributive mechanisms in the allocation and distribution of goods, 
producers are likely to have more power; if markets operate, there are greater incentives 
for individual effort in market transactions, while redistributive power is likely to matter 
less; then entrepreneurship becomes an alternative avenue for socio-economic mobility. 
Cadres, who are still reliant on the redistributive mechanism, become losers. 
Both theories seem to have some plausibility. On the one hand, there is evidence that 
people connected with cadre enjoy rewards. On the other hand, there is also some evidence 
that families with entrepreneurs but without cadre connections earn more income (Fligstein, 
1996, p1075). Both Rona-Tas' (1994) and (Fligstein, 1996) agree to Nee's (1989) general 
interpretation. However, Rona-Tas' (1994, p44) makes the criticism that no sociological 
theory of transition from socialism to capitalism can rely wholly on the experiences of 
agricultural petty commodity production as suggested by Szelenyi, (1988) and Nee (1989, 
1991). Another problem for Nee (1989,1991) is that he generalises conclusions to large 
populations (Fligstein, 1996, p1075). In fact both Szelenyi, with his associates (1995, 
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1996), and Nee (1991) later admit that some cadres retained their advantage. The 
continuing cadre power in China is because of partial reform, under which the institutional 
foundations of a market economy are only partially in place and cadres continue to 
redistribute resources by virtue of their positional power (Nee, 1991, p268). Power 
conversion argument is the dominant view of elites in Eastern Europe (Szelenyi and 
Szelenyi, 1995, p617). In a sense, the power conversion theory sounds more reasonable. 
Unfortunately, up to now, in the power conversion theory literature, only Rona-Tas' (1994), 
Wank (1999) and Clark (2000) have provided some empirical evidence. Thus the evidence 
supporting the power conversion theory is weak (Nee, 1996, p914). 
Clark (2000) builds his argument on five cases of nomenklatura entrepreneurs in the Czech 
Republic he interviewed with the assistance of translators. He therefore wisely 
acknowledges that the limited nature of these case studies makes it hazardous to draw very 
general conclusions and suggests that there is a need to compare nomenklatura 
entrepreneurs with those of non- nomenklatura background. Clark (2000) himself does not 
provide such a comparison. 
The only systematic empirical study is Rona-Tas' (1994) analysis of Hungarian income 
survey data collected in the spring of 1989 and 1991. Rona-Tas' (1994) distinguishes two 
private sectors in Hungary. The first is the private sector for consumer economy, which is 
operated by self-interested individuals and has existed all the time as the second economy. 
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The second is the expansive modem sector, which, by the new legal forms of 
entrepreneurship and the privatization of state property, allows private enterprises to 
accumulate capital. In the first private sector, cadres have less or no advantage. Ex-cadres 
are at an advantage in starting the second type of enterprises. 
But this does not seem to fit to the case of China. The variable 'income' used in Rona-Tas' 
(1994) analysis is measured in terms of the summed figures of primary income, secondary 
income from a second job, contracts, tips, household farming, and rental of an apartment, 
land, or equipment, and profit from a business enterprise. However, Rona-Tas (1994) 
realises himself that income of private entrepreneurs will be considerably underestimated, 
for example, to avoid income tax may be one concern of the entrepreneurs. Moreover, it 
does not supply any information about the importance of profit from business to the 
income of the entrepreneurs. Even if self-reported income is valid, there lies a question 
mark in the use of personal income to value the benefits the entrepreneurs get during 
transition. In the case of China, according to a survey, 41.4 per cent of the private 
entrepreneurs do not separate their income from enterprise profit (Hu et al., 1999). In any 
case, since 'an entrepreneur is an owner or co-owner of a company' after the Law on 
Economic Association laid the foundation for privatisation (Rona-Tas, 1994, p53), it is 
profit gains that is the interest of the entrepreneurs (Veblen, 1965). 
Another difference between China and East Europe lies in different paths of privatisation. 
In all East European countries, the privatisation of the public became state policy after 
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1989, while in China the public sector is maintained (Szelenyi and Kostello, 1996). Where 
privatisation has been more bottom-up in China, old political connections may count less 
(Rona-Tas, 1994, p64), as the similar new opportunities in Hungary provided by the 
privatisation process to buy machines or buildings and as such from state firms, of which 
individuals can take advantage, did not exist yet in China. On the contrary, as Kraus (199 1) 
finds, at the very beginning of the reform, people in private businesses were from 
peripheral groups, such as prisoners, the unemployed. 
Wank (1999, chapter 6) claims that the social backgrounds of entrepreneurs in China 
constrain the kinds of paths they operate through. He further argues that for the 
entrepreneurs born into cadre families, they could transfer the vast resources controlled by 
the state to the primitive accumulation and business start-up. They are also more successful 
in subsequent business operations. This can be true. But the ambiguous typology of cadre 
undermines his evidence and argument. As a matter of fact none of the existing research 
on the Chinese private sector has given readers a clear idea about what cadres are. Such 
research either provides an ambiguous concept of cadre or gives an arbitrary definition of 
cadre (e. g., Nee, 1989,1991; Wank, 1996,1999). 
Simultaneously, as pointed out in the previous section, this research begins with an 
analysis of national survey data on private enterprises in China. It aims to find out if the 
dominant power conversion theory is tenable in empirical data based on a clearly defined 
cadre concept. If the power conversion theory is right, the following hypotheses should 
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hold true in empirical data. 1) Backed by cadre experience or close cadre connections, the 
entrepreneurs with cadre background or close cadre social relations should be more likely 
to have much higher start-up capital. 2) The entrepreneurs with cadre background or close 
cadre social relations should appear more likely to finance their start-ups from public 
funding. So far, the test of such a hypothesis is not available. Chapter 3 is to fill such a gap. 
1.5 Social capital perspective: solving puzzles and bridging the two theories 
Fligstein (1996, p 1074) comments that the available research presents clues about what is 
happening in the post-communist societies, but their conclusions raise as many puzzles as 
answers. In fact, the power conversion theory partially explains the success of the 
entrepreneurs with cadre background or cadre connections, but largely neglects how those 
entrepreneurs without such backgrounds start, survive, develop and succeed in their 
businesses. For example, how did the China's 50 richest entrepreneurs succeed? At least 
forty of them have neither cadre background nor cadre fathers. Indeed, six of them were 
peasants when starting their businesses (Forbes, November 27,2000). Also it ignores the 
fact that some cadre entrepreneurs fail in their businesses. Szelenyi and Szelenyi (1995) in 
their comparative research on three East European countries find that on the one hand, 
some of the old elite hold the command positions of the new corporate sector in Poland and 
Hungary; on the other hand, some of the old elite lost out. For example, about half of those 
who managed the largest firms in 1988 in Hungary and Poland were out of elite positions 
by 1993. According to Hanley (2000), only a small proportion of nomenklatura members 
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in Poland have ownership of economic assets, of whom, the vast majority reported 
ownership of very small businesses. Thus, the argument that the cadre elite converted their 
old privileges into new ones is too simple (Szelenyi and Kostello, 1996, p 1093), as if there 
are few or no limits to the conversion of cadre status into economic gains (Szelenyi and 
Szelenyi, 1995, p616). 
In these contexts, this thesis attempts to contribute to the literature by examining the 
Chinese private enterprise start-ups from a social capital theory perspective. It is hoped that 
it will solve some puzzles and bridge the gap between the two apparently contradictory 
theories. Such a theory will also be a complement to the existing research. 
Figure 1.1 The simple model of power conversion theory 
Cadre entrepreneurs--lo- direct access to state resources-* business success 
'Social capital is the aggregate of the actual and potential resources that are linked to the 
possession of a durable network of relationship or mutual acquaintance and recognition' 
(Bourdieu, 1986, p248). In ordinary language, social capital is called connections 
(Bourdieu, 1993, p 160). The theory of power conversion is in the frame of social capital 
theory. Figure 1.1 shows the simple model of power conversion theory. It is partially in 
line with Bourdieu's (1986) argument, who points out that dominant social classes can use 
their privileged access to the three forms of capital, namely, economic capital, cultural 
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capital and social capital (see Chapter 5), to make strategic conversion of one kind of 
capital to another in order to solidify their class position. 
However, the argument of power conversion mainly looks at the existing cadre background 
or cadre connections but overlooks the creation of social capital. Bourdieu (1986, p249) 
has also pointed out that social capital, i. e., the existence of a network of connections, is 
not necessarily naturally given. Instead, it can be the product of investment by individuals 
who consciously or unconsciously aim at establishing or reproducing such social relations. 
Connections from cadre families and cadre experience are two channels to have social 
capital, if such connections are important and productive. The role of human agency must 
not be neglected (Wilkinson, 1996). Are there any other strategies to produce social 
capital? 
Furthermore, social capital is not always inheritable (Pahl, 1996). Social capital of the old 
order is not necessarily useful in the new order. The power conversion argument 
oversimplifies the process from social capital to economic outcomes as 'simultaneously a 
cause and an effect' (Portes, 1998, p16). Most of the research begs the question of how 
social capital is transformed into economic capital, which is indeed much more important. 
In China, guanxi, a similar term to social capital in the West, is popular, and indeed, it has 
become a means for business operation. Guanxi practice may have countervailed the 
disadvantage of lacking cadre background. When certain production factors are not 
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available, it becomes the channel to access the factors demanded. Social capital is one 
among several factors of production, along with human capital, monetary capital and 
physical and natural resources (Rose, 1997). Entrepreneurs, in particular those having been 
cadres, can access resources via cadre connections as Figure 1.1 suggested. In a transitional 
economy, if there is no other source of credit and capital, the prediction that cadres have 
preferential access to capital, which is held by government, is reasonable (Walder, 1996, 
p 1069). However, for example, many researchers have found in all socialist economies the 
second economy-the private sector always exists, even before reform (Los, 1990; Kraus, 
1991). This means that resources entrepreneurs access to for business operations are not 
necessarily in the hands of cadres. It implies that guanxi network for access to resources is 
not limited to cadre connections, on the other hand. In other words, entrepreneurs can 
resort to different types of guanxi for resources needed. These guanxi ties may include 
cadres who have control over resources. But even if cadres who control resources are not 
members of the network of an entrepreneur, the network can bridge the entrepreneur over 
to cadres, when needed. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into four parts: 
Part I looks at the background and development of private businesses in China. 
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In Part 2, a more theoretical part of the thesis, there are three chapters. Chapter 3 aims to 
test the power conversion theory. It firstly looks at the concept of cadre by examining its 
origin and usage in other communist countries and China. Tben, based on a clearly defined 
cadre concept, it analyses the unpublished 1995 national survey on private enterprises in 
China. The analysis focuses on the social backgrounds of private entrepreneurs and their 
close social relations, their business start-up capital, and the association between start-up 
and their backgrounds and their close social relations. A surprising finding is that being a 
cadre or having close cadre connections does not confer any advantage on the 
entrepreneurs in financing business start-up. It is argued that being a cadre and having 
close connections with cadres are only two of the channels producing guanxi. The 
widespread practice of guanxi has contributed to the finding in the other ways. It is argued 
that further in-depth qualitative research is needed to investigate how private entrepreneurs 
start up their businesses. 
Chapter 4 examines the concept of guanxi. The chapter reviews the available literature on 
guanxi by providing the definitions of guanxi, the functions of guanxi, the reasons of its 
emergence, the consequences and the implications of guanxi. It is found that there exist 
different types of guanxi and there are some deficiencies in the available research on 
guanxi. 
Chapter 5 explores the concept of social capital and the relationship between guanxi and 
social capital. It is argued that guand and social capital have several aspects in common 
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and that research on guanxi can overcome some deficiencies in the existing research on 
social capital and contributes greatly to the richness of the concept. 
This is followed by Part 3 with four chapters, which take the form of case studies. It 
extends the analysis on guanxi in the previous chapters. Chapter 6 describes how the case 
studies were conducted. In the vein of autobiographic methodology and self-reflection, this 
chapter explains how the field research was conducted with the help of guanxi. The nature 
of such guanxi is also explored with respect to contingency, reciprocity, obligation of social 
capital from guanxi, and social status. An argument in this chapter is that a cadre guanxi 
network does not always produce positive outcomes. It is contingent upon situations, for 
example, a change in one's social status can influence on one's social capital. Newly 
developed guanxi can also be useful. This also applies to businesspeople. 
Chapter 7 considers how the entrepreneurs in the private IT sector financed their start-ups. 
It is found that there are different channels of financing, which demonstrate different types 
of guanxi with different rules, for example, different forms of trust. Guanxi are thus not 
necessarily cadre guanxi as the power conversion theory assumes. Guanxi can be of 
different types and strengths. The finding in this chapter again points to the complexity of 
guanxi and social capital. 
Chapter 8 looks at how the private entrepreneurs found their customers at business 
start-ups. This chapter reveals that some types of guanxi or social capital come from 
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endowmentý and some from saving. If the entrepreneurs do not have guanxi at hand, they 
will establish certain guanxi, and then invest to develop and maintain guanxi. There are 
two other strategies to have guanxi: by subcontracting and linking to the elite. 
Chapter 9 concludes the research. It draws together the threads of the previous eight 
chapters. Then it discusses some research areas opened up by this research. Further, in a 
more speculative vein, it suggests that firstly, guanxi-based business practice will not 
diminish its importance in China, and secondly, the Chinese system of business does not 
seem to be in the transition to the Western model; instead, it indicates the development of 




Chapter 2 The Development of Private Enterprises 
The emergence and development of a private sector is one of the most significant outcomes 
of the reform in China over the last twenty years or so. Private business is widely 
considered the most far-reaching departure from the Communist order, with profound 
implications (Wank, 1999). The private sector has expanded beyond the marginal role 
firstly supposed, forcing changes in taxation, licensing, and regulations along the way 
(Young, 1995). Thus it is essential to look at the policy changes, operation enviromnent 
and the development of the sector, which in fact are the background of my current 
research. This chapter aims to provide a background for the thesis. It examines the policy 
development for the private economy in China, and the growth and contribution of private 
enterprises to the Chinese economy. In order to demonstrate its dynamics, comparisons 
with other sectors are also presented. 
2.1 The revival of private economy and the recognition of private enterprises 
According to Kraus (199 1), at the beginning of the 1950s after the founding of the People's 
Republic of China, there were 7.24 million independent private craftsmen, merchants and 
industrialists in the cities and towns, with about 40 million employees engaged in private 
business activities. The private sector produced more than half of China's industrial output. 
But later the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) set about systematically eliminating private 
business (the so-called nationalisation), and small-scale production and business were also 
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increasingly limited and finally annihilated. By the end of 1956, only 160,000 small-scale 
businesses remained, and the numbers continued to decline. Though there was a brief 
flurry of individual business activity following the failure of the Great Leap Forward, 
individual business was attacked by the Cultural Revolution as the "rat-tail of capitalism". 
Not until the late 1970s did reform lead to the revival of private businesses, which was 
mainly due to two reasons. 
Firstly, it was part of the reform to revitalize the ailing economy. Byrd (1992) argues that 
the emergence of the Chinese economic reform was due to pervasive inefficiency in SOES 
and the need to shift from Soviet-style extensive growth to intensive growth based on 
improved resource allocation. By 1978, China's industry was concentrated in urban areas 
and mostly owned by the state, with its output accounting for 90 per cent of the total and 
the remainder coming from collective enterprises. The private sector consisted of only 
about 150,000 individual peddlers, craft-people and repairers (Kraus, 1991). In 1978,72% 
of the overall 43.5 million industrial people worked in the state sector, 91.8% of the 
industrial sector's RMB 242.37 billion in fixed assets belonged to the state. Despite a high 
average annual growth rate of 14% for industrial output for nearly three decades, China's 
industry suffered from low efficiency levels, using obsolete technologies to produce 
unwanted products at high costs. Enterprises produced according to the plan set by the 
government, which did not consider the market demand. When a profit was certain, a 
higher cost resulted in a higher price. Enterprises simply reported costs and prices to the 
government without caring about the high costs. This led to massive waste and low 
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efficiency (Feng, 1995). 
The average productivity of capital had declined substantially: in 1957, RMB 100 worth of 
capital produced RMB 139.3 worth of industrial output, the same amount produced only 
RMB 95.5 in 1977. By 1977, the average productivity of capital had decreased about 30 
per cent. Studies also found stagnating total factor productivity (Chang and Wang, 1994). 
One possible explanation to the declining productivity is the low degree of workers' 
commitment in SOEs, as there is a strong relationship between behavioural indicators of 
worker attitudes and productivity and costs (Norsworthy and Zabala, 1990, cited in Bowles 
and Dong, 1999, p17). Workers in SOEs work at their own pace, and management 
implicitly had to negotiate with them to fulfill production targets (Chan, 1994). Similarly, 
Walder (1989) also describes how managers had to depend on workers' co-operation to get 
production going. 
Secondly, it was the result of the threat from the huge unemployment from both rural and 
urban areas. In rural areas, with the introduction of the household responsibility system, 
peasants started to diversify their economic activities, market their products, and invest in 
non-agricultural businesses. However, townships and villages lacked the resources to 
develop collective industry to employ the surplus labour released by reform. The 
household responsibility system itself is a form of private economy, which also became the 
initial stimulus to develop private economy further to absorb the huge surplus population. 
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In the urban areas, the ailing SOEs could neither absorb any more employees from the 
huge unemployment nor meet the demand of consumers, in particular numerous, varied 
and atomised goods and services. Regardless of the rural areas, in urban areas, 
unemployment became a severe problem for the government: many of the 17 million 
"educated youth" began to return, with a residue of young people who had evaded being 
sent to the rural areas, but who had no jobs; in addition, there were about 3 to 5 million 
school leavers each year who needed jobs. By 1982,7 million people were joining the 
waiting lists for jobs every year. Thus the most important motive for the government to 
allow the development of private business was the need to increase employment 
opportunities (Young, 1995). 
However, at the beginning of the revival of private economy, it was limited to individual 
economy (getihu), as the communist party emphasised that only very small, simple 
businesses would be allowable, and that these would be limited by state regulations and 
their dependence on the socialist public economy. 'Me framework envisaged in this policy 
still consisted of the traditional hierarchy of state, collective, and individual ownership, 
with state enterprises viewed as politically and economically superior, and the private 
sector intended to play a marginal role and to act as a supplement to the state and collective 
sectors. In line with these ideas, the private sector policy at the beginning of 1980s was 
aimed at allowing a limited amount of private business to take on some of the small-scale 
tasks that were difficult for the planning system to perform effectively. Private operators 
were not issued business licenses if their businesses competed with local state or collective. 
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In addition, licenses were initially restricted to people who did not have other employment 
prospects. Kraus (1991) finds that the employees in the private sector came from people 
looking for work, workers who lost their old jobs and unemployed, and pensioners. The 
unemployed comprised many different groups, mainly those who, as a result of work 
disabilities, had been eliminated from the normal work system, and former convicts, who 
had no chance of getting work in state or collective enterprises. 
The policy of promoting a limited private sector was confirmed by the State Council's 
issuing of a national regulations on urban individual economy in July 1981. The 
regulations encouraged and supported "unemployed youth" to work in fields whose 
products "were urgently needed by the masses, but which could not be supplied or only to 
a limited extent by the state or collectives". Operators were permitted to engage in 
small-scale handicrafts, retail commerce, catering, services, repairs, non-mechanised 
transport and building repairs. The regulations specified that individual economy should 
employ at most two assistants and five apprentices, "Ile activity of individual business is 
performed by one person or family. If necessary, one or two helpers may be employed with 
the approval of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. Workers with great or 
unusual technical experience may employ two or three, maximally five, apprentices" (cited 
in Kraus, 1991, p18). Later in March 1984, the government issued a decree to encourage 
engagement of individual business in rural areas, more importantly, the previous 
employment limit of two helper or five apprentices was raised to a total of seven persons. 
But all these affirmed the role of the individual economy as a "necessary supplemenf' to 
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the state and collective sectors, and placed limits on the size and scope of these businesses. 
Up to now, private economy was equal with individual economy (getihu) and it grew 
rapidly. By 1982, there were 2.63 million individual economy (getihu), with employment 
of more than 3.20 million (Kraus, 1991). 
However, the individual economy expanded production and scale, grew out of the set 
frame especially in the number of employees. Not until October 1987, did there come the 
breakthrough to full recognition for private enterprises, when the l3th Party Congress of 
the Chinese Communist Party formalised the theory of the initial stage of socialism. The 
theory claimed that economic development was the primary goal of the first phase of 
socialism, and thus capitalistic phenomena such as large private enterprises still had a 
positive role to play. Private enterprise, i. e., a privately owned enterprise hiring more than 
seven workers, was accepted for the first time. In April 1988, the revised Constitution 
legalised the existence and development of private economy, and promised state protection 
and support. 
This was followed by the Provisional Regulations on Private Enterprises issued by the 
State Council in 1988 and the Rulesfor Implementation of the Provisional Regulations on 
Private Enterprises promulgated by the State Administration of Industry and Commerce in 
1989. According to the regulation, private enterprise refers to the economic organisation, of 
which the assets belong to individuals, with more than 7 employees and run for profit 
making. By the end of 1988, China had 90,581 private enterprises (Chinaý Private 
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Economy Yearbook, 1994, p 168). Currently, the Chinese government defines three kinds of 
ownership as private enterprises. They are sole ownership, partnership, and a limited 
liability company. 
The status of the private enterprises was given further recognition in November 1993, 
when the Chinese Communist Party held the third plenary session of the l4d' Central 
Committee and officially declared that it was aiming for a market economy (for some years 
the official phrase had been "commodity economy"), albeit a socialist market economy. 
The government regarded the private sector as "an important economic force in developing 
new productive forces" and an integral part of "socialism with Chinese characteristics". 
Then came the greatest change in the government attitude to private ownership in 1997, 
when the 15d' Chinese Communist Party Congress announced the private enterprises as an 
important component of the economy and allowed the sales of state owned enterprises to 
the private sector. Private ownership was amended in the constitution in 1999. 
The gradual recognition of private enterprises and private ownership involves changes in 
institutions and policies. It also reflects the gradual and flexible approach of reform in 
China (Walder, 1995). Also, reform in China has taken place alongside with a strong 
continuity in fundamental ideologies and values (Brunn, 1993). This may be the so-called 
socialism with Chinese characteristics. But with the legalisation. of private property right, it 
is indeed a form of capitalism with Chinese characteristics. 
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2.2 The rapid development of private enterprises 
As it was pointed out previously, private enterprise is the most dynamic component of 
China's economy. The rapid development of private enterprises is seen not only with 
respect to the number of firms, registered capital and employment but also with respect to 
output and their contribution to retail trade and industrial and commercial tax. The changes 
since the formal recognition of private enterprises are shown as follows. 
2.2.1. Growing number of private enterprises 
The development of private enterprises is reflected in the growing number of private 
enterprises. Table 2.1 shows the development of private enterprise and compares the 
development with other ownerships. The number of private enterprises amounted to more 
than 1.2 million in 1998, which is 13 times of the number in 1989. Between 1989 and 1998, 
the number of private enterprises grew at an average annual rate of 33.3 per cent, while the 
growth rates for SOEs, TVEs, and FDI were 5.4 per cent, 0.3 per cent and 34.4 per cent 
respectively. Though the average growth rate of private enterprises was a bit lower than 
that of FDI, it was much higher than those of SOEs and TVES. More importantly, while 
the numbers of SOEs, TVEs, and FDI started to decrease from 1996 and 1997, private 
enterprises are still on the tendency of growing. The trend is better shown in Figure 2.1. 
After the 1992 Southern Tour of Deng Xiaoping, the senior leader, who advocated a bolder 
reform progress, the Chinese economy boomed soon and every sector grew rapidly. 
However, with the outbreak of Asian financial crisis in 1997, the numbers of enterprises in 
the three sectors except the domestic private enterprises declined. 
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Table 2.1 Numbers of enterprises by ownership during 1989-1998 















1989 90.6 1146.9 3829.6 15.9 
1990 98.1 8.35 1151.5 0.4 3381.9 -11.7 25.4 59.5 
1991 107.8 9.89 1253.7 8.9 3480.0 2.9 37.2 46.6 
1992 139.6 29.5 1547.2 23.4 4159.4 19.5 84.4 126.7 
1993 237.9 70.4 1951.7 26.1 5156.5 24.0 167.5 98.5 
1994 432.2 81.7 2166.3 11.0 5456.8 5.8 206.1 23.0 
1995 654.5 51.4 2218.6 2.4 5337.7 -2.2 233.6 13.3 
1996 819.3 25.2 2163.3 -2.5 5013.4 -6.1 240.4 2.9 
1997 960.7 17.3 2078.3 -3.9 4470.5 -10.8 235.7 -2.0 
1998 1200.1 25.0 1836.3 -11.7 3736.4 -16.4 227.8 -3.3 
average 33.3 5.4 0.3 34.4 
Source: China Statistical Yearhook, 1989-1998; Statistical Documents ofChina Industry and Commerce Management, 
1991-1998 
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2.2.2. Increasing registered capital 
Increasing registered capital is another indicator of the growth of private enterprises. The 
changes in registered capital for private enterprises and the comparison with other 
ownerships are demonstrated in Table 2.2. In 1989, the total registered capital in private 
enterprises was RMB 8.4 billion. Ten years later in 1998, it grew more than 85 times to 
RMB 719.8 billion. The average annual growth rate was 64 per cent. During the same 
period, the average annual growth rates for SOEs, TVEs and FDI were 12.9 per cent, 11.6 
per cent, and 36.9 per cent respectively. The average annual growth in pnvate enterprises 
in terms of registered capital was much higher than in other ownerships. 
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Table 2.2 Total registered capital for enterprises by ownership during 1989-1998 















1989 8.4 1123.2 565.3 27.6 
1990 9.5 13.1 1192.5 6.2 544.4 -3.7 33.0 19.8 
1991 12.3 29.5 1368.3 14.8 577.1 6.0 44.7 35.2 
1992 22.1 79.7 1794.8 31.2 824.2 42.9 116.0 159.7 
1993 68.1 208.1 2546.2 41.9 1322.6 60.5 245.6 111.8 
1994 144.8 112.6 2886.9 13.4 1576.8 19.2 312.3 27.1 
1995 262.2 81.1 3166.4 9.7 1623.1 2.9 399.1 27.8 
1996 375.2 43.1 3284.4 3.7 1726.5 6.4 441.5 10.6 
1997 514.0 37.0 3629.4 10.4 1624.4 -5.9 459.8 4.1 




64.0 13.0 11.7 36.9 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1989-1998; Statistical Documents of China Industry and Commerce Management, 
1991-1998 
Meanwhile, the average registered capital for a private enterprise increased very fast, 
which demonstrates the expanded economic scale for them. From 1989 to 1998, the 
average registered capital for a private enterprise grew from RMB 92.7 thousand to RMB 
599.3 thousand, at average annual growth rate of 23 per cent, compared with 7.6 per cent 
for SOEs, 11.9 per cent for TVEs, and 1.9 per cent for FDI (Table 2.3). The average 
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registered capital for FDI seems stagnant, as FDI declined sharply in both 1990 and 
199 1 after the political event in 1989. 
Table 2.3 Average registered capital for an enterprise by ownership during 1989-1998 
year private State owned Collective Foreign owned 
Reg. capital 
(RMBI, 000) 











1989 92.7 979.3 147.6 1733.1 
1990 96.8 4.4 1035.6 5.8 161.0 9.1 1301.4 -24.9 
1991 114.1 17.8 1091.4 5.4 165.8 3.0 1200.1 -7.8 
1992 158.3 38.8 1160.0 6.3 198.2 19.5 1374.7 14.6 
1993 286.2 80.8 1304.6 12.5 256.5 29.5 1466.4 6.7 
1994 335.0 17.0 1332.6 2.2 289.0 12.7 1515.2 3.3 
1995 400.6 19.6 1427.2 7.1 304.1 5.2 1708.8 12.8 
1996 458.0 14.3 1518.2 6.4 344.4 13.3 1836.1 7.5 
1997 535.0 16.8 1744.1 15.0 363.4 5.5 1951.1 6.3 
1998 599.3 12.0 1899.5 8.9 404.8 11.4 2051.2 5.1 
Average 
growth 
23.0 7.6 11.9 1.9 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1989-1998; Statistical Documents of China Industry and Commerce Management, 
1991-1998 
2.2.3. Employment in private enterprises 
More and more employment in private enterprises is another important indicator. In 1998, 
private enterprises had over 171 million employees. The figure was not significant 
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compared that of SOEs and TVEs, but it was higher than that of FDI, 2.9 million, in the 
same year. It is noted that real number of employees in private enterprises should be 
bigger, since many private enterprises are operated under the guise of SOEs or TVEs (it is 
termed "wearing red haf 9)3 , and there are considerable numbers of 
individual economy 
(getihu) having more than 7 employees but not registered as private enterprises. 
From 1989 to 1998, the employees in private enterprises rose to 171 million, more than 10 
times of 1.6 million in 1989. In other words, the employment in private enterprises 
increased 29.8 per cent every year. This was higher than the average annual growth rate of 
22.6 per cent for FDI, and contrasted sharply against the negative average annual growth 
rate of -0.01 per cent for SOEs and -0.06 per cent for TVEs (Table 2.4). Workers in SOEs 
3 Based on a survey of 475 private enterprises in a county, Jia ct al. (1994) find that there were many 
preferred policies if a private enterprise could succeed in registering as a collective enterprise. 
1) More bank loans. The maximum bank loan a private firm could be granted was 15 thousand yuan; 
while that for a collective firm could be several hundred thousand Yuan; 
2) Lower interest rate. The highest bank interest rate for private firms was 11.52 per cent; while the 
interest rate set for collective firms was only 6.6 per cent, and 6.3 per cent if the loan was under 
certain limit amount. 
3) Free administration fees. Private enterprises had to pay Industry and Commerce Bureau 2 per cent of 
administration fees, while collective firms were not charged. 
4) Favoured tax. Private firms paid tax at a ten-scale-accumulated-value-added system, while 
collective firms paid at an eight-scale system, which was lower. 
5) Other preferences. Collective firms were exempted from product tax in the first year of business 
start up and from gain tax in the first two years. The policy did not apply to private firms. While 
private had to pay membership fees to the association of private entrepreneurs, etc. 
Similarly, in Fushan county of Guangdong province, where private economy is active, private sector was in 
unfavored position. A private enterprise had to pay 3 per cent of its turnover and another 3 per cent of its gain 
as tax, while a collective firm only paid a tax of I per cent of its turnover. 
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and collective TVEs started to be made redundant with the reform in labour. Also, many 
private enterprises under the guise of collective firms took off their "red hats" and 
registered as private ownership when private entrepreneurs were assured of private 
property right by the Chinese senior leader Deng Yiaoping's speech in 1992. Thus, the 
employment in both state and collective firms grew slowly or negatively. 
Table 2.4 The izrowth in emDlovment bv ownershiD duriniz 1989-1998 
year Private (%) State Collective (%) Foreign Total 
1989 
1990 3.7 2.4 1.3 40.4 15.5 
1991 8.2 3.1 2.2 150.0 1.4 
1992 26.1 2.1 -0.2 33.9 1.2 
1993 60.9 0.3 -6.3 30.3 1.3 
1994 73.7 2.7 -3.2 -32.3 1.3 
1995 47.3 0.4 4.2 23.6 1.1 
1996 22.5 -0.2 -4.2 14.1 1.3 
1997 15.3 -1.8 -4.4 9.1 1.1 _ 1998 26.7 -18.0 -31.2 -2.3 0.5 _ 
_Average 
29.7 -0.01 -0.06 22.6 2.6 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1989-1998; Statistical Documents of China Industry and Commerce Management, 
1991-1998 
More importantly, the private sector has increasingly provided employment opportunities 
for the workers laid-off from the SOEs. For example, according to Homeway Financial 
News (January 5,2000), in 1999, an average of 4,000 workers made redundant by SOEs 
joined the workforce in the private sector every day. 
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2.2.4. Growth in output and retail trade 
The rapid development of private enterprises is also indicated by the growth in output 
and retail trade. From Table 2.5 and Figure 2.2, it can be seen that the output and retail 
trade of private enterprises grew rapidly between 1989 and 1998. In 1989, the output of 
private enterprises valued RMB 9.7 billion, and grew on average 51.9 per cent a year 
provided price factor considered, amounting to RMB 585.3 billion. During the same 
period, the retail trade of private enterprises grew from RMB 3.4 billion to RMB 305.9 
billion at average annual rate of 57.2 per cent. 
Table 2.5 Growth in output and retail trade of private firms during 1989-1998 








1989 9.7 3.4 
1990 12.2 23.7 4.3 23.4 
1991 14.7 17.6 5.7 29.2 
1992 20.5 34.1 9.1 53.3 
1993 42.2 92.7 19.0 94.1 
1994 114.0 148.4 51.3 145.9 
1995 229.5 86.5 100.6 79.0 
1996 322.7 34.5 145.9 36.7 
1997 392.3 20.8 185.5 24.3 
1998 585.3 51.8 305.9 65.7 
Average growth 51.9 57.2 
Source: Statistical Documents of China Indusfty and Commerce Management, 1991-1998 
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Figure 2.2 Growth in output & retail of private firms 
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2.2.5. The contribution in industrial and commercial tax 
The rapid development of private enterprises is also reflected by the growth of the 
industrial and commercial tax they contributed. Table 2.6 gives the details of the growth in 
industrial and commercial tax for private enterprises and the comparison with other 
ownerships. Starting from low base of RMB 0.11 billion contribution of industrial and 
commercial tax in 1989, private enterprises provided RMB 9.05 billion in 1997. Although 
the amount itself was still small, the average annual growth rate of 73.2 per cent was much 
higher than those of SOEs and TVEs. 
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Table 2.6 Growth in industrial and commercial tax by ownership during 1989-1998 

















1989 0.11 11.96 127.85 43.13 
1990 0.20 78.6 13.20 10.3 134.92 5.5 42.68 -1.0 
1991 0.34 69.0 15.08 14.2 144.70 7.3 44.11 3.3 
1992 0.46 34.6 17.66 17.2 155.92 7.8 47.81 8.4 
1993 1.05 129.9 31.50 78.2 252.24 61.9 83.71 75.1 
1994 1.75 67.5 36.04 14.5 298.10 18.1 81.10 -3.1 
1995 3.56 103.1 40.13 11.3 329.48 10.5 96.94 19.5 
1996 6.02 69.2 39.78 -0.9 1 
295.93 -10.2 99.60 2.7 
1997 9.05 50.2 46.05 15.7 386.49 30.6 105.23 5.7 
Average 
growth 
73.2 60.8 14.8 11.8 
Source: China Tax Yearbook, 1990-1998 
All the above have demonstrated the rapid development of private enterprises. They have 
also proved the contribution of private enterprises to the Chinese economy. The importance 
of private enterprises is more clearly reflected in the following facts. Firstly, while the 
SOEs, TVEs, and FDI have stagnated (e. g., Warner, 1995; World Bank, 1997; Cauley et aL, 
1999; Chinaonline, 31 May 2000), domestic private enterprises continue to grow rapidly. 
The private sector has become the main engine of Chinese economic growth (Financial 
Times, 20 July 1998; China News Digest, 23 March 1998; South China Morning Post, 19 
March 1998). Secondly, the performance of private enterprises has been a main catalyst for 
SOE reform. The Chinese government have addressed the enterprise reform in terms of 
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property rights and ownership, which opened the door for the transformation of SOEs. A 
survey (People ý Daily, 30 July 1998) shows that 62 per cent of private entrepreneurs are 
eager to buy SOEs to expand their scale of production and economy. Thirdly, all levels of 
government have started to abandon discrimination against the private sector, allow 
individual and private economy to compete fairly and develop together with state owned 
and collective economy, and they have also initiated many policies designed to foster the 
growth of private economy. (China News Service, 8 December 2000). In addition, the 
government will allow private enterprises to enter most industries that used to be 
controlled by the SOEs. This produces many new opportunities for private enterprises 
(China Securities, 12 November 2000). Definitely, the output value of private sector is 
becoming larger and larger, and the role of this sector is becoming more and more 
important. 
2.3 Obstacles to the development of private enterprises 
The development of private enterprises is a history of struggle-to overcome opposition 
and obstruction, survive and grow. Since the promotion of private economy conflicts with 
the ideology of communism, the growth of the sector was not easy. The barriers come from 
discrimination from both people and government. 
Firstly, people were hostile to private enterprises. The attitude of people may derive from 
the marginal status of the sector itself in the hierarchical ownership structure, where state 
comes first, collective second, and the private goes no where (Lin and Bian, 1991, p658). 
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The initial composition of private business people from marginal social groups, including 
former prisoners, was another factor contributing to the low social status. Kraus (1991) 
argues that the hostility to private enterprises was due to not only traditional social 
hierarchies and political prejudice but also envy of the wealth of the private business 
people. 
Secondly, there are restrictions imposed by the government. The size and business scope of 
an enterprise were controlled by the goverment. Private business was not allowed to 
compete with collective and state owned enterprises. In the planned economy, business 
premises, labour, raw materials, energy, etc., were allocated by government, private 
enterprises, excluded from the plan, often found it difficult to obtain these resources (Kraus, 
1991; Young, 1995; Wank, 1999). Local government officials often used their control over 
key inputs as leverage over private enterprises, and also they could block licenses or 
approvals, cut off access to credit, and add new restrictions on private enterprises' 
activities (Odgaard, 1992). Moreover, when the government carried out austerity policies, 
private enterprises were always the target. It was estimated that 15 per cent of private 
businesses (including individual economy) were driven out of business in 1989 alone 
(China Daily, February 28,199 1). 
Thirdly, exorbitant levies and sundry taxes become burdens to the private enterprises, 
which are regarded a source of government revenues rather than explicit taxes (II and Rose, 
1998). These charges are numerous. According to Bruun (1993, p260) there were all 
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together 20 charges levied on one private restaurant in Chengdu city: industrial and 
commercial tax, income tax, city reconstruction charge, education charge, city grain fund, 
provincial grain fund, meat fund, management charge, business administration charge, 
revenue stamp tax, public order charge, sanitation charge, energy source fund, 
front-door-cleanliness-guarantees, clean transportation charge, association membership fee, 
employees' contract charge, and excessive signpost charge. Odgaard (1992) only finds only 
two of the dozens of charges on private shops, the income tax and the industrial and 
commercial tax, were imposed by the central government. Many charges are levied by the 
discretion of local governments. 
Fourthly, private enterprises' start-up and capacity for survival and growth are constrained 
by lack of capital! In the West, capital becomes manageable when an enterprise develops 
to certain stage. However, in China, capital is not easy to access for the private enterprises 
at any stage of growth. According to David Machenzie, chief of mission for the 
International Finance Corporation's China operation, the major restriction for the 
development of private enterprises is a lack of efficient funding channels. Liu Yong Hao, 
vice chairman of All China Industry and Commerce Federation, who also runs China's 
largest feed producer the New Hope Group, confirmed that many private enterprises have 
difficulties getting funds from banks; 4. The state commercial banks are usually reluctant to 
4 In June 1999, the Industrial and Commercial Bank, China's biggest lender, reported that 21% of its loans 
were held by non-state enterprises. But the majority of this was lent to collective and foreign-invested firms. 
Individually owned and private enterprises shared a minute 0.5% of the funds. Credit managers at the big 
four state-run commercial banks are still pressured by the government to lend to SOEs. When they do lend to 
private f irms, it is only for the safest projects (the Economist Intelligence Unit, 21 September 2000). 
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lend to private businesses out of concern about their trustworthiness and repayment 
capability. Fang Haixing, general manager of the Group Co-ordination Committee of 
China Construction Bank, also admitted that China's banking sector lacks a fier of 
institutions offering loans for projects in the private sector, on which commercial banks do 
not want to take the risk. He thus suggested that real private owned banks become a key to 
the solution, "Only they can understand the real need of the private enterprises" (AFX, 27 
April 1999; China Daily, 2 May 1999). Even in one of the major cradles of private 
economy, Zhejiang Province, private enterprises are still facing difficulties in financing. 
The chairman of a private group corporation remarked, the lack of a high-technology risk 
fund has become a big obstacle to the drive for private enterprises to step in the 
high-technology industries, because such a risk fund for non-state enterprises exists 
nowhere in China (China Daily, 20 December 1998). 
Walder (1991) points out that state banks and official sources of credit generally offer 
loans more on the basis of political consideration than economic ones. Private enterprises 
lack the legitimacy and necessary political backing to enjoy reliable access to capital and 
thus must depend on private and informal sources of credits, which are limited and are 
available only at substantially higher interest rates. 
Although foreign investors, including venture capital investors, have become increasingly 
interested in the prospects of private enterprises, not until September 1998, did the 
International Financial Company, a World Bank member, become the first foreign investor 
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who provided the first loan of US$6.5 million to a Chinese private company (China 
Reform News, II September 1998). It was the first time that private enterprises were 
allowed to attend the China Fair for International Investment and Trade held in September 
1999. However, "(Although) the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation 
(in charge of the fair) has not set down any explicit discriminatory policies against private 
businesses regarding their co-operation with foreign investors, private companies have 
received unequal treatment in the actual implementation of the foreign investment policy", 
claimed Maochun He, deputy director of the World Trade Research Department of the 
Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Co-operation (China Daily, II 
April 1999). 
Another important capital source is the stock markee. In the market economies, stock 
markets work as a mechanism to allow capital raised for enterprises and a more rational 
allocation of resources. They channel savings to their most efficient users and act as a 
pressure for raising firm efficiency. However, according to Dong (1999), China's stock 
markets have another important function, that is, serving SOEs reform. Bowles and White 
(I 992a, 1992b) find that in China, bonds and shares have functioned as one instrument in a 
complex struggle for resources between political, institutional and economic actors. 
Meanwhile, share issues have in the event been economically unimportant but political 
important, because they challenge the ideological and institutional underpinnings of a 
"socialist" economy-ownership. Predictably, most companies listed in the Chinese stock 
s China opened its first bourse in Shanghai in December 1990. 
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markets are state owned and few are non-public. Dong (1999) therefore advocates that 
more private enterprises should be treated equally without discrimination and allowed to 
enter stock markets. 
China has yet to enact any laws to help finance the private sector, though according to 
China Security News (23 January 1999), the Financial and Economic Committee under 
China's legislature the National People's Congress (NPC) has planned to submit a draft 
private enterprise and investment laws to the NPC. The ministry of Finance has begun to 
draft measures to require local government to set aside part of their budgets as financial 
guarantees for loans extended to the enterprises in private sector (China Daily, 2 May 
1999), but the aftermath has not yet been seen. 6 
In sum, all these reflect the difficult conditions for the private sector. As a strategy to 
outweigh these disadvantages, private entrepreneurs were forced to operate their business 
under the guise of collective or state enterprises. A survey conducted by the State Industry 
and Commerce Bureau reveals that 80 per cent of TVEs were in fact private enterprises 
(China ý Private Economy Yearbook, 1996). Also, many private entrepreneurs are forced to 
6 According to South China Morning Post (24 July 1999), by May 1999, about 18 provinces and regions had 
tried the experiment of establishing a credit-guarantee system, but the aim was quoted as "to help small and 
medium-sized enterprises solve their financial difficulties", instead of private businesses. In terms of size, 
most of the private enterprises are small and medium. However, compared with the huge number of the 
dominated publicly owned enterprises, they are "small ethnic minorities ". 
People's Daily (16 June 1999) seemed to try to propagate such cases that supported private businesses. It 
reported a magic result of financial injection to a private firm: in April 1999, Fuan City set up the first 
credit-guarantee company in Fujian Province to help private enterprises. In two months, it helped 24 
funding-hungered private enterprises to borrow loans from commercial banks. With loan backing, one private 
company's monthly output doubled. 
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cultivate personal connections (guanxi) with government officials or state owned 
enterprises managers for favours. To maintain such connections, the private entrepreneurs 
have to pay good prices and gifts, and sometimes, even commissions and bribes (Young, 
1995; Wank, 1999, Zhu, 1998; Tho and Zhu, 2001). 
2.4 Cadres have advantages in private enterprise start-up? 
As pointed out in the aforementioned chapter, it is open to question whether being a cadre 
provides advantage in private business operation. Some argue that being a cadre helps 
entrepreneurs to start their businesses in East Europe (Staniszkis, 1991; Rona-Tas, 1994; 
Clark, 2000). But some oppose this argument (e. g., Hanley, 2000). It is impossible for this 
limited research to examine every aspects listed above. This research looks at the most 
critical stage of business operation, start-up. 
Private enterprises largely started their economic activities as individual or family firms 
(getihU)7, which were operated by those in disadvantageous positions, such as those 
eliminated from the normal work system (Kraus, 1991). Also, more and more private 
enterprises are being registered as such at start-up, after the legal status was granted to 
private enterprises, in particular after Deng Yjaoping's Southern Tour in 1992. People 
7 As a result of adjusting to the market and of their growth, the firms have advanced to a point where more than seven 
workers were required to fulfil production goals. Some families, so called specialised households (zhuanyehu), were 
indeed private non-agricultural businesses and extended far beyond the scope previously supposed possible for private 
economic activity. According to a survey conducted in 1984 by the Rural Development Research Centre under the State 
Council, 0.07 per cent of the investigated households had already hired more than seven workers (cited in Zhang and 
Ming, 1999, p234). It was estimated that by the end of 1988, there were about 500,000 individual economy (getihu) 
that could be counted as private enterprises (Zhang and Liu, 1995, p55). 
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continue to invest their savings, say, from moonlighting, or borrow money from friends, 
relatives, to set up their own firms. In 2000, there were 295,300 new private enterprises, 
which means an average of 809 new private enterprises every day in the country (China 
Business Times, 30 March 200 1). 
Legal leasing 8 of public owned enterprises has led to the asset accumulation of 
individuals. In some areas, 50 per cent of the total collective firms were leased to 
individuals (Zhang and Liu, 1995, p29). 
According to some research, the start-up capital of private enterprises derives from public 
assets. For example, some private entrepreneurs who were born in cadre families, their 
business start-ups were financed by public funds, either by bank loans from state banks or 
as money from public units (Wank, 1999). A state owned firm manager is more than 
pleased to take bribes from non-state trade partner in exchange for enforcement of contract 
between the two parties (Tao and Zhu, 2000,2001). Also, the dual price system 9 
introduced in the early 1980s provided a new way for corrupt officials to milk state 
property. These "personal savings" became the start-up capital. This can be true in the 
9 According to Shen et al (1996), there are three types for leasing collective firms: total capital leasing, partial capital 
leasing and intangible capital leasing. In the last category, a collective firm only "leases" its intangible capital, such as 
firm title, business license, and credit. One collective firm leased its trademark for an annual payment of RMB 10 
thousand. 
9 The gradual Chinese strategy for moving from economic planning to a market system, which includes 1) 
opening the free market while keeping state supply unchanged at the (lower) plan price; 2) adjusting the plan 
price incrementally over time to approach the market price. The supply offered at the plan prices is normally 
fixed by quota, if not reduced, over time. 
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beginning of reform, given the absence of a well-built legal system preventing public 
assets from going to private pockets. 
In fact, how private entrepreneurs start up their business is not the main concern of the 
existing research. However, putting these accounts together, we have some ideas about 
different paths to start-up private enterprises. From the sparse research mainly based on 
small case studies, it is still ambiguous who these people are and how they start up their 
businesses, in particular whether being a cadre makes the advantage in start-up. To fill this 
deficiency, the next chapter will analyse a large national survey data on China's private 
enterprises in 1995. It will focus on how private entrepreneurs with different backgrounds 
financed their business start-ups and whether there are differences between entrepreneurs 
with and without cadre background in terms of business start-up capital and the main 
sources of their start-up capital. 
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Part 2 Theories 
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Chapter 3 The advantage of being a cadre or having close cadre connections 
in financing business start-up? A survey analysis on China's private enterprises 
This chapter tests the dominant theory of power conversion suggested by some social 
scientists presented in Chapter 1. Firstly, it examines the concept of cadre in China and 
gives a clear definition of cadre in this research for the purpose of analysis. Then, based on 
a national survey data set on the Chinese private sector, the social background of the 
entrepreneurs, their social relations, start-up finance and the main sources of start-up 
finance are examined. In order to find out whether being a cadre or having close cadre 
connections has any advantage at business start-up, the association between the 
entrepreneurs' background and their start-up finance is explored. Lastly, this chapter offers 
some explanations for the finding. 
3.1 What are cadre and nomenklatura? 
According to the available research on post-conununist societies presented in Chapter 1, 
the social background and social relations of private entrepreneurs are paramount to the 
success of their business operation. Backed by cadre experience or cadre family 
background, their businesses tend to be more successfid. Before going into further 
investigation, one key question must be answered: What are cadre and nomenklatura? 
Clark (2000) confines his informants to nomenklatura, but he does not provide a clear 
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definition of nomenklatura. Instead, he describes what positions the five informants held 
before the communist regime collapsed. To Clark's (2000, p441) understanding, 
nomenklatura is another term for cadre, which can refer to a very high position, such as a 
member of the Politburo in Prague in the late 19 80s, and also to a low position as "a junior 
Party member in a middle management position organising holidays and outings for 
colleagues". To Rona-Tas (1994, p53), the category of former cadre in Hungary includes 
not only someone at the very top of the communist hierarchy but also everyone who 
formerly joined the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party and reached some position of 
power. Similarly, Hanley (2000, p145) labels cadres in Eastern Europe as individuals who 
occupied positions of administrative authority during the state-socialist period. 
Gazso (1992, p77) defines nomenklatura as persons in leading positions, related to the 
uppermost circle of the party elite, or the main possessors of political power--the executive, 
the mass organisations and the economic administration. Based on the data from the 
Hungarian National Statistics Office, the term applies to cadres ranged from central to 
capital city to county level. To Hanley (2000, p145), "nomenklatura lists" for the 
communist parties in Eastern Europe consisted of those positions that required approval by 
the central Committee before they could be filled. 
Harasymiw (cited in Manion, 1985, p215) gives a broader concept of nomenklature and 
argues that the Russian term nomenklatura means a list of positions, arranged in order of 
seniority, including a description of the duties of each office. It generally refers to the lists 
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of offices controlled by the various communist party committees. In the glossary of the 
Soviet Union, the Library of Congress (1997) gives the definition of nomenklature as 
follows: 
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union's system of appointing key personnel in the government 
and other important organizations, based on lists of critical positions and people in political favour. 
It also refers to the individuals included on these lists. 
While in the glossary of Hungary, the Library of Congress (1997) slightly changes the 
definition of nomenklatura as 
From the Latin nomenclature. This Russian word denotes an enumeration of important 
positions and the candidates who are examined, recommended, and assigned to fill them by 
connnunist party conuyýttees at various levels. 
Therefore in the aforementioned research, nomenklatura commonly refers to individuals in 
leading positions of the communist regimes. In other words, leading cadres are 
nomenklatura. 
Unlike the common understanding of cadre and nomenklatura in Eastern Europe, cadre in 
China is a confusing term. Probably because of the ambiguity of the term, the research on 
China's private sector does not give a clear definition what the cadres are. Nee (1989,199 1) 
does not provide the definition of cadre in his analysis on the survey data on private family 
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farms in Fujian province in China. Wank (1996) does not clarify what cadre is, either. Then, 
Wank (1999, p117) uses a term "functionaries" to categorise persons previously employed 
in public units in white-collar positions, as if this referred to cadres, which is not 
appropriate. When describing the entrepreneurs' fathers' occupations, quite unbelievably, 
he even counts officials of Kuomingtang (the Chinese communist enemy) in cadre category. 
Perhaps confused by the term, though Odgaard (1992) mentions that cadre category in 
China is very broad, he does not give a definition for cadre. 
Apart from the aforesaid research, many researchers do not define explicitly what cadres 
are or who cadres are when researching China (e. g., Seymour, 1989). Indeed, cadre is a 
very broad term used in China. It is sometimes understood as a social class. For example, 
according to Li et al. (199 1), in China's social structure, cadres are the leading class in the 
social hierarchy, followed by workers and peasants, with peasants on the bottom. Under 
the Chinese communist regime, the social classes are stratified through three major 
systems: the household registration (hukou) systemlo, the unit (danwei) system", and the 
10 The Hukou (household) registration system originally came from political and social control, as a critical Chinese 
communists' response to dilemmas inherent in China's development strategy under condition of labour surplus and 
capital shortage in a predominantly agrarian society in the 1950s. It divides the whole population into two statuses: urban 
resident and rural resident. Urban residents are the state's direct responsibility. The state must supply urban area with 
employment, housing, food, transportation, medical facilities, schools and many other essentials and amenities of life 
(e. g., Cheng and Selden, 1994; Lu, 1993). The Chinese government has been reforming the system. 
11 A work unit is called a danwei in Chinese. Whether it be a government department, factory, research 
institute, or university, the work unit is a microcosm of the Chinese society with its own political hierarchy, 
networks of personal and professional relationships, services, and, in many cases, living quarters. Together 
with the Hukou system, the danwei system came into being since 1950s as a social control mechanism. It is 
through the work unit that the Chinese govermnent exerts its influence on the life of the individual, for it is 
the unit issuing the identification card that marks the bearer as a working member of Chinese society. The 
unit provide social benefits, such as medical care, and housing (e. g., Lu, 1993). Not until recent years, were 
the necessities of daily life for a person provided by a unit he or she works. 
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hierarchical administrative ranking (jibie) system. The state has the mandatory power of 
distribution of resources and social positions, which determine the three classes, cadre, 
worker and peasant. 
On the other hand, cadre is also defined as someone in certain leading positions. For 
example, Bums (1985) counts all members of basic-level leadership organisations as local 
cadres. The basic-level leadership organisations include commune (gongshe) or township, 
brigade (shengchan dadui) or village (cun) management committees, the party branches, 
the village and party assemblies, and also production team (shengchan dui) management 
committees. Each basic-level leadership organisation, consisted of a hierarchy of authority 
extending from commune leaders to production team officials, could have numbered four 
to five hundred members. In his revised paper, Nee (1996, p922-923) defines cadre as 
holding positional power in local government. All the various ranks of cadres comprising 
the local administrative elite, from county level officials down to cadres in the natural 
village, are cadres. 
Cadre is termed ganbu 12 in Chinese. According to Vogel (1967), in China, cadres firstly 
12 According to Strauss (1999), some state that ganbu came into Chinese via the Japanese term kanbu (a 
word in which the kanji is identical to the Chinese characters); while a number of other sources, insist that 
the term came into China through the Soviet Union. However, all sources agree that the word ganbu 
originates with the French cadre, since the Japanese term kanbu, in turn, had its origins in the French "cadre". 
In Russian, the term "cadre" connotes "core group" and also "personnel" in the general plural as opposed to 
an individual. The Library of Congress (1997) defines cadre as 
Organized group of party activists. A party member who holds a responsible position (usually 
administrative) in either the party or the government apparatus. In a more restricted sense, a person 
who has been fully indoctrinated in party ideology and methods and uses this training in his or her 
work. 
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emerged in the Guomingtang of Sun Yat-sen in the early 1920s. In the communist 
revolutionary movement, the new type of leader, the ascetic, fearless and disciplined 
fighter-ideologue, came into its own. A cadre was not an ordinary peasant or worker, but a 
leader who committed to the cause of communist revolution and moved among the masses 
to build a revolutionary organisation. When the Chinese communists succeeded and took 
over power, the role of cadres began to undergo a fundamental change in order to cope 
with the many complex administrative matters conftonting the nation, which required 
literacy and administrative skills other than fearlessness and bravery. Administrators, 
scientists, technicians and other specialists joined the cadre contingent. The cadre became a 
bureaucrat. Prior to 1949, all cadres had been communist party members. However, after 
1949, many government cadres were neither party members nor Youth League members. 
Cadres are recruited from several channels in China. Firstly, cadres currently available can 
be re-assigned, who are either army men transferred to civilian work, or graduates of 
universities, colleges, and technical secondary schools. Secondly, workers in state owned 
or collectively owned enterprises can be chosen as cadres. Thirdly, people from society at 
large can also have the opportunity to be recruited, but the opportunities are confined to 
those who are mainly urban educated youth, unemployed specialised and technical 
persons, and people with skills acquired through study on their own. The main criteria are 
loyalty to the communist party, the education background of a senior secondary school 
graduate or above, and being around twenty-five years old of age (Manion, 1984). 
The Chinese Communist leadership began to standardize the term around a much broader set of connotations 
than existed in Russian in the late 1930s and early 1940s. 
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Thus in China, the broadly used term cadre carries two different meanings. One cadre 
concept encompasses all personnel with authority or expertise in Party, state, army, or 
units of economic production, be they Party members or not (Strauss, 1999). Cadres 
considered on this basis include the following personnel in government, Party, business 
enterprises and service establishments: (1) employees from clerical personnel and above 
(including platoon chief and above among policemen and firemen; non-labouring foremen 
and above in industry, building, installation and construction work; and shift chief and 
above in postal and telecommunications work); (2) industrial technicians; (3) 
agro-technicians; (4) technicians working on the seas; (5) public health technicians of 
middle level and above; (6) scientific technicians; (7) news and publishing personnel; (8) 
teaching personnel; (9) personnel in culture and the arts; and (10) translators (China 
Labour Statistical Work Handbook, 1958, cited in Vogel, 1967, p50). 
In this version of the cadre concept, the term cadre is mainly understood as experience or 
social status. It covers occupations in government organisation, the communist party and 
other organisations, as well as people who work as administrator and management in state 
entities. 
This version of the cadre concept may not be a good variable to indicate advantageous 
social position, as it does not give inforniation about the power of different positions in the 
hierarchy, neither does it provide any information in the power of allocating resources. The 
broad usage of cadre to describe the social origin of the entrepreneurs may have concealed 
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the fact of the advantage of being cadres or having connections with cadres. 
The other concept of cadre is defined as someone reaching some position of power (e. g., 
Bums, 1985), as many people refer to anyone in a position of power as a "cadre" 
(Manion, 1985). Rona-Tas (1994) regards the category former cadre not only someone at 
the very top of the communist hierarchy but also everyone who formerly join the 
Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party and reached some position of power. In line with this 
account a cadre in this thesis is defined as someone reaching certain position of power. 
The cadre category includes not only someone at the very top of the communist 
hierarchy but also everyone who reached some position of power, ranging from chief 
prefecture and county level officials down to village heads, who clearly have certain 
power of allocation of resources. 
To date, analysis about the Chinese private sector based on nation-wide data is not 
available. Both Bruun (1993) and Wank (1999) carried out research in private commerce 
business, while Nee (1989,1991) pays attention to private farming. The existing research 
only examines private enterprises in a single sector in a certain region. The following 
analyses fill the gap. By using a national survey data on private enterprises, it looks at what 
these entrepreneurs are in terms of their background and social relations. More importantly, 
it attempts to find out if being a cadre or having close relationship with cadres renders 
advantage in private business start-up in China. 
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3.2 Source of the data 
The following analysis in this chapter is based on "The 1995 National Survey on Private 
Enterprises and their Owners in China". The survey was mainly designed by the social 
scientists from the Sociology Institute of the Chinese Social Sciences Academy and 
Beijing Academy of Social Sciences. China Society of Private Economy Research 
(CSPER) 13 organised the survey, with researchers at local Federation of Industry and 
Commerce trained as interviewers. 
A sample of 3,025 cases was selected from a total of 432 thousand private enterprises 
registered with the bureau of industry and commerce by the year-end 1994. Based on the 
register, a probability proportional to size sampling procedure was utilised according to the 
provincial, urban/rural, and sectoral (industrial) distributions of the private enterprises in 
the country. Firstly, a proportion quota of enterprises was allotted to each province. Then, 
within each province, at least three cities and three counties (for province with 10,000 or 
more registered private enterprises, at least six cities and counties) were randomly selected. 
In each selected city or county, enterprises were divided into clusters according to 
urban/rural location and industrial categories. Enterprises were selected from each cluster 
until the share was met, and at least one enterprise was selected from each cluster. For 
13 
. It 
is supposed to be a non-government academic organisation, which aims at doing theoretical and 
practical research on the private economy. Mainly advocated by people from the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, the Department of United Front Work (DUFW) of CCP, State Industry and Commerce 
Administration in 1988, it was finally set up in 1993 by All China Federation of Industry and Commerce 
(ACFIC). The current chairman is a former vice chairman of ACIFIC and vice minister of DUFW. It has 
offices in the building of ACIFIC (See Brief Introduction of CSPER, Yearbook, 1996: 247). 
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example, out of the 432 thousand registered private enterprises by 1994,181 thousand, or 
42 per cent of the total, were located in the countryside, and 251 thousand, or 58 per cent 
of the whole sample, were located in urban areas. With the fixed rural/urban ratio, out of 
the sample of 3,025 cases, 1,261 enterprises from the countryside and 1,764 from urban 
areas were selected accordingly. 
Table 3.1 the Industrial distribution of private firms 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid agn 116 4.0 4.1 4.1 
mining 38 1.3 1.3 5.4 
manufacture 1127 39.3 39.8 45.2 
electri 21 .7 .7 46.0 
construct 161 5.6 5.7 51.7 
Irrigate 1 .0 .0 51.7 
transport 76 2.6 2.7 54.4 
commerce 767 26.7 27.1 81.5 
finance 5 .2 .2 
81.7 
estate 17 .6 .6 82.3 
social 218 7.6 7.7 90.0 
service 
health 13 .5 .5 90.4 
education 11 .4 .4 90.8 
research 72 2.5 2.5 93.4 
other 188 6.6 6.6 100.0 
Total 2831 98.7 100.0 
Missing System 38 1.3 
iTotal 2869 1 100.0 1 
The industrial distribution of private enterprises is shown in Table 3.1. Private enterprises 
are mainly in manufacturing (40.4 per cent), commerce (27.4 per cent), social services (7.2 
per cent), construction (5.5 per cent), agriculture (4.1 per cent), and transportation (2.4 per 
cent). 
In May and June of 1995, the survey design and sampling procedure together with training 
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of the interviewers were accomplished. From July to September of 1995, face-to-face 
interviews were conducted with private enterprise owners randomly selected from 334 
counties and urban districts out of all the 30 provinces, autonomous minority regions, and 
municipalities. Interviews were successfully completed for 2869 firms with their owners 
(private entrepreneurs hereafter), yielding a final response rate of 94 per cent. 
The survey investigated both the private enterprises and the entrepreneurs. Enterprise 
situation includes the capital, employment, profit, internal organisation and the 
management of the private enterprises. In the aspects of the private entrepreneurs, their 
social mobility, social relations, family properties, political background, social status and 
social attitude (class-consciousness) were investigated. 
It is noted that there are some limits to the survey. For example, the sample was designed 
to ensure representativeness, but in reality, the rural/urban and sectoral distributions of the 
private enterprises vary across provinces. On the other hand, applying national ratios might 
have narrowed the variability and possibly the representativeness of the sample; 
over-representation of large enterprises is another problem, which is due to the natural 
inclination towards the boosting of local industry and commerce bureau officials, who 
tended to pick their biggest and best private enterprises. 
Based on the survey, this research aims to find out whether the social origins and social 
relations of private entrepreneurs provide them with any benefits in business start-up. Thus, 
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only the relevant variables are described and the relationships explored, the irrelevant 
variables are not presented here. 
3.3 Relevant variables 
As suggested by the available literature, different business outcomes show the importance 
of cadre experience or cadre family background. Businesses operated by cadre or 
cadre-related entrepreneurs seem to have better access to start-up capital, and be more 
successful than non-cadre background entrepreneurs. The survey has five main variables to 
depict the social background and the social relations of an entrepreneur: 1) the position of 
the entrepreneur's father, 2) the position of the entrepreneur before business start-up, 3) the 
position the entrepreneur's spouse, 4) the position of the entrepreneur's closest relatives, 
and 5) the position of the entrepreneur's closest friends. The variables are what the 
theorists of power conversion thesis utilise (e. g., Rona-Tas, 1994; Clark, 2000). 
In business operations, financing at start-up is critical. To the Chinese private enterprises, 
financing is most paramount, as it is difficult for them to access capital 14 . Therefore, 
financing is a best indicator to examine if cadre related entrepreneurs have an advantage in 
business start-up. For start-up financing, variables used are: 1) the registered capital at 
business start-up; 2) the real assets at start-up; and 3) the main sources of start-up capital. 
If cadre related entrepreneurs have advantage in start-up, they should be more likely to 
14 See Chapter 2 for more detailed description about the adverse financial environment for private business. 
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have higher amount of registered capital and real assets in any given industry at the 
beginning of business. In other words, entrepreneurs with cadre background should stand 
in the groups with more registered capital and real assets at start-up, in particular, they 
should be more likely to have the highest registered capital and real assets. They should 
also be less likely to have lower than average registered capital and real assets at start-up. 
Furthermore, as the power conversion theorists suggest, resources controlled by the state 
can be transferred by cadres to the primitive accumulation that stimulates business start-up, 
since no one has money after decades of socialism. They should be more likely to rely on 
public finance, such as bank loans, for their start-up capital (e. g., Wank, 1999; Clark, 
2000). 
It is noted that many factors have influences on the start-up financing of the private 
enterprises, such as governinent policy, location, finance, and education of the 
entrepreneurs, etc. However, this research doesn't aim to build up a model to examine the 
functions of each factor. Instead, it hopes to find out if there is correlation between the 
start-up capital and the related social background variables. 
3.4 The entrepreneurs' background before start-up 
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Figure 3.1.1 shows that the entrepreneurs come from a variety of social origins. Some of 
them used to work in government or party organisations and many of them have been 
enterprise managers. In the government and party line, 4 per cent of the entrepreneurs had 
been a section chief or town chief, about 1.7 per cent of the entrepreneurs used to be 
division chiefs or equivalences or even in higher positions. In addition, 5.7 per cent of the 
entrepreneurs had been village chiefs before setting up their private businesses. 52 per cent 
of the entrepreneurs had "no title", which means they had no power in the official power 
structure. The hierarchical structure of the Chinese government system is demonstrated in 
Figure 3.2. 
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Many interviewed entrepreneurs had been either enterprise managers (11.8 per cent) or 
middle managers (8.9 per cent) or enterprise procurement and supply representative (5.3 
per cent). About 2.3 per cent of the entrepreneurs were state or collectively owned 
enterprise leasers. All the entrepreneurs in these categories 15,40 per cent of the 
entrepreneurs, had certain powers in terms of the allocation of resources in the planned 
economy. They were thus cadres as defined previously in this thesis, which refer to anyone 
in a position of power (Manion, 1985; Rona-Tas, 1994). Under such a definition, 60 per 
cent of the entrepreneurs, who were either in non-power positions or had no titles of 
descriptive power (Figure 3.1.2) 
is Under such a definition, cadres include persons in the position in the Chinese party/government hierarchy 
at the level of 1) section chief, 2) division chief, 3) department chief, and 4) the head of a county or a higher 
entity, 5) enterprise manager, 6) middle manager in a enterprise, 7) enterprise procurement and supply 
representative, 8) town or township chief, 9) village chief, 10) state or collectively owned enterprise leaser, 
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Figure 3.1.2 Responds' power 
3.5 The entrepreneurs' social relations 
Table 3.2 The background and the closest social relations of the entrepreneurs 
Cadre Non-cadre Total 
Respondent 40 60 100 
Father 32.1 67.9 100 
Spouse 29.5 70.5 100 
Closest relative 54.5 45.5 100 
Closest friend 73.8 31.5 100 
At least one 85.5 - - 
All 97 cases/3.7 243cases/10.9 - 
The social relations of the entrepreneurs are examined in terms of their fathers, spouses, 
and the closest relatives and friends. Table 3.2 shows the distribution of these social 
relations of the entrepreneurs. About one third (32.1 per cent) of the entrepreneurs come 
from cadre families; 29.5 per cent of the entrepreneurs' spouses are (were) cadres. Outside 
family, the entrepreneurs have close connection with cadres. More than half (54.5 per cent) 
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of the entrepreneurs' closest relatives are cadre. Nearly three quarters (73.8 per cent) of the 
entrepreneurs' most frequently contact friends are cadre. 
Furthermore, 85.5 per cent of the entrepreneurs have at least one connection with cadre, 
i. e., 85.5 per cent of the entrepreneurs either have at least one of the social relations as a 
cadre or they were cadre themselves. About 4 per cent (3.7 per cent) of the entrepreneurs 
have the densest cadre connections, where both the entrepreneurs and all their social 
relations are (were) cadres. 
Generally speaking, the private entrepreneurs have close connections with cadres. Many of 
them were cadres themselves, and many of them were bom in cadre families. Meanwhile, 
many of the entrepreneurs' spouses hold (held) cadre positions in government 
organisations or enterprises. Besides these, many entrepreneurs tend to interact most 
frequently with relatives and friends who are cadres. The social background of the 
entrepreneurs and their social relations consist a network, which is closely connected with 
cadres. The high percentages 16 of cadre origin and cadre social relations, i. e., the over 
16 Comparable statistics is not available. The latest relevant data about cadre occupation as the first 
definition is from China Statistics Yearbook 1987, which estimates there were about 8 per cent cadres in 
employment population in 1987. De facto, the Chinese communist party planned to reform cadre 
management system with replacement of civil servants in 1987, of which the theme was seen in the speech 
addressed by then general secretary Zhao Ziyang in the 13 Ib Congress of the party (Chow, 1991). 
Accordingly, in 1988, the Chinese government stopped using occupation status in statistics; instead, they use 
figures of employees in sectors. 
In 1993, the Chinese authorities established a new civil service system and officially defined "civil servants" as 
those 5.285 million "cadres" or administrators, managers, and professionals who work for government 
agencies, and a separate management system has been established for these individuals. The new system 
excludes all employees of various agencies working in the so-called "non-govcmment" or service unit sector, 
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representation of cadre entrepreneurs and their social relations in the private sector seems 
to indicate the advantage of cadre connections. Whether such networks have implications 
for business operation is thus worthy ftirther investigations. 
3.6 Registered capital and real assets at start-up 







Valid 2780 2566 
Missing 89 303 
Mean 92728042 1325569.28 
Std. Error of Mean 124672.11 131826.05 
Median 150000.00 200000.00 
Mode 100000a 100000 
Std. Deviation 6573425.01 6677741.00 
Variance 4.321E+13 4.459E+ 13 
Skewness 24.876 12.604 
St(L Error of Skewness . 046 . 048 
Kurtosis 760.773 198.790 
Std. Error of KuTtosis . 093 . 097 
Range 226999990 149999992 
Minimum 10 8 
Maximum 227000000 ISOOOOOOO 
25 35000.00 SOOOO. 00 
P il 
so 150000.00 200000.00 
ercent es 75 ,0 2 002 1 0 6 00 0000, O 
90 11 80000.00 1 TO O0000.00 
Multiple modes exist The smallest value is shown 
As shown in Table 3.3, the distribution of the start-up registered capital is positively 
skewed, the range is huge, and the mean is much higher than both the median and the 
mode. It is also the case for real assets the entrepreneurs had when they set up their 
such as education, posts and telecommunications, and health, and employees of state-owned enterprises. 
Official policy since 1987, however, has called for flexible and appropriate management systems to be 
established for employees of these systems (Bums, 1997). 
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businesses. Thus the medians are the better values to describe the central tendency of the 
two variables. 
The average registered capital at start-up was RMB 150,000 (median). Twenty five per 
cent of the entrepreneurs registered enterprises with the amount of capital of lower than 
RMB 35,000, half of the enterprises had registered capital of lower than RMB 150,000, 
and a quarter of the entrepreneurs had more than RMB 500,000 registered capital. One 
tenth of the entrepreneurs had more than RMB 1.18 million registered capital. 
The average value of real assets an entrepreneur had at start-up was RMB 200,000 
(median), which is RMB 50,000 higher than the average registered capital. Since the mean 
of real assets is also higher than that of registered capital, it is safe to say that in general, 
the entrepreneurs already had much more accumulation than registered capital before their 
businesses began. This is supported by the comparison of the values of the two variables at 
quartiles. 
The average accumulation of real assets is about 40 times the annual income of an ordinary 
Chinese resident in a city, and more than 60 times of the annual income of an ordinary 
Chinese citizen living in the countryside 17 in 1997. How did the entrepreneurs finance 
their business start-up? What is the difference between those who were cadres and who 
were not cadres in financing? 'Mese questions need to be answered. 
17 The average annual income for a city and town resident was RMB 5189, and that for a resident living in 
the countryside was RMB 2999 in 1997 (A Statistical Survey of China, 1998). 
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3.7 Cadre background, registered capital and real assets at start-up 
It has been found both variables of registered capital and real assets are positively skewed. 
Can data transformation reduce this problem'? When variables are positively skewed, we 
can apply square root transformations for the purpose of improving the non-nality of 
variables (Osbome, 2002). Figure 3.3 and 3.4 show the distributions of the two variables 
after the transformation. Clearly, they are still positively skewed. The transformation has 
not improved the normality of the distribution. 
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This indicates that we cannot use a parametric test, because the assumption of normal 
distribution is not tenable (Field, 2000, p49). Non-parametric tests can be applied when 
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data is skewed (Foster, 1999, p 194). Among all non-parametric tests, Chi-square test is the 
most widely used and it has a wider range of applications than most others (Owen and 
Jones, 1994, p429). In this analysis, cross-tabulation analysis and the Chi-square test are 
used to examine the association between the entrepreneurs' background variables, i. e., their 
social origins and social relations, and business advantage variables, i. e., the registered 
capital and real assets at start-up, and the main sources of finance. In order to test whether 
cadre related entrepreneurs have an advantage in business start-up in terms of being less 
likely to have less than average capital and being more likely to stand in the group with the 
highest capital, the variables of registered capital and real assets at start-up are collapsed 
into four categories according to their median, three-quartile and 90 percentile values. 
Table3.4 Comparisons in start-up capital for entrepreneur with and without cadre 
connections 
Registered capital Real assets 







The highest 10 
percentage 
yes 47.4 12.3 48.8 10.6 
Respon no 56.2 8.3 55.9 7.1 
-dent Sig. P=. OOO, V=. 097, C=. 097 P=. 001, V=. 081, C=. 081 
yes 6.3 12.0 47.9 
=9.5 
father no 55.2 9.5 55.4 18.3 
Sig. P=. OOI, V=. 086, C=. 086 P=. O 13, V=. 070, C=. 070 
yes 52.6 11.1 51.3 9.6 
spouse no 53.6 8.9 54.2 7.9 
Sig. P=0.197 P=0.351 
yes 52.7 8.4 53.5 7.5 
relative no 54.2 10.1 54.8 8.5 
Sig. P=0.226 P=0.287 
yes 51.1 10.2 50.8 9.3 
friend no 57.0 7.7 58.8 5.0 
Sig. P=. 004, V=. 075, C=. 075 I P=. 000, V=. 093, C=. 093 
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Table 3.4 summarises the results of cross-tabulation analysis examining the association 
between the entrepreneurs' background/social relations and start-up capital, i. e., registered 
capital and real assets at start-up. It is found that the entrepreneurs who have been a cadre 
are less (47.4 per cent) likely to have start-up registered capital lower than the average of 
RMB 150,000, compared with the non-cadre entrepreneurs (56.2 per cent). Cadre 
entrepreneurs are more likely to have start-up registered capital of between RMB 150,000 
and RMB 500,000. Among the 10 percentile cases with the highest registered capital, the 
cadre entrepreneurs lead four percentage points at 12.3 per cent, compared with 8.3 per 
cent of the non-cadre entrepreneurs. Chi-Square tests reveal that there is difference in 
start-up registered capital for the entrepreneurs with and without cadre background. 
However, the very low values of Cramer's V (V=0.097) and Contingency Coefficient 
(C=0.097) suggest a very weak association between the two variables. The low value of 
Lambda (=0.000) warns that the independent variable "cadre" does not predict the 
dependent variable "the start-up registered capital" (See Appendix Table Al. 1, Table A 1.2, 
Table A1.3, Table AIA for detail). The association between the two variables is so weak 
that further regression analysis is not needed (Siegel and Castellan, 1988, p301; Norusis, 
1993, p213; Vaus, 1990; Ke et al., 1996, p255; Zhang, 1998, p 196). 
Table 3.4 demonstrates a similar result for the association between the entrepreneurs' cadre 
experience and their real assets at start-up. In other words, the association between the 
entrepreneurs' background and real assets at start-up is very weak (see also Appendix A 
Table A2.1, Table A2.2, Table A2.3 and Table A2.4). 
3.8 Entrepreneurs' social relations and their registered capital and real assets at 
start-up 
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As shown in Table 3.4 (see also Appendix Tables A3.1, A3.2, A3.3, A3.4, A4.1 A4.2, A4.3, 
and A4.4), entrepreneurs born in cadre families (father as a cadre) are slightly more likely 
to have the highest (the highest percentile) registered capital and real assets start-up. 
Chi-square tests find that the differences in these two aspects between the entrepreneurs 
with and without a cadre father are statistically significant at the levels of 0.01 and 0.05 
respectively. Again, however, the low values of Cramer's V (V=0.086 and 0.070 
respectively) and Contingency Coefficients (C= 0.086 and 0.070 respectively) show a very 
weak association between the dependent and independent variables. The low value of 
Lambda (=0.000) indicates that the independent variable "the entrepreneur's father as a 
cadre/non-cadre" predicts neither the dependent variables "the start-up registered capital" 
nor real assets at start-up (e. g., Siegel and Castellan, 1988, p301; Norusis, 1993, p213; Ke 
et al., 1996, p255; Zhang, 1998, pI 96). 
Table 3.4, together with Appendix Tables 9.14 and Table 10.14, shows a repeated story 
when the associations between the entrepreneurs' closest friends and registered capital and 
real assets at start-up are analysed. In other words, the cadre status of the entrepreneurs' 
closest friends has fairly weak correlation with both registered capital and real assets at 
start-up. 
Again, the entrepreneurs with cadre spouses are slightly less likely to have less than 
average registered capital and real assets and slightly more likely to be in the top 10 
percentile group of both registered capital and real assets at start-up. However, the 
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difference between those with cadre spouses and without is not statistically significant in 
either registered capital or real assets (p=0.197 and 0.351 respectively; see Table 3.4 and 
also Appendix A Tables A5.1, A5.2, A6.1 and A6.2). 
Interestingly, the entrepreneurs whose closest relatives are non-cadres are slightly more 
likely (10.1 per cent and 8.5 per cent respectively) to have the highest registered capital 
and real assets at start-up (the top 10 percentile group) than the entrepreneurs who have 
closest cadre relatives (8.4 per cent and 7.5 per cent respectively, see Table 3.4 and 
Appendix A Tables AT 1, A7.2, A8.1 and A8.2). However, Chi-Square test reveals that the 
differences are not significant in either start-up registered capital (p=0.226) or real assets at 
start-up (p=0.287). 
The above analysis indicates that cadre experience or having close social relations with 
cadres does not provide the entrepreneurs with an obvious advantage in terms of registered 
capital and real assets at business start-up, although there is very slight advantage for the 
cadre entrepreneurs. Therefore, the survey data does not support the assumption that being 
a cadre or having close social relations who are cadres have leading advantage in financing 
their start-ups in terms of the amount of capital in registered capital and real assets. The 
reasons will be discussed later. 
3.9 The main sources of start-up capital 
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Figure 3.5 The main sources of start-up capital 
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family & Mend 
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There are several main sources for the entrepreneurs to obtain start-up capital as shown in 
Figure 3.5. More than half (56.7 per cent) of them relied on their own savings for start-up 
capital. More than a quarter (27.6 per cent) of them obtained finance from their relatives or 
friends. 13 per cent of them admitted to have loans from bank or organisation, which are 
what Wank (1999) terms public finance. The remaining entrepreneurs (2.6 per cent) 
financed their start-ups from overseas and other investment. 
This section tries to find out if there is any difference in the sources of start-up finance. As 
there is discrimination against private enterprises, it is hard for private entrepreneurs to get 
start-up finance from banks (e. g., Uehara, 1999; China Daily, May 2 1999). If the 
entrepreneurs who have connections with cadres have the strength of "power conversion" 
(e. g., Clark, 2000; Rona-Tas, 1994), they should be more likely to get finance from bank or 
other organisations, that is, transferring public funds (Wank, 1999) for their business 
start-ups. 
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Table 3.5 Comparison of public finance for the entrepreneurs with and without cadre 
connections 
Social relations Public finance 
Cadre Non-cadre 
Entrepreneur 14.1% 12.8% 
Father 13.2% 12.9% 
Spouse 12.9% 13.4% 
Closest relative 12.4% 13.8% 
Closest friend 13.1% 13.0% 
All 14.7% 11.3% 
Table 3.5 compares the percentages of getting public finance between cadre and non-cadre 
related entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs who have been cadres (14.1 per cent) and who 
come ftom cadre families (13.2 per cent) are slightly more likely to obtain public funds for 
their business start-ups, compared with the entrepreneurs who have not been a cadre (12.8 
per cent) and whose fathers are (were) not cadres (12.9 per cent). But on the contrary, the 
entrepreneurs whose spouse are (were) not cadres (13.4 per cent) and whose closest 
relatives are not cadres (13.8 per cent) tend to be slightly more likely to get public finance 
than those having cadre spouses (12.9 per cent) and closest cadre relatives (12.4 per cent). 
However, cross-tabulation and Chi-Square tests don't find any significant difference in the 
sources of start-up capital between the cadre related entrepreneurs and non-cadre related 
entrepreneurs (see Appendix A Tables Al 1.1, Al 1.2, A12.1, A12.2, A13.1, A13.2, A14.1, 
A14.2, A15.1 and A15.2). Thus the comparisons suggest no evidence of advantage of 
having connections with cadres in obtaining loans, either from banks or other public 
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organisations. 
In short, the analysis indicates that entrepreneurs who have close connections with cadre 
don't seem to have an advantage in start-up in terms of registered capital and real assets at 
start-up. Neither do the cadre related entrepreneurs appear to have advantage in obtain 
public finance. 
3.10 The density of connections with cadre and start-up finance 
The above examines individually the influence of the cadre background of the 
entrepreneurs and their social relations. Connections with cadre do not make any 
difference in business start-up registered capital, real assets and the main sources of 
finance. 
Do the connections with cadre have collective power? In other words, does the density of 
connections with cadre account for any difference? There is the possibility that when the 
connection with cadre is dense, the function of connection with cadre turns up. This section 
aims at exploring if such a possibility exists. 
In terms of the density of connections with cadre in the survey, there are two extremes, on 
the one end, neither the entrepreneurs themselves nor their social relations are (were) 
cadres; on the other end, both the entrepreneurs and all their social relations (were) are 
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cadres. In the former case, the density of connections with cadres is the least; while in the 
latter, the entrepreneurs have the densest cadre connection. If the assumption that the 
denser the connections with cadres the more likely the entrepreneurs to have advantage in 
business start-up is true, the entrepreneurs with the densest cadre connections should 
appear far less likely to have lower than average registered capital and real assets at 
start-up, on the other hand, they should be much more likely to have the highest registered 
capital and real assets at start-up,. In addition, they should have more opportunity to obtain 
public finance. 
Table 3.6 Comparison between all-cadre and non-cadre entrepreneurs in start-up finance 
Non- All Significant Cramer's Contingency 
cadre cadres V Cocfficicnt 
Lower than 135 45 P=0.083 V=0.143 C=O. 141 
Registered average 57.0% 49.5% 
capital The higbest 10 21 16 
percentage 8.9% 17.6% 
Real assets Lower than 128 35 P=O. 149 V=0.131 0--0.129 
average 55.9% 41.7% 
The higbest 10 15 9 
percentage 6.6% 10.7% 
Public finance 27 14 P--0.031 V=0.163 C--O. 160 
Main sources 
of capital 11.3% 14.7% 
As illustrated in Table 3.6 (see also Appendix A Tables A16.1, A16.2, A16.3, A16.4, A17.1 
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and A17.2), the entrepreneurs with the densest connections with cadre are less likely to 
have less than average registered capital and real assets at start-up than those without any 
connection with cadres. On the other hand, they are about twice more likely to have the 
highest registered capital and real assets at start-up. Also, they seem slightly more likely to 
obtain public finance. However, like the findings previously, none of the differences 
between the entrepreneurs with the densest cadre connections and those without any 
connection with cadres is statistically significant. In other words, there is no statistical 
evidence that the entrepreneurs with densest cadre connections have advantage in terms of 
having more registered capital and real assets and getting public finance at business 
start-up. 
3.11 Does industry affect the difference? 
Wank (1999) and Nee (1989,1991) draw different conclusions from their research, where 
the former mainly concentrates on commerce, while the latter focuses on farming. Oi 
(1989) and Rona-Tas (1990) suggest that the advantages of cadres are greater in industry 
than agriculture. Does this mean that industry matters? In other words, can it be true that 
cadre entrepreneurs have an advantage in certain industry, such as in the case of Wank's 
(1999) study in commerce? 
It was found in section 2 that private enterprises are mainly engaged in manufacturing 
(40.4 per cent), commerce (27.4 per cent), social services (7.2 per cent), construction (5.5 
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per cent), agriculture (4.1 per cent), and transportation (2.4 per cent). If the cadre 
experience or having cadre connections has advantage in certain industries, the advantage 
should be found in the main sectors listed previously. Again, the following analysis 
compares start-up registered capital and real assets and the main sources of start-up capital 
between the entrepreneurs with the densest cadre connections and the entrepreneurs 
without any cadre connection. 
There are 86 private firms operated by the entrepreneurs without any cadre connection 
together with 33 firms run by the entrepreneurs with the densest cadre connections in the 
manufacturing industry. 26 entrepreneurs with the densest cadre connections are in 
commerce businesses, comparing with 60 entrepreneurs without any cadre connection. 
Small numbers make impossible this comparison being conducted in other industries. In 
the construction industry, 13 entrepreneurs have neither been cadres nor have a cadre 
social relation. In the same industry, only 4 entrepreneurs have the densest cadre 
connections. 27 entrepreneurs with the least cadre connection have their businesses in 
social service businesses; while only 5 entrepreneurs with the densest cadre connections 
are in the same industry. In the transportation industry, there are 7 entrepreneurs who have 
the least cadre connection and 3 entrepreneurs who have the densest cadre connections. In 
agricultural businesses, there are 15 firms operated by the entrepreneurs without any cadre 
connection. However, no entrepreneur with the densest cadre connections does business in 
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this industry. Thus, the comparison is confined in the two main industries where the 
majority of private firms are engaged. 
3.11.1 The densest cadre connections versus non-cadre connection in commerce 
Cross-tabulation and Chi-square tests find that the entrepreneurs with the densest cadre 
connections are less likely to have lower than average registered capital and real assets, 
and they are more likely to have the highest registered capital and real assets at start-up. 
The entrepreneurs with the densest cadre connections are about three times more likely 
than those without any cadre connection to have the highest registered capital. But 
interestingly, such a possibility declines in real assets at start-up. Also, the entrepreneurs 
with the densest cadre connections are more likely than those without cadre connection to 
obtain public finance for their start-ups. This may, to some extent, be understood as the 
advantage of having cadre connections in terms of greater access to public finance, as 
suggested by some researchers (e. g., Wank, 1999). However, again, the differences 
between the two groups of entrepreneurs are not statistically significant (Table 3.7 and also 
Appendix A Tables A18.1, A18.2, A18.3, A18.4, A18.5 and A18.6). 
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Table 3.7 Comparison of start-up capital between all-cadre and non-cadre in commerce 
All-cadre Non-cadre Significant 
Lower than The highest 10 Lower than The highest 10 
average percentage average percentage 
Registered capital 13 4 40 3 P=0.252 
50.0% 15.4 66.7% 5.0% 
Real assets I1 1 39 2 P=0.353 
45.8% 4.2% 65.0% 3.3% 
Main sources Public finance Public finance P--O. 180 
Of capital 3 3 
11.5% 4.8% 
3.11.2 The densest cadre connections versus non-cadre connection in manufacturing 
Table 3.8 shows the Cross-tabulation and Chi-square test results of the comparisons 
between the entrepreneurs with the densest cadre connections and those without any cadre 
connection in manufacturing industry (see Appendix A Table A 19.1-6 for details). Unlike 
the previous findings, the entrepreneurs with the densest cadre connection tend to be more 
likely to have lower than average registered capital. Another interesting finding is that the 
entrepreneurs with the densest cadre connection tend to be slightly less likely to have the 
highest real assets at start-up. Again, the entrepreneurs with the densest cadre connection 
are more likely to get public finance at business start-up. However, in no case, is the 
83 
difference between the two groups of entrepreneurs statistically significant. In other words, 
there is no clear statistical evidence to support that closely cadre related entrepreneurs have 
advantage in financing business start-up. 
Table 3.8 Comparison of start-up capital between all-cadre and non-cadre in 
manufacturing 
All-cadre Non-cadre Significant 
Lower than The highest 10 Lower than Ile highest 10 
average percentage average percentage 
Registered capital 18 4 42 10 P=0.897 
54.5% 12.1% 48.8% 11.6% 
Real assets 12 2 42 6 P--0.594 
40.0% 6.7% 51.2% 7.3% 
Main sources Public finance Public finance P=0.787 
Of capital 5 9 
14.7% 10.3% 
3.12 Any advantage for connections with high-level cadres? 
It might be thought that my analysis fails to confront the fact that not all cadres are the 
same and that what really matters for business success is not being a cadre - but being, or 
having been or having had relations with a high level cadre. To test this possibility we 
compare entrepreneurs with a background of being a cadre at higher than county chief 
(division chieO level with those without. It should be noted that a person at a level of 
higher than county chief (division chief) is a high rank cadre. 
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Table3.9 Comparisons in start-up capital for entrepreneur with and without high-level 
cadre connections 











The highest 10 
percentage 
Yes 36.4 18.2 44.7 13.2 
Respon No 53.0 9.8 53.2 8.4 
-dent Sig. P=0.078 P=0.654 
Yes 38.9 11.1 48.3 7.8 
Father No 53.1 10.2 53.3 8.7 
Sig. P=0.006 (V--C=0.073) P=0.340 
Yes 41.9 14.0 53.3 2.6 
SpoUSe No 53.5 9.5 55.3 8.5 
Sig. P=0.389 P=0.547 
Yes 57.1 8.7 55.2 6.7 
relative No 52.9 9.3 54.0 8.1 
Sig. P=0.602 P=0.858 
Yes 49.6 11.9 53.6 9.1 
Friend No 53.6 9.0 51.7 7.7 
Sig. P=0.230 P=0.753 
Table 3.9 reports briefly the comparisons between the entrepreneurs with and without a 
connection with a high-level cadre in start-up capital and the main sources of start-up 
capital. The entrepreneurs having been a high level cadre or having connections with high- 
level cadres are more likely to have the highest registered capital. The entrepreneurs 
having been a cadre or having a high level cadre as the closest friend are also more likely 
to have the highest real assets at start-up. But interestingly, the entrepreneurs whose fathers, 
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spouses and closest relatives are cadres are less likely to have the highest real assets at 
start-up, compared with those without such connections with high-level cadres. It must be 
noted that none of these differences is statistically significant (see also Appendix A Table 
A20.1-6, A21.1-5, A22.14, A23.14, and A24.14). 
Table 3.10 compares the entrepreneurs with and without connections with high-level 
cadres in the main sources of start-up capital. Only the entrepreneurs whose closest friends 
are high-level cadres are slightly likely than those without to have public finance at 
start-up (14.4 per cent versus 12.9 per cent). Quite contrary to the power conversion 
theory's prediction, the entrepreneurs having been a high-level cadre or having high-level 
cadre fathers, spouses and closest relatives are consistently less likely to have start-up 
capital from bank or other public organisations. 
Table 3.10 Comparison of public finance for the entrepreneurs with and without high-level 
cadre connections 
Social relations Public finance 
High-level cadre Non-high-level cadre 
Entrepreneur 11.9% 13.3% 
Father 11.9% 13.2% 
Spouse 10.9% 13.3% 
Closest relative 12.7% 13.1% 
Closest friend 12.9% 14.4% 
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3.13 No strength of connections with cadre? 
Generally speaking, the data analysis has not found clear evidence that connections with 
cadres have advantage in start-up finance. Though cadre related entrepreneurs are more 
likely to have higher start-up capital in general; in some aspects, non-cadre related 
entrepreneurs are more likely to have higher start-up capital. In particular, there is not 
much difference in the possibility of getting public finance between entrepreneurs with and 
without cadre connections. The finding is not in accordance with some other similar 
research (Rona-Tas, 1994; Kolankiewicz, 1996; Wank, 1999; Clark, 2000), which believes 
that cadre related entrepreneurs have an advantage in start-up. Why? 
Firstly, there is the possibility that connections with cadre are not important in some 
aspects. The analysis of the importance of connections with cadre is based on the 
assumption that the government controls resources and cadres have power in redistributing 
these resources. Under the traditional central planning system in China, all means of 
production were under the control of central or local govermnent, across different 
authorities at different administrative levels. However, with the development of 
marketisation, the government has fewer and fewer goods to control. The force of market 
pushes the development of the private sector in China. With the emergence of the market 
the central distributor will lose power and direct producers will have more discretion over 
their goods and services, as a consequence, marketisation will provide new alternatives to 
bureaucratic advancement. Even in the absence of fundamental change in the political 
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order, the growth of market institutions causes a decline in the significance of government 
allocation power (Nee, 1992; 1996). The more complete the shift to market coordination, 
the less likely that economic transactions will be embedded in the networks dominated by 
cadres, and the more likely power-control over resources will be located in market 
institution and in social networks of private buyers and sellers (Nee, 1989). 
This is justified by the survey of China's Entrepreneur Survey System " (1999). 
According to the surveys, 54.8 per cent of entrepreneurs assumed that raw materials were 
over-supplied in 1996. In 1999,77.3 per cent entrepreneurs had such a belief, an increase 
of 12.5 percentage. This indicates that China has passed the shortage economy to some 
extent; it also implies lower control of government over production factors, on the other 
hand. Therefore, opportimities for gain depend less on the personal discretion of cadres in 
positional power. 
Secondly, compared with Eastern European countries, China has a different reform path, 
which can lead to a different result. Privatisation of govenunent enterprises has not played 
a significant role, although a new but small private sector has emerged (Walder, 1995, 
p965). Where privatisation has been more bottom-up, old political connections may count 
less (Rona-Tas, 1994, p53). At the very beginning of the reform, people in private 
businesses were from peripheral groups, such as prisoners, the unemployed (Kraus, 1991). 
" The survey was conducted by China's Entrepreneurs Survey System, a subsidiary institute of The 
Development Research Centre under the State Council in 1997. The ownership composition of the sample is 
as follows, state owned 45.7%, collectively owned 7.7%, privately owned 3.5%, foreign invested 8.6%, 
others 33.9%. The survey has 3629 valid responses among 10,000 mailed-out questionnaires. 
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Indeed, even in the same block with a similar privatisation process, nomenklatura 
members in Poland and Hungary have not an identical fate in property accumulation. A 
much larger proportion gained ownership rights over productive assets in Hungary than in 
Poland. This is mainly because the two countries have different privatisation policies 
instituted by post-communist governments, upon which the ability of the nomenklatura 
members to accumulate economic assets is greatly contingent. Only a small proportion of 
nomenklatura members in Poland have ownership of economic assets, of whom, the vast 
majority reported ownership of very small businesses (Hanley, 2000). Szelenyi and 
Szelenyi (1995) also disconfirm the power conversion theory and argue that the power 
conversion thesis is grossly exaggerated. 
These point to the possibility that entrepreneurs with cadre connections are not necessarily 
to have higher start-up capital in China. As resources are not all controlled by cadres, 
businesspeople do not necessarily rely on public finance. In other words, they can have 
alternatives for their start-up capital. 
Thirdly, the survey only investigates the closest social relations of the entrepreneurs. This 
is a limitation of the data. Strong ties of course have their strengths. However, strong ties 
are not necessarily the most helpfid ties. Weak ties can also have strength in bridging 
opportunities (Granonetter, 1973). Social relations can provide individuals with both 
expressive and instrumental support. The survey data did not specify the closest friend and 
relative in what aspect or in what sense. The closest relative or the most frequently 
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contacted friends may provide expressive support, but they may be helpless in business 
operation. 
Fourthly, and more importantly, guanxi practice in China is common. Entrepreneurs 
without available connections with cadres can have alternatives to connect themselves with 
cadres and access resources, if cadres control them. Thus, it is essential to find out what 
these alternatives are and how they work. The closest social relationships examined in this 
analysis are only a form of guanxi. Guanxi can be a source of sustained competitive 
advantage for doing business in China (Tsang, 1998), which can be of different types. If 
cadre related entrepreneurs have an advantage in start-up as found in some situations, the 
non-cadre related entrepreneurs are able to overcome the disadvantage by guanxi. This can 
explain the similar opportunities in obtaining public finance at start-up for entrepreneurs 
with and without cadre connections found in the above analysis. 
Moreover, the entrepreneurs who have been cadres have no such power any more when 
they become private entrepreneurs. The change of social status has effects on their social 
capital. This has been ignored by the existing research. The last two points will be the main 
concem of the case study chapters. 
3.14 Conclusion 
The analysis of the survey data on China's private entrepreneurs suggests that being a 
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cadre and having close connections with cadres provides private entrepreneurs with more 
possibilities to have higher start-up capital. Such a result may be interpreted as that cadre 
related entrepreneurs have an advantage in start-up. However, it must be noted that the 
association between such connections and start-up capital is very weak. Also in some 
aspects, non-cadre related entrepreneurs are more likely to have higher start-up capital. For 
example, in manufacturing, non-cadre related entrepreneurs are more likely to have higher 
real assets at start-up. The power conversion theory claims that cadre related entrepreneurs 
could transfer public finance for private businesses. However, the comparative analysis in 
this chapter has suggested that there is not much difference between entrepreneurs with 
and without close cadre connections in terms of the possibility of obtaining public finance. 
Therefore, the statistical analysis in this chapter does not support the general argument of 
power conversion. 
It is also worth pointing out that the findings in this chapter should be interpreted with 
caution. It should be noted that the data analysed was collected in 1995, before the 15th 
Chinese Communist Party Conference in September 1997, which introduced top-down 
privatisation by re-organisation, merger, leasing contract operation, joint stock partnership 
or sell-off, in order to quicken the pace of state enterprises reforin (Financial Times, 
December 8,1997). The advantages of having connections with cadres, such as buying 
public assets with a low price by cadre related entrepreneurs (Clark, 2000), had not 
emerged yet. Another limitation of the data is that enterprises run by cadre related 
entrepreneurs were beyond the investigation of the 1995 survey on private enterprises, if 
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they were under the guise of state owned or collectively owned firms. Also, the finding that 
there is no significant advantage for cadre related entrepreneurs is limited to business 
start-up. It is possible that they can enjoy some other advantages, for example, converting 
public assets into private, or getting more out of their effort because of their power and 
connections (Walder, 1996, p1063). It will be rash to make a general conclusion that 
connections with cadres are not important to the private business in China. Further 
qualitative research is thus needed. 
The theory of power conversion is in the frame of social capital theory, where social 
capital is "what ordinary language calls connections" (Bourdieu, 1993, p160). Cadres, or 
connections with cadres, are supposed to convert political power to economic advantage 
(e. g., Rona-Tas, 1994; Kolankiewicz, 1996; Wank, 1999). However, social capital is not 
inheritable all the time (Pahl, 1996). Social capital of the old order is not indispensably 
useful in the new order. 
More importantly, close connections widi cadres examined in the survey are only a form of 
social relations, or of social capital. Social capital also involves transforming contingent 
relations for personal ends. The entrepreneurs could not choose what kind of family to be 
bom in, and they could not choose their former occupations at will under the planned 
economy. Besides these static attributes of individual entrepreneurs, there are many other 
social relations they can choose to develop for their business purpose. As Van Duijn et aL 
(1999) find, the anticipation of future benefits is a main consideration of developing 
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relations, and another person's high social status influences the decision to invest in 
relations. In other words, social capital can be created and developed. This is what I call 
the dynamics of social capital. Neglected by the social scientists mentioned above, the 
dynamics of social capital will be discussed in the following chapters, with the next two 
chapters examining the two key concepts of guanxi and social capital. 
Nee (1989) maintains that the more complete the shift to market, the less likely that 
economic transactions will be embedded in social networks dominated by cadres, and the 
more likely power - control over resources - will be located in market institutions and in 
social networks of private buyers and sellers. The IT sector has recently emerged in China, 
and thus is more market-oriented than the traditional sectors with less government 
interference. How do private entrepreneurs in this sector start up their businesses? The case 
studies will shift to analyse the private IT sector and answer this question. 
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Chapter 4 Guanxi 
The previous chapter found that there is no statistical evidence to support the power 
conversion theory, which claims that cadre-related entrepreneurs have an advantage in 
business start-up. It suggested that the close social relationships examined are simply a 
form of guanxi. Both the entrepreneurs with and without available connections with cadres 
can practice guanxi, which can provide them with an advantage. This chapter is a literature 
review on the available research on the guanxi concept. It examines the definitions of 
guanxi, the importance of guanxi and thus the functions of guanxi, and the reasons for its 
emergence, the consequences and the implications of guanxi. Also, some deficiencies of 
the available research are discussed. 
4.1 What is guanxi? 
Guanxi is a term very common in every day Chinese life. Abroad, there is a popular belief 
that guanxi has magic power, which is reflected in the fashion of more and more people 
talking about guanxi. The search engine of the portal yahoo. com shows more than 2000 
items, when the key word 'guanxi' is entered. Most of the pages emphasise the importance 
of guanxi in China. Foreign consultancy companies provide advice to companies with an 
interest in China. According to them, without guanxi, a foreign firm will face a dim fiiture 
in China. Also, more and more social scientists have paid attention to guanxi (e. g., Gold, 
1985; Walder, 1986; Solinger, 1989; Wank, 1999), and some researchers have made 
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guanxi the key concept in their research (e. g., Yang, 1994; Guthrie, 1998; Tsang, 1998; 
Luo, 2000). 
The characters that comprise the word guanxi are guan and A Guan, as a noun, means a 
door or pass (as in Shanhaiguan, the place in Hebei province where the Great Wall meets 
the sea). Guan is also a verb with the meaning of "close up". Both usages have the 
metaphor of barrier. If we apply this to human relationships, a person inside the barrier is 
one of us, an insider, while another person outside the barrier has no "relationship" with us, 
or even can be our enemy, and thus is not of our concern. M is used both as a noun and a 
verb. In its verb form, guanxi means to tie up or connect (as in the common verb lianxi, to 
communicate); in its noun form, xi has the meaning of "a systeze' or "a networW'. Thus 
guanxi conveys something like "tying up interface systemý' (Li and Li, 2000, p 1). However, 
in the Chinese language, guanxi has several different connotations. In the most general 
sense, guanxi simply means relationship, which refers to the existence of a relationship 
between people or things, for example, the relationship between buyers and sellers, or the 
relationship between two variables in social science research, can be termed guanxi. In this 
sense, the word does not carry any connotations about how these relationships work. 
More commonly, guanxi refers to the contact and connection between people, or particular 
people with whom one has a strong connection. Accordingly, it has been translated into 
English in different ways, such as, social relationship, personal ties, and personal 
relationship. However, the meaning of guanxi can be more than what can be represented 
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by the term relationship or connection. For example, Xind Xinyu Cidian (New Words and 
New Phrases Dictionary, 1989, Beijing) defines guanxi as "the use of someone's authority 
to obtain political or economic benefits by unethical persons". 
In the social and business context, guanxi is a rich and complex concept. A number of 
researchers have tried to elaborate on this construct, but no universal definition has so far 
been presented. Tsui and Farh (1997, p56) define guanxi as the existence of direct 
particularistic ties between two or more individuals. To Walder (1986, p162-186), guanxi 
substitutes for impersonal market transactions in a setting where such markets are 
restricted and scarcity prevails, thus guanxi is social relations involving the exchange of 
favours or a reliance on personal connections or petty corruption to obtain a public or 
private good. Davies et aL (1995, p210) argue that guanxi relates to personal relations 
involving the exchange of favours and the giving of face or social status and that the 
concept of networking is well suited to capture the key features of guanxi. Tsang (1998, 
p65) simply borrows Pye's definition of guanxi as "friendship with implications of 
continued exchange of favour". To Lovett et al. (1999, p232), guanxi refers to networks of 
informal relationships and exchanges of favours that dominate business activity throughout 
China and East Asia, which is an ancient system based on personal relationships. 
One of the most frequently cited studies of guanxi by Yang (1994, p6) starts with the 
definition of guanxi xue or the art of guanxi as follows: guanxi xue involves the exchange 
of gifts, favours and banquets; the cultivation of personal relations and networks of mutual 
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dependence; and the manufacturing of obligation and indebtedness. Indeed, Yang (1994) 
does not explicitly distinguish between guanxi and guanxi practice, where guanxi is simply 
interpersonal relationships; while the use of guanxi, these personal relationships; to gain 
advantages is guanxi xue. Gold (1985, p672) makes it clear that the technique of 
establishing and manipulating guanxi is guanxi xue. To Luo (2000, p2), guanxi is the 
concept of drawing on connections in order to secure favours in personal relations, 
whereas guanxi xue refers to the practical strategies that best ensure personal relationship 
building, utilisation, and development. 
Putting these elements together, we arrive at a much fuller concept. Guanxi involves firstly, 
personal relations, secondly, the use of personal relations, and thirdly, obligation and 
reciprocity in exchange. The precondition of guanxi is the existence of personal relations. 
To refer to the use of guanxi is to understand guanxi as opportunism'9. Obligation and 
reciprocity imply the norms of guanxi. 
Firstly, guanxi is personal relationship. To understand the personal aspect of the term 
guanxi, the best way is to know how Chinese have relationships with each other. The 
traditional Chinese social system was not defined in terms of individuals but in terms of 
dyadic ties between individuals, which reflected the teaching of Confucius. Man is defined 
as a social and interactive being, rather than an isolated, separated entity. The social 
" The term is used here in the everyday sense of 'the practice of taking profit from all occasions' (Penguin 
English Dictionary, 1980) rather than in the way it has come to be used in economics since Williamson 
(1975), who used it to mean making self-disbelieved statements on actions, i. e., lying and cheating. 
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philosophy of relationships is what Confucius called the principles of lun: a differentiated 
order2o. Fei (1992) argues that linkage among the Chinese is ego-centred social space 
radiating from the centre like ripples from a stone dropped in water. Chinese place people 
with whom they are interacting into different categories, such asjiaren (family members), 
shuren (acquaintances) and moshengren (strangers), or zyiren (one of us, insider) and 
wairen (outsider). The differentiation implies completely different social and 
psychological meanings to the parties involved and accordingly the relationships are 
governed by a different set of interpersonal rules. From this perspective, jiaren and shuren, 
or zyiren, are guanxi, while moshengren or wairen are not guanxi. Thus, guanxi is an 
ego-centred personal relationship. 
Closely related, guanxi is also private and informal. Guanxi exists between individuals 
rather than organisations; accordingly, guanxi is not housed in organisation but in 
individuals. People establish and maintain guanxi through private and informal channels, 
such as banquets and gifts (Yang, 1994). The government officially discourages guanxi. 
From the communist's point of view, guanxi works against the supposed fair comrade 
interpersonal relationship among people, and thus it contradicts the communist ideology 
(Gold, 1985). As well, the practice of guanxi has negative impact, which has not a very 
clear boundary with corruption and is labelled deviant practice (Yang, 1994, p63). In this 
sense, guanxi itself can only exist in informal and private settings. Wang (2000, p530) 
2' Lun is a system of social roles with distinct status differences, which stresses the differentiation between 
individuals: prince and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder brother and younger brother, and 
friend and friend. All these relationships are superiors to subordinates except fiiend to friend. 
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points out that informal networks exist in every society, including the most advanced 
industrialised societies, but the informal guanxi networks in Chinese society stand out for 
three reasons: 1) the degree to which informal networks contradict and undermine formal 
institutions is extremely high; 2) the influence of informal networks is unusually strong in 
every aspect of Chinese life; and 3) the level of institutionalisation of Chinese networks is 
very low. 
Secondly, guanxi is instrumental. Gold (1985) argues that the pre-eminent characteristic of 
personal relationship in China today is instrumentalism. The principle that underlies it is 
guanxi, which means connectedness or particularistic ties. Walder (1986, p162-186) also 
looks at guanxi as an instrumental personal relationship, mingling instrumental intentions 
with personal feeling. It can range from strong personal loyalties to ceremonialised bribery. 
At the one end of this spectrum is the type of relationship connected with the term 
particularism, which involves showing favouritism to people with whom one has 
pre-existing personal ties. In this type of guanxi, the affective aspect of the relation is the 
motivation. At the other end of the spectrum is the type of relationship that amounts to 
ceremonialised bribery, which involves a straightforward exchange of favour for material 
gain or a compensatory favour. In this type of relationship, the primary motivation is the 
instrumental aspect of the direct exchange with a minimum personal element. Between 
these extremes is a type of relationship termed target cultivation, which is purposeful 
cultivation of someone in a position of power so that one may benefit. The instrumentalism 
of guanxi is more apparent from the object of the cultivation of guanxi that centres on the 
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factory allocations and socio-political services that are controlled by individuals. The 
cultivation takes place through the giving of small gifts and the performance of favours for 
the purpose of future advantage. 
Similarly, Hwang (1987) identifies three kinds of interpersonal relationships in social 
exchange in the Chinese setting, namely, expressive ties, instrumental ties, and mixed ties. 
Expressive ties occur mostly among family members, close friends, and other congenial 
groups, which are based on affection. Instrumental ties are based on achieving specific 
goals, existing between people who interact with each other on a short-term basis, such as 
a salesperson and a customer. Mixed ties are in between the two. These are relationships 
between people who know each other and expect to interact with each other on a long-term 
basis. Moreover, in such situations, people seek to influence others by renqing 2 1. The 
mixed ties are typical guanxi by their instrumental function. The purely instrumental ties, 
which are usually short and unstable, are not guanxi. 
in a guanxi relationship, appropriate behaviours are expected in accordance with the norms 
of guanxi, which include reciprocity and trustworthiness. The Chinese people place great 
stock in the importance of mianzi (face), which is one's social image and social status 
21 According to Hwang (1987) and Yang (1994), there are three meanings of renqing. Firstly, renqing refers to the 
emotional responses of an individual in everyday life, which is part of the intrinsic character of human nature; secondly, 
renqing means a certain kind of resource that one can present as a medium of social exchange, which is close to the word 
faVOUT; thirdly, renqing is a set of social norms which require one should keep in contact with relatives, friends, and 
acquaintances, and offer help to those in need. In other words, renqing is also the proper way of behaving oneself in 
social relationships. 
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gained by performing one or more social roles that are recognised by others. Both parties 
in a guanxi relationship must obey the implicit rule of reciprocity. Disregard of this can 
lead to the damage of one's reputation and thus social status (Wank, 1999, p98-109). It 
might be said, then, that guanxi is, in this sense, an instrumental relationship with Chinese 
characteristics. 
Thus, thirdly, guanxi is a reciprocal relationship through which people exchange favours. 
Gold (1985) points out that guanxi is based on reciprocity, the traditional concept of bao, 
where one does favours for others as social investments, clearly expecting something in 
return. The favours exchanged range from providing scarce resources necessary in 
everyday life (Walder, 1986) to presenting job opportunities (Lin and Bian, 1991) or 
business information (Solinger, 1989), as well as other kinds of benefits (Yang, 1994). 
Owing someone a favour only obligates one to return it at a later time, but there is no 
specification on when one should return a favour. The return of favour will not always be 
equal. In fact, if one returns a favour abruptly and quickly, this may imply the end of 
guanxi (Luo, 2000, p27). 
Since guanxi has become more and more instrumental, the line between guanxi and bribery 
is very hard to draw. Walder (1986, p179) labels the straightforward exchange of favour 
for material gain or a compensatory favour as ceremonialised bribery. Wang (2000, p536-7) 
insists that there are several distinctions between guanxi and bribery. First, mianzi (face) 
and gangqin (affection) are not important in bribery, while they are elements in guanxi; 
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second, guanxi is based on long-term relationship, whereas favour exchange through 
bribery is short-term transaction; third, the nature of gift giving is different. In guanxi, the 
symbolism embodied in gifts is often more important than the practical value of gifts, 
while the monetary value of gifts is the determinant to the grant of a favour. Despite these, 
in the long run, guanxi generally means repayment of favours in one way or another. 
Guanxi becomes the enabler of future opportunities. 
Indispensable for reciprocity, trust is an important ingredient of guanxi. For example, Child 
(1996, p13) argues that guanxi is reciprocating relationship built on trust and mutual 
identity. According to Yueng and Tung (1996), 85 per cent of managers whose companies 
had business in China reported that trust was an essential condition for guanxi and that 
guanxi could not exist without trust. Based on mutual expectation among social members, 
trust is the basic precondition for social interaction (Barber, 1983). Zucker (1986) points 
out that trust is a set of expectations shared by all those involved in an exchange. With 
family and kinship ties, which expand the radius of trust, overseas Chinese in Southeast 
Asia extend credit, pool capital and delegate authority without fearing of default or deceit 
(Fukuyama, 1995b). Besides family and kinship ties, guanxi is another most important 
source of trust. Trust is available because 'the community is so close-knit that malfeasance 
is not only difficult to conceal or execute, but often even hard to imagine" (Granovetter, 
1992, p7). 
Therefore, guanxi in its utilitarian aspect is a personal relationship accessed for desired 
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goods based on the norm of reciprocity. Arias (1998) offers a summary of the main 
characteristics of guanxi: (1) It includes the notion of a continuing reciprocal relationship 
over an indefinite time period, (2) favours are banked, (3) it extends beyond the 
relationship between two parties to include other parties within the social network, (4) the 
relationship network is built among individuals not organisations, (5) status matters - 
relationships with a senior will extend to his subordinates, but not visa versa and (6) the 
social relationship is prior to and a prerequisite to the business relationship. 
But such a concept a narrow understanding of guanxi, has at least three limits. Firstly, 
family relationships and other expressive relationships, which people can resort to for 
certain purposes, are excluded. Chinese do not consider family relationships as guanxi 
relationships as defined above. One cannot say, for example, that one has guanxi with 
one's father or that one needs la guanxi (pull connection) with one's father. Secondly, the 
dynamic aspect of guanxi is overlooked. When the pre-existence of guanxi is not available 
but needed, there are alternatives, such as establishing and developing guanxi. Thirdly, all 
these kinds of guanxi seem based on utilitarian rational calculation, which is not true. 
In fact, a broad sense of guanxi, which includes both family relations and other expressive 
relations, overcomes these deficiencies. Table 4.1 compares the two scopes of guanxi. 
Interpersonal relationships can be simply divided into blood or consanguineous 
relationships and social relationships. The former are family or kinship relationships, 
including one's family members, relatives, and often members of the same clan. Social 
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relationships mainly arise from social interaction outside both family and extended family 
seftings. 
Table 4.1 Comparison of broad and narrow term of guanxi 
Broad guanxi Narrow guanxi 
Types of relations Consanguineous and social 
relations 
Social relations outside 
family 
Function Expressive, instrumental Instrumental 
Terms Expressive ties, mixed ties Mixed ties 




Norm Obligation of affection, 
reciprocity 
Reciprocity, but interest is 
main concerned 
Broad guanxi comes from either endowment (fianzi), savings (lielez) or investment (touzi) 
(Wank, 1999, p123), while narrow guanxi does not contain guanxi from endowment. 
Guanxi from endowment are social relations by virtue of birth or "congenitally" 
(tianshengde) into a family or a particular economic class or bureaucratic rank. Guanxi of 
savings is acquired through life experiences that predate the entrepreneurial career in 
childhood, education, work and political experiences. A third route of guanxi accumulation 
is acquired after the onset of the business career by investment. To put it simply, the first 
kinds of guanxi are from family or extended family, while the latter two kinds of guanxi 
exist outside family. 
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Indeed, most discussions of guanxi suppose that it already exists. For instance, Solinger 
(1989) understands guanxi as family, friendship, co-worker, or schoolmate ties. What is 
the case for the individuals who anticipate the need to request a favour from someone but 
have not yet such guanxi with the person? Those without present guanxi can establish such 
relationships, or try to curry favour with such relationships, and turn the potentials for their 
personal ends (Hwang, 1987; Fei, 1992). Alternatively, joining certain associations can 
help to know people and build guanxi (Odgaard, 1992). Yang (1994) describes how gifts 
and banquets help to build and keep guanxi. But in fact, these are not enough for 
maintaining guanxi. Also, little research has examined what the bases are for developing 
guanxi. These, together with other strategies of having guanxi, will be addressed in 
Chapter 8. 
In summary, many different types of guanxi exist in contemporary China. The most 
common forms continue to be based on kinship, family friendships, shared home area, 
educational ties, bureaucratic linkages, and so on so forth. On the one hand, all types of 
guanxi invest Chinese morality with a high degree of particularism and reciprocity; on the 
other hand, each type of guanxi has a different connotation and corresponding norm. In 
everyday life, and also in business, no one can expect in advance only to rely on 
6utilitarian' types of guanxi. In this sense, guanxi is interpersonal relations in the broad 
meaning. 
4.2 The reasons for the pervasiveness of guanxi 
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According to Yang (1989), the art of guanxi started to spread in practice about two or three 
years into the Cultural Revolution. Guanxi arose as a social response to the deep 
penetration of state power into everyday life and the politicalisation of social relationships 
during the Cultural Revolution, on which people relied to secure everyday survival against 
the collapse of social order. Since the reform and open policy, guanxi has become more 
and more prevalent. Therefore, the government's attitude toward guanxi is that people 
use guanxi to engage in official corruption and guanxi has detrimental impact on the good 
of the whole society. The practices are thus labelled "crooked wind" (buzheng zhifeng) and 
condemned by the official Chinese press, which include the use of public position for 
private gain, nepotism, patronage, factional favouritism, bribery, the exchange of special 
privileges of office among officials, and so on so forth. The government and media blame 
three reasons for the prevalence of guanxi practice. Firstly, it is based on tradition, which 
comes from China's thousands of years of feudalism, under which people had to rely on 
blood ties and clans for survival. Secondly, the Cultural Revolution forced people to rely 
on personal relationships to secure everyday survival since social orders were broken down. 
Thirdly, the practice arose from the influence of the "bourgeois individualism" of the West 
and "its ethic of self-gain" (Yang, 1994, p58-64). 
The ordinary people have similar stance with the government with respect of denouncing 
guanxi practice. However, they admire and even approbate guanxi. This is because guanxi 
has the alternative relational ethics: the ethics of obligation, reciprocity, and mutual aid, 
and the responsibilities of friendship and kinship (Yang, 1994, p64-71). 
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Hwang (1987) comments that the instrumental use of guanxi arose and persisted in 
Chinese society because of cultural and structural factors. Through historical accident 
coupled with manipulation by political and cultural elites, in ways we cannot now unravel, 
the Chinese have developed an elaborate vocabulary for thinking about interpersonal 
obligations and how they can be won or lost. The structural factor explains why the 
practice is more popular in China, where a few power figures control major economic and 
other resources and arbitrarily allocate them; Guanxi becomes a usefid way to solicit 
favour from the power figures. 
It is true that the use of guanxi is in every facet of everyday life. Guanxi has become 
widely used to secure scarce commodities, from food and other consumables to housing 
and even hospital beds. It can help to obtain employment, to transfer jobs, including 
geographic mobility, and as well to get promotion (Yang, 1994). 
Walder (1986, p187) believes that such a subculture is supported by the economic 
conditions. In the redistributive socialist economy, low levels of technical development, 
and poor transportation and communication networks, people have to rely on a 
bureaucracy of state distributors to dispense livelihood and discipline. Networks of 
instrumental personal ties are essential to the procurement of goods and services. On the 
contrary, in the market economies such as Japan and the United States, where commodities 
exist in abundance, factory officials do not have the wide personal discretion. 
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When talking about doing business in China, Arias (1998) argues that the dominance of 
guanxi in Chinese society is due to culture and to a lesser degree, institutional weakness and 
corruption. As a result, the Chinese market is conditioned by the reliance on trust 
relationships rather than on the enforcement of legal contracts. 
In a word, the Chinese culture has a tendency of relying on guanxi. While the shortage 
economy forces people to adopt guanxi route for desired goods, unstable institutions foster 
the popular practice of guanxi. 
4.3 Guanxi in business 
Much has been written about the use of guanxi to acquire jobs, power, and resources in 
China (e. g., Gold, 1985; Walder, 1986; Lin and Bian, 1991; Bian, 1994; Yang, 1994). Still, 
available research on business mainly looks at the benefits of guanxi, which is defined as 
personal relations for favour exchanges based on reciprocity, mainly gift-giving, or bribery 
(e. g., Solinger, 1989; Bruun, 1993; Young, 1995). 
In researching business before the reform era, Solinger (1989) finds that a downgrading of 
market exchange elevates the importance of non-market dealings. Guanxi had already 
acted as an aid to the informal collection of market intelligence, and eventually to control 
over goods; Guanxi also served sometimes as a supplement, but more often as a substitute, 
to gift-giving in the barter and bribery that attend the exchange of scarce goods. Since 
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money and goods are scarce, prices are controlled, and rationing, both formal and informal, 
dictates the legal distribution of key goods and services, guanxi helps to circumvent the 
restrictiveness of marketing regulations. In addition, in the absence of guanxi, exchange 
is far less likely to take place if one side lacks nothing the other can offer. Thus guanxi has 
facilitated trading. 
Under the condition of reform in process, Luo (2000, p4l) believes that guanxi has 
economic legitimacy because of high institutional uncertainties in China, which lack many 
of the mechanisms deemed necessary by conventional wisdom for a functioning market 
economy. Property rights are not well defined, channels for disseminating information on 
supply and demand are absent, while the bureaucracy dominates the social order. To deal 
with the Chinese bureaucracy and to reduce the uncertainties, Chinese people prefer to rely 
on their guanxi in power to get things done. As a result, guanxi constitutes a substitute for 
institutional support for business; it reduces operational uncertainties, including political 
uncertainty, and enhances economic returns. Also guanxi establishes a link for the flow of 
information on resource supply and demand, reducing information cost promoting 
business effectiveness; Guanxi can spur the development of new market channels and 
render protection against contextual hazards. 
In the same vein, Tao and Ho (1997) point out that China's private entrepreneurs have to 
face a highly vulnerable social status, anxiety about unpredictable government policies and 
the predominant economic opportunities, which profit from a highly versatile and 
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adaptable subcontracting network. It is therefore critical that entrepreneurs have guanxi 
networks to enhance flexibility and to co-ordinate production. They have to maintain close 
kinship and regional ties, particularistic relationships and other forms of guanxi for 
economic use to raise funds, to acquire industrial know-how, to gain access to supply of 
raw materials and to secure an abundant and reliable supply of other resources (Kraus, 
1991; Young, 1995; and Wank, 1999). Odgaard (1992) finds that local govemment 
officials often used their control over key inputs as leverage over private enterprises, and 
also they could block licenses or approvals, cut off access to credit, and add new 
restrictions on private enterprises' activities. Moreover, when the government carried out 
austerity policies, private enterprises were always the target (Nee, 1989). Furtherniore, 
private enterprises have to face exorbitant levies and sundry taxes (Bruun, 1993). To 
overcome these problems, many private entrepreneurs are forced to cultivate guanxi with 
government officials or state owned enterprises managers for favour. 
Guanxi can bring some other benefits. A survey of Hong Kong Chinese executives found 
that businessmen believed that once good guanxi had been established, a number of 
benefits would follow, which included the smooth running of routine business operation, 
information about government policies, and receipt of administrative approvals (Davies et 
aL, 1995). Tsang (1998) asserts that guanxi can provide individuals and firms with an 
imperfectly imitable resource, which renders a distinct competitive advantage over others 
in doing business in China. Also, guanxi based business practices offer certain transaction 
cost advantages over existing structural alternatives, since where the guanxi network is 
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well developed, the transaction cost advantages of reduced enviromnental and behavioural 
uncertainties and opportunistic behaviour are sufficient to warrant the integration of guanxi 
and market based exchange (Standifird and Marshall, 2000) 
4.4 Some deficiencies of guanxi In research on business 
There are several problems with the available research. Firstly, most available research was 
conducted under the condition of the shortage economy, which has changed through more 
than two decades of reform; secondly, most research mainly examines guanxi with 
government and govenunent officials, or suppliers, which is only one aspect of guanxi, and 
thus thirdly, other types of guanxi are ignored. Fourthly, some research on guanxi has led 
to a misconception of guanxi. In a sense, everything can be achieved with guanxi and 
without guanxi very little can be accomplished in China (CNN. com, January 19,1999; Li 
and Li, 2000). In line with this, Davies et al. (1995, p209) claim that witliout guanxi, one 
simply cannot get anything done in China. In addition, to some extent, the researchers 
generalize guanxi, and go to two extremes. At the one end, guanxi is totally instrumental, 
in a sense, affection does not exist among family members and close friends, and people 
only have interest in material gains. At the other extreme, with guanxi at hand, it seems 
that rational economic choice is totally out of consideration. 
To expand a little on the above points. First of all, most of the research is about guanx! 
under scarce economy, which forced people to use guanxi for desired goods. However, by 
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1993, the system of market allocation had stabilised, shortage had been alleviated 
(Whitcomb and Li, 1996). People in China can almost buy all what they need in the market. 
People have a common attitude that giving or paying money for a service is much simpler 
and more efficient than relying on guanxi (Yang, 1994, p163). As a result, money 
relationship has increasingly impinged on guanxi operation. 
Secondly, all available research emphasizes guanxi with government and government 
officials who have control over resources. For example, it is believed that the success of 
Unicom-Sparkice, a joint Internet venture in Beijing, is due to the boss Mr Zeng's strength 
from his high-power government connections--guanxi (CAW, January 19,1999). Given 
the many power structures and idiosyncratic, personal, and local nature of law and 
regulation in China, the importance of various forms of guanxi is not to be doubted. In a 
supplier market, guanxi with suppliers is undoubtedly crucial to business operation. That is 
fine, as far as it goes. However, with the progress of reform and economic development, 
the roles of government have changed, its political and administrative interference in 
business have declined. Government officials have not much control over the distribution 
of resources and products; on the other hand, markets are becoming increasingly 
competitive. More and more companies have found themselves on their own surviving 
without goveniment subsidies (Guthrie, 1998). 
The third deficiency is connected with the second point: the available research neglects 
guanxi with buyers, who are becoming more and more powerful in the competitive market. 
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Davies et aL (1995) identify four values of guanxi in developing business in China's 
market: procurement, information, bureaucracy, and transaction smoothing. The four 
factors except the last one are concerned with suppliers, the sources of resources, the 
information and bureaucratic approval of government. Some researchers have begun to 
realise this deficiency, and study guanxi strategy of marketing, in terms of relationship 
marketing (e. g., Wong and Chan, 1999). But such research is only a good start in a very 
general sense. 
Also it is important to note that since guanxi in business involves both instrumental and 
expressive elements, little attention has been paid to how to balance the two. Walder (1986, 
p179) finds that some kinds of guanxi are cultivated steadily over a long period of time and 
often develop into relationships that entail some human feelings between the parties. Other 
kinds are more short term, directly instrumental, and initial attempts at cultivation are close 
to the expected favour. The more distant the favour working and gift giving is from the 
favour expected in return, the more likely the guanxi involved includes ganqing (feeling), 
the less likely is it to appear as crudely instrumental on the part of the supplicant and as 
corruption on the part of the one who grants the favour. 
In addition, according to most research, it seems that guanxi always has positive outcomes. 
But unfortunately, this is untrue. Furthermore, guanxi can also have constraints on actions. 
No researcher has yet clearly put forward this point. To some degree close to this argument, 
a few researchers discuss dilemma in guanxi relations (Hwang, 1987; Chen, 1995). 
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According to Chen (1995), guanxi brings obligations as well privileges, and these 
obligations can extend to "ftiends of friends" throughout entire networks. Thus the skilful 
practitioner of guanxi will as often as not consciously try to avoid linking him or herself 
too intimately with certain others so as to avoid being weighed down with obligations 
(cited in Lovett et al., 1999, p234). Hwang (1987) points out the dilemma in a guanxi 
relation is mitigated or worsened by the interaction of the three factors, the cost of the 
resource allocator, the anticipation of the resource petitioner's reciprocation, and social 
evaluations of other people from the same interpersonal network. In other words, the 
actions of guanxi ties are usually based on the careful weigh of the expected gain and loss. 
As a result, guanxi cannot always have positive outcomes. 
Similarly, Chen (1994, p145) argues that in Taiwan, subcontracting is based on "weight of 
interest and affection7. Which of the two elements weighs more depends on guanxi 
between the two parties, the contractor and the subcontractor. In this sense, business 
guanxi is the integration of the most measurable (interest) and the least calculable 
(affection). 
4.5 Guanxi as a form of social capital? 
In researching business in China, some researchers have started to look at guanxi as a form 
of social capital. Wang (2000, p538) defines social capital as social structure that enables 
coopcration, of which guanxi is a form. Wank (1999, p 12 1) dcscribes guanxi as a form of 
societal capital, which is believed by the researcher broader than social capital. Luo (2000, 
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p4l) also discusses guanxi as a form of social capital, which creates economic value. 
Borrowing Bourdieu's (1986) definition, Luo looks at social capital as obligations, the 
advantages of connections or social position, and trust. 
What is social capital then? Is guanxi simply a form of social capital? What is the 
relationship between social capital and guanxz'? Literature review indicates that a 
systematic discussion about the two concepts is not available yet. The next chapter will 
attempt to fill in this deficiency and give answers to these questions. 
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Chapter 5 Guanxi: Chinese Social capital 
The early chapter examined the concept guanxi and finds that some researchers have 
treated guanxi as a form of social capital. However, a systematic discussion about the two 
concepts has not yet been seen. This chapter aims to fill this gap and contribute to the 
literature. It firstly looks at what social capital is. Then it addresses the relationship 
between the two concepts, and the implications for research in social capital theory. 
5.1 The popularity of social capital 
Table 5.1 The increase in academic use of social capital 





The term social capital is becoming more and more popular in the academic field. With the 
publication of Making Democracy Work (Putnam, 1993) and Trust (Fukuyama, 1995b), the 
concept has attracted much political and popular attention in North America (Wall et aL, 
1998). This popularity is illustrated by the dramatic increase in academic use of the 
concep t22 In forty years from 1951 to 1990, the term occurred only four times in the titles 
of journals. In the late 1990s, the term became fashionable in more and more journal 
22 The finding is based on an examination of keywords social capital for journal articles and theses written 
from 1951 to 2000. The library searches were conducted in March 2001 in BIDS International Bibliography 
of the Social Sciences, with social capital occurring in title/keyword/abstract fields in English language 
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articles. From 1996 to 2000, the number of articles using the concept increased 
spectacularly to 3 18 (Table 5.1). 
Narayan and Woolcock (1999) identify a number of research fields in which social capital 
has featured prominently. These include (1) families and youth behaviour problems; (2) 
schooling and education; (3) community life; (4) work and organisations; (5) democracy 
and governance; (6) general cases of collective action problems; (7) public health and 
environment issues; (8) crime and violence; and (9) economic development. From Table 
5.2, it can be seen that social scientists from various disciplines have contributed to the 
developing concept of social capital (Wall et al., 1998). 
Table 5.2 Journal articles from different disciplines using social capital 
General journal category Pre 1981 1981-1990 1991-1995 
Sociology/anthropology and related 9 26 46 
Economics and business 3 14 21 
Education - 6 22 
Development/planning/geography 7 5 13 
Agriculture 4 2 
Psychology I - 5 
Total by period 20 55 109 
Source: Wall et aL (1998)' 
Also, social capital theory has been applied to research on transitional economies. For 
example, Kolankiewicz (1996) takes contemporary Poland as a case to examine the 
23 Wall et al. (1998) conducted library searches at the University of Guelph in 1996 in the the following data 
bases: ABI1INFORM, AGRICOLA, ART INDEX, CAB ABSTRACTS, ECONLIT, ERIC, GEOBASE, 
HUMANITIES, PSYCLIT, and SOCIOFILE. The result was based on an examination of key words for 
journal articles and these written from 1981 to 1995. 
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emerging process of class formation attendant on privatisation and democratisation, by 
using social capital theory. Dinello (1998) examines the social capital of Russian bankers 
who are perceived as the prime movers of Russia's transition to the market. Clark (2000) 
proposes an approach from the social capital perspective to examine the socially 
constructed process undertaken by business founders in the transition of the Czech 
Republic. 
5.2 What is social capital? 
An increasing number of social scientists refer to social capital as the information, trust, 
and norms of reciprocity inhering in one's social networks (Woolcock, 1998). However, 
the term social capital is subject to a variety of interpretations by users from different 
trends in dominant thinking and particular perspectives. Schuller (2000) points out that 
social capital seems to be a flexible term that can be fixed into different settings. Inter alia 
the popularity of the notion of social capital may be its fluidity, the fact that it can be used 
in so many different ways and in different contexts. Wall et aL (1998) finds that, in the 
early 1970s, social capital was defined in very tangible ways by economists, namely as 
physical infrastructure or financial asset. Here, social capital can mean the totality of all 
forms capital: natural, economic, or human. Other researchers equated social capital with 
certain expenditures of the state. In sociology and interdisciplinary social sciences, social 
capital has only been used more recently. For them, it has somewhat distinctive meaning. 
The following sections examine three main streams of social capital theory in literature. 
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5.2.1 Social capital according to Putnam and Fukuyama 
Putnam's (1993) notion of social capital is most dominant and fashionable in development 
studies. Putnam (1993) relies on the idea of social capital to address the questions about 
the necessary conditions for creating strong, responsive, and effective institutions in 
different regions in Italy. He strongly emphasises the vibrancy of associational life and an 
informed public as a necessary condition for a healthy civic community. Social capital is 
measured by voting patterns, newspaper readership, and participation in sports and cultural 
associations. For Putnam (1993), social capital includes trust, norms, and networks; each 
enhances co-operative actions, persists in the long run and re-asserts itself under suitable 
circumstances. 
Fukuyama (1995a, 1995b) examines social capital in countries, a broader level than 
Putnam's (1993) regions. In an attempt to explain why some countries have been more 
economically successful than others, Fukuyama (1995a, 1995 b) treats social capital as 
trust, the ability of people to work together for common purposes in groups and 
organisations. He compares a number of countries in terms of their social capital strength, 
and concludes that high levels of sociability (social capital) and loyalty make individuals 
work co-operatively in the corporations that drive the economy and ensure prosperity. 
Many researchers (e. g., Leonardi, 1995; Evans, 1996; Knack and Keefer, 1997,; Cohen and 
Field, 1999; Fedderke et aL, 1999; Hall, 1999; Hofferth and Iceland, 1998; Kyle, 1999; 
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Paxton, 1999; Temple, 1998; Temple and Johnason, 1998) are in the same line with 
Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995a, 1995b). They generally look at social capital as 
norms of horizontal association or the social and political enviromnent that enable such 
norms to develop, and trust. In other words, social capital is the norms of cooperative 
action. 
5.2.2 The origin of social capital 
According to Wall et aL (1998), although social scientists have figured in developing the 
concept of social capital, the term has only been used by academics in recent times. 
This is indicated by the fact that the term is not found in any of the following 
encyclopedic references: Encyclopaedia Sociology, Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 
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International Encyclopaedia ofthe Social Sciences and Survey ofSocial Sciences. There is 
one exception though, in the Encyclopaedia Sociology, the term social capital is mentioned 
under the title of "social network theory", described as a "prominent theme" in writing 
about the purposive use of networks. In the newly published Sociology edited by Fulcher 
and Scott (1999), the term social capital is not mentioned; instead, cultural capital is 
explained. 
What is the origin of social capital? Astone et al. (1999) argue that the concept of social 
capital originated in sociology and is being widely incorporated into much current social 
science. Recent empirical studies using the term social capital almost always refer to a 
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widely read article by an American sociologist James Coleman (1988), which was later 
revised and presented in his book Foundation of Social Tbeory (1990). Sobel (2002, p 145) 
finds that nearly all of the papers in the World Bank volume on social capital (1999) cite 
Coleman's paper (1988 or 1990). It is found that Putnam (1993, p167), an American 
political scientist at Harvard University, who contributed greatly to the popularity of the 
concept, in fact boffows Coleman's (1990, p302,304, and 307) definition of social capital 
by quoting 'Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive... ' and concludes that 
4spontaneous cooperation is facilitated by social capital'. But it must be noted that his own 
concept of social capital goes beyond Coleman's (1990). 
In the same vein, Paxton (1999) points out that the term social capital remained obscure 
until Bourdieu and Coleman popularised it, though a number of authors, from a variety of 
fields, used it. Therefore, Wall et aL (1998, p300) argue that 'social capital has gained 
currency over the last decade, spurred in large part by the work of James Coleman and 
Piere Bourdieu. ' It is commonly agreed that the concept of social capital was introduced by 
two major social scientists Bourdieu and Coleman. 
5.2.3 Coleman's version of social capital 
Coleman (1988) studies a sample of public school students in the USA to establish the 
links between social and human capital. Based on the assumption that different family 
structures create different levels of social capital available for children, Coleman 
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operationalised social capital into six factors. The six factors are the parents' presence in 
the home, the number of additional children present, the different combinations of parents 
and siblings, the mother's expectation for a child's education, the mobility of the family, 
and the church attendance. He finds that school dropout rates are low when social capital is 
high, i. e., when both parents are present in the home with one sibling, a mother expects the 
child to attend college, there is little family mobility, and there is a religion affiliation. 
Building his theory on the work of Loury (1977), Granovetter (1973,1974,1985), and Lin 
(1981,1982), Coleman (1988,1990) defines social capital by its function: 'social capital 
paralleling the concepts of financial capital, physical capital, and human capital, but 
embodied in relations among persons. ' (1988: sll8). Ile concept of social capital 
illustrates how the social structure of a group can function as a resource for the individuals 
of that group. Social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends 
that in its absence would not be possible. There are three forms of social capital: 1) 
obligations and expectations based on trustworthiness of the social enviromnent, 2) 
information-flow capacity of the social structure, and 3) norms enforced by sanction. 
Coleman (1988,1990) claims that social capital inheres in the structure of relations 
between and among actors. In family, social capital is the relations between parents and 
children. Outside the family, social capital is the social relationships that exist among 
parents. To summarise for Coleman, social capital is obligations and expectations, 
information, and norms existing between and among social relations. 
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5.2.4 Bourdieu's concept of social capital 
Based on Marxist analysis, Bourdieu introduces a more complex class notion than the 
concept of class as a system of property rights and seeks to reveal the indispensable 
contribution that the consumption of symbolic goods makes to reproducing class 
domination through legitimation and selection (Gartman, 1991). Bourdieu (1986,1993) 
introduces a more complex class notion, where he explores social class in terms of volume 
and structure of capital. Different forms of capital, i. e., economic capital, cultural capital, 
and social capital are taken into account. 
Bourdieu's concept of capital is broader than the monetary notion of capital in economics. 
Bourdieu (1986, p241-243) defines capital as "accumulated labour (in its materialised form 
or its 'incorporated', embodied form) which, when appropriated on a private, i. e., 
exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in 
the form of reffied or living labour". Capital presents itself under three fundamental 
species: economic capital, cultural capital, and social capital. Each of them has its own 
subtypes. 
Economic capital is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be 
institutionalised in the form of property rights. Economic capital refers to financial 
resources and assets, in which a good example is monetary income. 
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As a matter of fact, Bourdieu pays much more attention to cultural capital. Cultural capital 
in fact should be called information capital to give the notion in its full generality, which 
itself has three forms, embodied, objectified, and institutionalised (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992). 
Cultural capital consists of various cultural advantages that can be turned into economic 
gains. Bourdieu (1986, p246) identifies three forms that it can take: 1) the embodied state, 
which consists of what Bourdieu calls "long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body", in 
other words, this is the culture that we carry around with us in our head, such as knowledge 
and habit; 2) the objectified state, which is the culture found in "things", existing in 
possessions, such as books or paintings or clothing; 3) the institutionalised state, which is 
typically represented in formal education qualifications. Therefore, certain ways of 
thinking and speaking, or a stock of cultural possessions, or examination certificates can all 
present people with cultural advantages. The term cultural capital reflects the importance 
of culture in education, in occupational success, in a word, in social status. 
Acquiring cultural capital is not just a matter of passing examinations and gaining 
qualifications. Bourdieu suggests that correct manners, the right tastes, say, in dress, and an 
appreciation of high culture are all part of cultural capital. They can be crucial in 
determining whether someone gets a high status job or gains admission to elite circles. 
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Social capital is 'the aggregate of the actual and potential resources that are linked to the 
possession of a durable network of relationship or mutual acquaintance and recognition' 
(Bourdieu, 1986, p248). Social capital is thus the sum of the actual and potential resources 
that can be activated through membership in organisations and social networks. Bourdieu 
(1993, p33) explains that 'one can give an intuitive idea of it by saying that it is what 
ordinaiy language calls connections'. 
From the above, it is found that the central proposition of social capital theory is that 
networks of relationships constitute a valuable resource for the conduct of actions, 
providing their members with collectively owned capital, a credential that entitles them to 
credit. There are several sources of social capital. Firstly, much of social capital is 
embedded within networks of mutual acquaintance and recognition. Secondly, social 
capital is available through the contacts or connections networks bring. Thirdly, social 
capital can be derived from membership in specific networks, where such a membership is 
restricted (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). In short, from the variety of definitions of social 
capital, it is concluded that social relationships are a common element. As Astone et aL 
(1999) have commented, the use of term social capital to refer to the resources that emerge 
from one's social ties is exceedingly popular. 
5.3 The relationship between guanxi and social capital 
From the above, it is found that guanxi and social capital are two analogous concepts. 
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The overlap of the two concepts is apparently reflected in the origins of social capital that 
advanced Coleman's (1988,1990) theory. Loury (1977) uses social capital as a set of 
resources inhering in family relations and in community social organisation, which is 
useful for the cognitive or social development of a child or young person. 
Lin (1982) defines his concept of social resources as resources embedded in one's social 
network, which are accessible through one's direct or indirect ties. Earlier than Lin, 
Granovetter (1973,1974) was centrally concerned with how people use their social 
relationships for instrumental goals. Not surprisingly, their successor Coleman (1988,1990) 
identifies social relations in family and outside family in community as social capital. Both 
guanxi and social capital involve social relations, the norms that undergird them, and the 
positive consequences of having such relations. Nonetheless, this does not mean that social 
capital is all about guanxi, or guanxi is another term for social capital. Besides several 
common aspects, there are some differences. 
For instance, social capital is regarded as both the attributes of individuals and 
organisations by Coleman (1988,1990) and Putnam. (1993); while guanxi is mainly about 
interpersonal relationships, which are rather difficult to transfer into an organisation 
attribute. The relationship between guanxi and social capital, more precisely, the three 
main streams of social capital theory, can be better understood as illustrated in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3 Comparisons between guanxi and the three main social capital theories 
Guanxi Bourdieu Coleman Putnam 
Components Guanxi Networks, Social Civic 
relations, trust, obligation relations, association, 
norm of obligations, reciprocity, 
reciprocity information and trust 
and social 
norms 
Location Personal Personal Between and Organisation 
networks networks among actors (civic 
association) 
Sources Guanxi Connections Family & Networks of 
networks Community civic 
association 
Attributes Individual Individual Both Organisation 
individual and (community, 
community region) 
ownership Private Private Public Public 
function Instrumental Instrumental Instrumental Instrumental 
How produced Building, Mainly By-product of By-product of 




Norm Reciprocity 1 2bligation Reciprocity Reciprocity 
Trust Particularism Not mentioned Part of norm General 
Affection Involved Likely Not concerned Not concerned 
Firstly, both social capital and guanxi involve social relations. It is social relationships 
between and among actors that structure social capital for Coleman (198 8,1990). Bourdieu 
(1986) explicitly explains that network of social relations are social capital. Membership in 
a civic association for Putnam (1993) provides its members a form of social relationship. 
Although Putnam stresses that civic association cutting across social cleavages nourishes 
wider cooperation, he admits that strong interpersonal social relations, such as kinship ties, 
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play a role in collective action. Indeed, social capital is popularly defined as the resources 
that emerge from one's social ties (Astone et aL, 1999). 
Secondly, both guanxi and social capital are instrumental, and they are actually or 
potentially productive. Guanxi is defined as instrumental social relationships. As Gold 
(1985) notes, instrumentalism is an extraordinary characteristic of guanxi in China today. 
In the available literature, social capital is also described as playing a functional and 
positive role in outcome. As an instrument, when social capital is present, it increases the 
capacity for action and facilitates various ends for the members of a group and also the 
group as a whole. A good example of the productive outcome of social capital is in 
building human capital (Coleman, 1988). For Bourdieu (1986), social capital is directly 
usable in the long or short term, and can be converted into economic capital. According to 
Putnam (1993), social capital of trust and civic engagement foster collective actions and 
thus institutional success in the broader community or region results, making democracy 
work. 
Thirdly, the benefits of social capital and guanxi are reinforced by the norm of reciprocity. 
Norms define what actions are considered acceptable or unacceptable, and can be seen as 
the basis of social capital (Coleman, 1990). As argued in the previous chapter, the norm of 
reciprocity, bao, is an essential component of guanxi. Like many other theorists, Putnam 
(1993) suggests that norms are important ingredients of social capital, the most important 
of which is reciprocity. Together with trust and network, norms enhance co-operative 
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actions. Without using the term of reciprocity, Bourdieu (1986) implicitly talks about the 
norm of social capital as durable obligations subjectively felt. Coleman (1988,1990) 
points out that obligation, as a form of social capital, depends on two elements, 
trustworthiness of the social environment, which means that obligations will be repaid, and 
the actual extent of obligations held. Accordingly to Gouldner (1960), reciprocity is one of 
the universal norms, and principal components of moral codes. It is a concrete and special 
mechanism involved in the maintenance of any stable social system. 
Besides these similarities between the two concepts, there are differences. One 
differentiation lies in the different levels of analysis. These result in different 
understandings of where the good locates. In turn, this leads to two further distinctions, one 
is how to produce social capital or guanxi, and the other is the difference in the nature of 
trust. 
Firstly, theorists have different views of the sources of social capital. Bourdieu (1986) 
has a similar stance with guanxi. Personal networks are the sources of social capital. 
Unlike Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1988,1990) suggests that both family and community 
provide social capital for individuals; while Putnam (1993) regards networks of civic 
association as the sources of social capital. 
Different understandings of the sources of social capital and guanxi derive from different 
analysis levels by the theorists, to a great extent. To some researchers, social capital, like 
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guanxi, is a private good that can be used for private purpose. Both Bourdieu and Coleman 
write about social capital as an attribute of a person. There is some other research in this 
line that sees social capital as resources for individuals, for example, Anheier et aL (1995), 
Astone et aL (1999), Burt (1992,1997a, 1997b, 1999), Clark (2000), Dinello (1998), 
Kolankiewicz (1996), Pahl (1996), Rose (1998), and Sanders and Nee (1996). 
However, represented by Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995a, 1995b), more theorists 
consider social capital in a broader sense (e. g., Putnam, 1993; Evans, 1996; Fedderke et aL, 
1999; Hall, 1999; Hofferth and Iceland, 1998; Kyle, 1999; Knack and Keefer, 1997; 
Leonardi, 1995; Neace, 1999; Paxton, 1999; Temple, 1998; Temple and Johnason, 1998). 
Putnam (1993) defines social capital as the attributes of social organisation. Social capital 
is seen as a macro-sociological phenomenon, or a character of a community, and thus 
social capital is a public good and a community resource. For the theorists in this line, the 
whole community, from regions to entire nations, can hold different levels of social capital, 
which in turn enhance the chances of positive outcomes, such as, development and 
democracy. 
Coleman (1988,1990) treats social capital as a feature of both individuals and community. 
For both Putnam (1993) and Coleman (1988,1990), social capital is a public good that is 
beneficial to everyone in a community. This diverges from Bourdieu's (1986) social 
capital and guanxi. Like guanxi, Bourdieu's (1986) social capital is a private asset that 
only serves those individuals who hold such connections. 
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Secondly, in regard to how the intended outcome of social capital or guanxi is produced, 
theorists have different visions. Both Coleman (1988,1990) and Putriam (1993) believe 
that social capital, as a public property, is the by-product of other social activities, such as 
participation in choral societies, sports clubs, etc. Like guanxi, social capital of Bourdieu. 
(1986) is not necessarily a natural given; instead, it is the product of investment by 
individuals who consciously or unconsciously aim at establishing or reproducing such 
social relations. The investment implies expenditure of time and energy, which in turn 
means directly or indirectly expenditure of economic capital. 
Thirdly, guanxi and social capital do not share the same understanding of the nature of 
trust. Luhmann (1979) divides trust into two categories, interpersonal trust and institutional 
trust. Interpersonal trust is based on experience, while institutional trust is built on stable 
and clearly defined institution other than individuals. People rely on institutional trust to 
deal with unfamiliar settings, to anticipate and make decisions. In the same vein, PaIdam, 
(2000) suggests that trust can be simply divided into generalised trust and special trust 
where generalised trust is defined as trusting people in general; while special trust is to 
trust known people or trust in particular institutions. Clearly, both interpersonal trust and 
special trust can refer to trust from guanxi, known people, while generalised or institutional 
trust is close to ]Putnam's (1993) concept of trust and Coleman's (1988,1990) 
trustworthiness of social envirorunent. 
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There are two further differences. Firstly, an affective element is involved in guanxi 
exchange. It is also compatible with Bourdieu's (1986) account. However, affection is 
not the concern of Putnam (1993) and Coleman (1988,1990). Secondly, guanxi, the term 
developed in the Chinese discourse, has ethical controversy in tenns of its bluffed 
boundary with corruption. However, social capital seems to involve no ethical problem; 
instead, it is a good that promotes positive outcomes, for instance, economic development. 
Figure 5.1 Representing overl3p between guand and the three main social capital theories 
in conclusion, guand and social capital are two overlapping terms. They have common 
ingredients, such as the existence of certain social relationships, the norms of such 
relationships, and the outcome of them. Nevertheless, guanxi is most approximate to 
Bourdieu's (1986) notion of social capital, which is mainly looked at from the rclational 
dimension of social capital to refer to the actual and potential resources embedded within, 
available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed or created by 
an individual (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Moreover, like Coleman (1988,1990) and 
Putnam (1993), guanxi has also another important ingredient, trust, though they have 
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different understandings of its nature. This is not of Bourdieu's (1986) concern. Guand 
and Bourdieu (1986) are similar in terms of analysis level and the way of producing the 
property. However, both Coleman (1988,1990) and Putnam (1993) have different 
understandings from guanxi and Bourdieu in these two aspects. The relationships between 
guand and social capital are demonstrated in Figure 5.1. Guand and the three versions of 
social capital overlap each other. However, guanxi is closest to Bourdieu's social capital 
and thus overlaps more with it; while Coleman and Putriam have much more in common 
with each other and may be thought of as a different North American variant (Wall et aL, 
1999). 
5.4 Conclusion 
Popular usage of the term social capital has emerged among various social science 
disciplines. The concept provides a useful analysis tool for social scientists. However, 
there exist two outstanding deficiencies. Firstly, extensions of the concept in recent 
writings, from an individual asset to an attribute of communities and even nations, may 
jeopardise its heuristic value. 'As a property of communities and nations rather than 
individuals, social capital is simultaneously a cause and an effect' (Portes, 1998, p16). 
Sobel (2002, p146) has also found that some authors, led by Coleman and Putnam, at times 
equate the existence of social capital with outcomes obtained using social capital. 
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Embedded in communities, social capital is mobilised by individuals of the communities 
who pursue their personal gain; it does not provide each member with the same chance and 
the same gain. The formal associations, advocated by optimistic social scientists like 
Putnam (1993), may only be a small factor in the production of social capital or trust (Lyon, 
2000). Furthermore, the same strong social ties that help some members of the community 
also enable them to dominate and exclude others (Mcclenaghan, 2000). Similarly, Sobel 
(2002) points out that the ability to use network relationships need not be good for 
society or even for the network. For example, using blockmodeling procedures to analyse 
data on German writers, Anheier et aL (1995) find that in the community of culture fields, 
significant differences in both culture and social capital distinguish elite from marginal 
writers. 
Communities become the venues for the individuals seeking social resources for their 
personal ends. The nature of communities has changed and been extended from the 
traditional locale-based notion of a community. As Falk and Kilpatrick (2000) argue, the 
life of communities tends to be community-of-common-purpose. Communities, where 
social capital locates, are a set of personal, ego-centred social networks rather than spaces 
(Lomnitz, 1999). In many circumstances, these benefits of social capital come at the cost to 
individuals outside of the group (Sobel, 2002, p146). 
Secondly, the bulk of research using the concept of social capital is focused on the 
consequences of possessing or not possessing an adequate amount of social capital, but 
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little research has been done on how it is brought into being (Astone, et aL 1999). The 
importance of social capital lies in how social capital helps to achieve personal ends. 
Social capital is like a kind of precious mine under the earth, without the labour of human 
beings, its value would never be realised. 
It is found that an individual's access to social resources is instrumentally important and 
people therefore invest in each other to gain future access to different resources (Lin et al., 
1981; Lin, 1982). A high social status of the other person has a positive influence on the 
decision to invest in relations (Van Duijn et aL, 1999). A precondition to building social 
capital is the existence of sufficient numbers of interactions of a particular quality (Falk 
and Kilpatrick, 2000). In line with the classic work on the gift by Mauss (1969), Eisenstadt 
and Roniger (1999) argue that the latent function or purpose of the gifts is to establish the 
obligation to engage in social interaction and to uphold those obligations entailed in such 
interaction. 
Social capital provides only an instnunent for personal gains, how to transfer social capital 
into the gains is in fact more important (e. g., Astone et aL, 1999; Pahl, 1996). In this aspect, 
both Bourdieu (1986) and guanri can contribute to the richness of social capital. Bourdieu 
(1986) has pointed out that people will deliberately join certain clubs that provide social 
capital. Unfortunately, Bourdicu has never put his theory into empirical research. 
Furthermore, as noted previously, clubs, a form of community-of-common-purpose (Falk 
and Kilpatrick, 2000), cannot provide their members with equal social capital. For instance, 
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joining certain associations can lead to knowing people and building guanxi (Odgaard, 
1992), but this is only a start point for obtaining social capital or turning the potentials for 
their future use. What are the other bases for establishing guanxi? Are there any other 
strategies that solve the problem of one's own lack of guanxi? 
In this sense, research on guand practice, in particular, the creation of social capital, e. g., 
building guanxi, and investment to produce obligations, can contribute greatly to social 
capital theory. From this perspective, guanxi or guanxi xue has a great advantage in 
understanding how social capital comes into being. What are different types of guanxi 
accessed for business start-ups? How do they come into beings? When entrepreneurs do 
not have available guanxi, how do they establish guanxi? Are there any other alternatives? 
These become the main task for the case studies of this thesis. 
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Part 3 Case Studies 
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Chapter 6 Self-reflective methodology: guanxi approach 
The previous two chapters examined the two key concepts of guanxi and social capital of 
this thesis. It further argued that guand with cadres are not always useful, as most research 
had imagined. Such guanxi have also constraints. In addition, guanxi can be built and 
developed. With an aim to demonstrate these points, this chapter will describe and analyse 
how this researcher utilised a guanxi approach to conduct field research. 
The methodology for the case studies is snowball sampling by a guanxi approach, i. e., 
exploiting guanri to conduct field research by using the initial guanxi to 'snowball' and 
gather additional contacts as informants. This was done in Beijing during the five months 
from early May till late September 2000. Snowball sampling seeks to take advantage of the 
social networks of identified respondents to provide a researcher with an ever-expanding 
set of potential contacts (Miles and Huberman 1994; Thomson, 1997). Thus, snowball 
research methodology is a very good strategy to access "hard-to-research" populations 
(Atkinson and Flint, 2001). However, none of the above mentioned methodology is about 
guanxi approach. 
Yeung (1995) find that the most important issue in research in China appears to be the 
ability of solving the problem of "getting in7, that is, to form relationships or guand. If one 
has no referrals or guanxi, he or she is not likely to get any insightful information (Davies 
el aL, 1995). However, little research has been done from a first hand experience to 
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demonstrate how researchers solve the problem. This research methodology fills such a 
gap. 
6.1 Reflective methodology 
This chapter is therefore an autobiography of my field research. Biography and 
autobiography are also closely articulating with the lives of others (Stanley, 1992). "From 
the (autography or biography of) a person we can recover social process and social 
structure, networks, social change and so forth, for people are located in a social and 
cultural enviromnent which constructs and shapes not only what we see but also how we 
see if' (Stanley, 1993, p45). Autobiography and biography provide an important source, 
through which it is possible to see how specific individuals internalise particular social 
expectations and aspirations. Furthermore, they could offer sociologists the chance to 
understand the social enviromnent in which the individuals act as social being (Evans, 
1993). Similarly, Cotterill and Letherby (1993) point out that autobiography and 
biography not only record the life of one individual, they are also documents of many lives. 
Thus they are also relevant to the academic empirical research of sociology. 
However, sociology has been slow to use the writer her/himself as a source to develop a 
reflexive analysis for sociological discussion (Ribbens, 1993). This autobiographical 
account describes how the researcher used the guanxi approach to conduct field research. 
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Therefore, the research methodology per se provides a unique reflective "window" to the 
understanding of guanxi. 
6.2 Choosing the field site 
I chose Beijing as my field research site mainly for two reasons. Firstly, private high-tech 
enterprises have become the pillar of Beijing's economy (China Daily, 23 October 2000). 
Beijing Zhongguancun High-tech Park, where most high-tech firms are located, plays a 
demonstration role to other domestic Science Parks (Wang, 2000). Secondly and more 
importantly, I have guanxi in Beijing where I have lived for more than ten years. In 
particular, I have a network of guanxi covering many government organisations after 
several years of work in a central government department. I had thought that these ties 
would help me to access private entrepreneurs in the field site, as much research suggested 
the power and control of government departments and private business association over the 
private sector (see Odgaard, 1992; Bruun, 1993; Young, 1995; Wank, 1996 and 1999). The 
relationship between private entrepreneurs and government officials is patron-clientelist 
(Wank, 1999). This proposal was configured by my vision of choices embedded in my 
guanxi structure - my personal relation network in government departments. 
6.3 Introduction of Zhongguancun High-tech Park 
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Beijing, the capital city of China, has a population of 12.4 million. In 1998, its gross 
domestic product (GDP) was RMB 201 billion (US$ 24 billion); the industrial output was 
RMB 171.5 billion (US$ 20.7 billion). By the end of 1998, there were 61,113 private 
enterprises, whose average registered capital was RMB 620,000 (US$ 75,000) (BPIA data, 
2000). 
Located in Haidian District in Northwest Beijing, Zhongguancun was initially the name of 
a place adjacent to the campus of Peking University. In the early 1980s, some researchers 
began to run non-state technology firms in Zhongguancun. Because at the beginning, most 
of the firms sold electronic products, Zhongguancun got the nickname "Electronic Streef'. 
Since May 1988 when the State Council approved the establishment of Haidian 
Experimental Zone for the development of high and new technology, Zhongguancun has 
grown up from an "Electronic Street" to a leading hi-tech park in China. On June 5,1999, 
the State Council, the Chinese cabinet issued its official written reply on the construction 
of Zhongguancun. Zhongguancun High-tech Park is now a state level high-tech park. 
Zhongguancun covers 68 universities and 213 research and development (R&D) 
institutions including the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Peking University and Tsinghua. 
University. It makes thousands of R&D discoveries every year (China Daily, January 25, 
2000). According to Economic Daily (May 8,2000), there are more than 6,600 
high-tech"' companies in the park, which include well-known Chinese companies such as 
24 China has a relatively systematic and comprehensive listing of high-tech technology products in various 
sectors with detailed technical definitions. According to The List of China k High-Tech Technology Products 
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Stone, Legend and Founder. Their utilisation of new technologies has contributed to nearly 
50% of this industry. There are also more than 1,000 foreign-invested enterprises. 
During the past decade, IBM, Microsoft, Intel, Motorola, Hewlett Packard, Mitsubishi and 
dozens of other world-renowned companies have set up R&D centres in Zhongguancun or 
its surrounding areas. Domestic companies are also locating their R&D centres in the park. 
Some famous companies, such as Founder, Legend and Stone, are now devoting an 
average of 8% of their overall technological, industrial and trade revenues to R&D. 
Zhongguancun is thus called the Chinese Silicon Valley. 
In the past ten years, Zhongguancun has had an annual economic growth rate over 30 per 
cent. In 1999, its 6,690 high-tech and new-technology enterprises earned RMB 86.41 
billion (US$ 10.4 billion) in revenues. The value of these companies' gross industrial 
output in 1999 was RMB 52.7 billion (US$6.4 billion, current prices). The increase in the 
value of Zhongguancun's gross industrial output was so substantial that it accounted for 
70% of that of Beijing in 1999. 
Zhongguancun's importance is demonstrated by the fact that it leads China's 53 high-tech 
and new-technology zones in total revenues. In addition, Zhongguancun's enterprises 
released on Sept. 28 2000 by China's Ministry of Science and Technology, the State Commission of 
Economic and Trade, and the State Administration of Taxation, high-tech products were 2,056 items in II 
sectors. The It technological areas are: electronic information, software, aerospace, integrated 
photo-mecbanical-electrical technology, biology, pharmaceutical and medical equipment, new materials, new 
energy and high-energy, efficient devices, environmental protection, atmosphere and ocean, material 
utilization technology and agriculture (Xinhua News Agency, September 28,2000). 
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produce about 10% of Chinese high-tech zones' revenues, gross industrial output and 
before-tax profits (Economic Daily, May 8,2000). 
Beijing's municipal government announced ambitious goals for its Zhongguancun Hi-tech 
Park 25 . These goals include Zhongguancun enterprises generating annual revenues of RMB 
110 billion (US$13.3 billion) in 2000 and RMB 600 billion (US$72.6 billion) within 10 
years (Beying Youth Daily, January 30,2000). 
6.4 Proposed paths to access interviewees 
As stated in the aforementioned section, the decision to conduct field research in Beijing 
derived from self-confidence in my guanxi accumulated in more than ten years of study 
and work in the city. The paths to access interviewees were accordingly supposed to be in 
existence. Before action, I had a brainstorm by going over my old and shabby name and 
25 After the new plan on Zhongguancun Hi-tech Park was published, all the hi-tech parks in Beijing are 
generally called Zhongguancun Hi-tech Park. The new Zhongguancun Hi-tech Park consists of three zones: 
center zone, development zone and radial zone. The center zone has an area about 75 square kilometers, 
which is bounded by the Xiwai Street in the south, the Planned Fifth Ring 
Road in the north, Jingmi Canal in the west, and Badaling Great Wall Expressway in the east. The core of the 
center zone includes Chinese Academy of Science, Peking University, Tsinghua University, and west zone of 
Zhongguancun (science & technology business center, sale center, and business & culture service center). 
The center zone is the traditionally and popularly recognised location of Zhongguancun High-tech Park, and 
is the field site for this research. The development zone and radial zone are not of concern in this research, 
and thus are not given further description. For further details, see Beijing Municipal Govermnent, 
Ministry of Science and Technology (PRC), "Request for instruction on actualizing the strategy of 
flourishing country by science and education, and accelerating the construction of Zhongguancun High-tech 
ParV, Beijing Policy file [ 1999] No. 35. 
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address book, which contains contact details of all my guanxi: friends and familiar 
acquaintances. I wrote down a list of people, who, I thought, could help introduce private 
entrepreneurs as my interviewees. The proposed paths are shown in Figure 6.1 (see p 172). 
I started from the "embedded structure ...... government line, where I have a number of 
guanxi after working for more than seven years in a central government department. The 
first government department I decided to contact was Beijing Policy Research (BJPR). 
This was based on three considerations. Firstly, it is an influential think-tank body of 
Beijing municipal government, and thus it can help. Secondly, being responsible for 
providing policy advice to the municipal government, it may be interested in my research. 
Thirdly and more importantly, I had dense guanxi there: three friends, with AI as the head 
of the department and A2 and A3 both as middle chiefs under A I's supervision. 
Soon I found that A3 had gone to Hong Kong to join her husband. A2 had moved to a new 
post outside the think-tank. Al is in a very high position of the government's hierarchy. He 
is always very busy and it is very difficult to get hold of him. As status matters - 
relationships with a senior will extend to his subordinates (Arias, 1998), it should be a 
good path to get me through to the officials in Zhongguancun High-tech Park, who would 
in turn introduce me to private entrepreneurs under their jurisdiction. In China, which is a 
rather hierarchical society, if one has rich and influential friends, one can surely draw on 
more resources (social capital), if it is needed, than if one has poor friends far from the 
seats of power (Lin, 1995). 1 thus kept on calling him with a great expectation. I finally 
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caught him on the telephone and explained to him my research plan. He discussed with me 
about my research topic for a while and told me clearly, 
I know few private entrepreneurs myself as you know we don't have direct contact with them. Yes, I 
have good guanxi with the heads of the research offices under Haidian District (where the high-tech 
park is located) government and Zhongguancun High-tech Park, but as far as I know they do not have 
any good means to access private enterprises themselves. 
At this point, I gave up this line of enquiry. It may be assumed that government agencies 
without direct interaction with enterprises would have difficulties in accessing them. Can 
the officials from government departments in charge of private enterprises help me access 
private entrepreneurs? 
The second proposed paths were Beijing Bureau of Industry and Commerce (BBIC) and 
Beijing Federation of Industry and Commerce (BFIC)26. It is well known that the Bureau 
of Industry and Commerce has the power to issue business licences to enterprises, and 
several friends strongly recommended it as the best route to access private enterprises. I 
began from the superior of BBIC, the State Bureau of Industry and Commerce (SBIC), 
where A4 and some other friends of mine are in important positions such as the aide to the 
minister. However, A4 suggested me not to go to their subordinate, 
26 A semi-government organisation under the auspice of the Department of United Front Work (DUFW) of 
the Communist Party. Nationally, there is All China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC). The 
federation is said to represent entrepreneurs, mainly from the private sector. 
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You know our staffs have only one-time contact with an enterprise, or once a year when the enterprise 
comes to renew its licence. In general, the frequency of contact is not enough for them to build up 
intimate guanxi with firms. We bet the outcome would be better if you try Beijing Federation of 
Industry and Commerce (BFIC), which is authorised by the government to administrate private 
entrepreneurs. 
They thus got me through to Mr Shi, the head of the research department of Beijing 
Federation of Industry and Commerce (BFIC), who was responsible for the 2000 National 
Survey on Private Enterprises in Beijing area. Mr Shi told me frankly, 
I was allocated 100 questionnaires of the National Survey on Private Enterprises from the All China 
Federation of Industry and Commerce. I assigned them to the 18 districts and counties. I am not very 
clear about how they will finish their task in detail yet. We do not have full time staff responsible for the 
survey, and I presume that they will have to fill in the questionnaires in passing when they visit some 
enterprises. I will go with them to visit some private firms. If you would like to join us, no problem at 
all. But if you have your own questionnaire for the entrepreneurs to fill in, it will be a bit difficult. You 
know, we the Federation of Industry and Commerce, aim to unite (tong zhan) the private sector. We are 
supposed to serve private enterprises. Since we cannot help them much, we'd better not trouble them 
too much. The less, the better. A professor at Chinese Academy Social Sciences gave me 200 
questionnaires of another research project. I have no idea yet how to deal with them. 
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You may try Beijing Individual and Private Economy Association (BIPEA). They may be more helpful, 
since they have 80 thousand members and we have only 2,000 members representing private 
entrepreneurs. 
From the feedback of Mr Shi, I understood that this was not a realistic way to pursue, 
although I had prepared three other guanxi for the same path, A5, A' and A7. A5 was the 
aid to a former vice mayor of the city, while A6 is a vice-mayor a the moment. A7 does 
research at a Beijing research institute, and also gives advice on the research projects of the 
BFIC. 
Cadre guanxi, on which I had great expectations, provided me with no solution to access 
private entrepreneurs. This is ironic, given the belief of the power of cadre guanxi in China. 
This situation applies very well to Burt's (2000) description of "redundancy of networW'. 
Though A8, a department chief in a district, was willing to help me on his own initiative, I 
declined his kind offer. This is because is Zhongguancun High-tech Park is not in his 
district. 
The remaining guanxi not yet accessed are individuals without a government background. 
A9, All, A13, and A14 are private entrepreneurs themselves, while AlO and A12 are 
journalists. I lost contact with A14 even after consulting several friends on his whereabouts. 
A13 is now the acting CEO of a famous brand PAD product. I rang his company twice, the 
receptionist politely asked me to leave my name and telephone number after apologising 
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that her boss was either abroad for business or in a meeting. But I have never received his 
call back. 
6.5 Who are those supposed to help? 
The aforementioned guanxi can be sorted into four categories according to the way I got to 
know them: 1) university alumni; 2) work acquaintances; 3) friend's friend, and 4) getting 
to know each other by chance. Eight of them are my university alumni (A I, A2, A3, A8, 
A 10, A 11, A 13, and A 14); Tbree of them are acquaintances I knew during the years of 
working in the central government (A4, A5, and A6); Two of them were introduced by a 
third party friend in the first time (A7, and A9); The last one (A 12) is a jourrialist, whom I 
came across in a ceremony to receive a national paper award in 1988. 
Al and I graduated from the same university, but he left the university eight years earlier. I 
did not know him until I met him on a business trip to the city where he served as a deputy 
mayor in 1996. We felt we were getting close, when we learned we were alumni and talked 
a lot about the university. Soon, he moved to work in Beijing, which was a new working 
environment for him. I arranged parties for him to be introduced to a dozen friends from 
various departments of the central government. 
I did not know A3 at the university either, but we began to know each other in 1996 in the 
process of competing for a scholarship to study in the UK We helped each other, and both 
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of us succeeded in securing a scholarship. Later she returned to China to continue her 
career in Beijing municipal government. I had been very familiar with the other alumni on 
campus of the university, three of whom, A2, A8, and AIO, studied at the same department 
with me. 
I began to know the three persons, A4, A5 and A6, because of our work contact. At the 
time, two of them (A4, A5) dined out with me sometimes. This is a common way to keep 
in touch and promote friendship. Besides, we helped each other on many occasions. 
I was introduced to A7 and A9. A7 is a social scientist. I had tried to help him do a 
cooperative research project in the UK. He is willing to help me with my research, which 
is also his research interest. A9 was indebted to me since I helped her prepare for and pass 
IELTS (International English Language Testing System) examination. 
Though I met A12 by chance, we soon became good friends, as we had common interests. 
I was very active on campus and I helped him to report university student life. We have 
kept in contact through the years. 
Four out of the fourteen guanxi contacts I listed, A9, AlO, Al I, and A12, helped me access 
some interviewees. The number of interviewees they introduced can be seen in both Figure 
6.1 and Figure 6.2 (p172,173). 1 had believed that with guanxi, in particular, guanxi in 
government departments, I would have interviewed many cases without a great deal of 
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effort. However, my background as a middle rank central government cadre and the cadre 
guanxi did not help much in the field research. The fact implies the waning influence of 
government on enterprises, in particular the private high-tech sector. The fact also 
illustrates the multi-dimension of guanxi. These will be discussed later. Now, the question 
comes: Who helped me complete the interviews? 
6.6 Who rolled the snowball for me? 
As the proposed routes to access interviewees were denied in practice, I had to turn to 
other channels. The Bei ing Individual and Private Economy Association (BIPEA) j 
mentioned by Mr Shi gave me a sense of snatching straws. BIPEA is a semi-official 
organisation. under Beijing Bureau of Industry and Commerce (BBIC), fully responsible 
for the daily affairs of the private sector. All private enterprises and individual economy 
are required to be members of the association. It sounded an ideal path to approach private 
entrepreneurs. But my friends in the SBIC seemed not to be able to connect me to the 
association. 
A happy accident occurred which filled the gap, when I was thinking that I was at the end 
of my resources. I just wanted to call my friend FI to say hello, and he told me that his 
brother-in-law used to be the general secretary of the association. Thus FI became the first 
person who helped me. He introduced me to a new friend NFI, Mr WYM, and my field 
research got underway. The progress is shown in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 Time line for the progress of field research 
Time Friends Resorted Interviewees Contacted Interviews Conducted 
Week I Listing Acquaintances 
Week 2 AI-AI4 in Figure 6.1 
contacted; A9, AIO, & 
A 11, may help 
A9 &AIlin Figure 6.1, 
as F3/CI &F7/C2I in 
Figure 6.2 
Week 3 Happy Accident: Fl, F2 C3 Visiting NFI for help 
Week 4 Contact NFI every 2 
days 
C2 _ 
Week 5 F4 (A 10), F5, F6, F8, 
F9, FIO 
C7, C5 (F6/C38, 
F8/CI6, F9/C25, 
FIO/CI7) 
Cl, C2, (C7)* 
Week 6 C4, C6, C? I, & C9 C3, C4, C5 
Week 7 C8, CII, C19 C6, C7 
Week 8 CIO, C12, C14, C24 C8, C9 
Week 9 C3l, C20, CI3 CIO, CII, C12 
Week 10 C15, C23 C13, C14, C15 
Week II FII, NF2 C18 C16, CI7, CI8 
Week 12 F12, NF3 C22 C19, C20, (C21)*, C22 
Week 13 C26, C28 (C23)*, C23, C24 
Week 14 C29 C25, visit NF3 
Week 15 C27 (C26)*, C27 
Week 16 C30, C32 C28 
Week 17 C36, C37 C26 , C29 
Week 18 C33, C34, C35, C36 C30, (C? 2)* 
Week 19 C21, C31, C32 
Week 20 C33, C34, C35, C36 
Week 21 C37, C38 
Note: Only the first time of contacting with an interviewee is recorded in this table. Most cases were 
interviewed after several times of contact, which are not demonstrated here. 
These are cases that were not finished in the first visit and a second visit had to be paid. 
This is the case invested by a Taiwanese and thus not included in the research. 
From Mr WYM's line, I interviewed five cases, the 2 nd , 7d, I 11h , and 19'h, plus a case 
introduced by the 7h informant. 'Mough Mr WYM was the first person who promised to 
help me, and I had hoped to make many interviews through his referrals, the number of 
informants he provided is disappointingly low, and it took me a long period to wait for the 
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interviews. This can be seen from Table 6.1 and the case order I interviewed in Figure 6.2 
173). 
The second friend F2 to help me was another happy accident. He has his own business in 
the IT sector in Xiamen. Since he lives far away from my field site in Beijing, I had not 
thought of him until I met his wife who came to Beijing for a tour and mentioned her 
husband had some friends in Beijing doing computer related businesses. F2 introduced me 
to a friend as my P informant. It is the P informant C3 who helped me to roll the 
snowball. From this line, I interviewed II cases all together, the biggest snowball in my 
research. 
In fact, the third friend F3 became the first case Cl I formally interviewed. She was a 
partner and vice manager of a palm computer company. She was waiting for a visa from 
the Canadian Embassy in China to immigrate to Canada. Since she was preparing to leave 
for Canada, I did not bother her further to introduce me to someone else. In fact, 
interviewing her in a friendly and relaxing atmosphere gave me a good start and warm-up 
in the field research. 
A 4th friend I resorted to for help is Mr CLH, a journalist of an IT magazine. I had hoped to 
rely on him for more private IT bosses, but his strength lies on big firms with guanxi with 
their media or propaganda departments. These big firms are mainly state owned or 
collectively owned, beyond my research interest in the private sector. He promised to 
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contact private bosses, but he only succeeded in helping me interview a vice general 
manager of a big company as my 5h informant. Nevertheless, he provided me with 
information of two friends of ours in the IT sector, F8 and F9, with whom I had lost 
contact after years of being abroad. Both of them became my informants as case 16 and 
case 25 respectively. 
F8 mentioned the name of a department-mate NF2, Mr YJJ, but without telephone at hand. 
I managed to get his mobile number. Unfortunately, Mr. YJJ was always unavailable for 
interview; he suggested that I interview his classmate, Mr. WZH, who was coded as the 
27th interviewee. In a party organised by F9, I met another friend F 10, who became the 
17th case. 
Friend F5 helped me to access case C 10. In turn, C 10 offered me a snowball of seven other 
interviewees. They are C13, C26, C28, C32, C36 and C37. 
Although friend F6 was the sixth person I contacted to do an interview, he became my last 
interviewee C38. He also arranged for me to interview C29. 
Interviewing the 7h friend, Mr HJC, was postponed several times by telephone because he 
had unexpected trips out of Beijing. It was coded the 21" case. But when the interview was 
in process for about half an hour, he was called away for an emergency meeting. Though 
coded as case C21, it was actually completed for the second time around the last few days 
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before I left for the UK Before leaving me for the emergency meeting, Mr HJC made me 
an appointment with one of his friends doing PC business. I visited his friend Mr WXQ the 
next day as the 22 nd informant. 
Then an I Vh friend helped me to interview the 18'h informant in the biopharmaceutical 
sector. 
The 12 th friend, a journalist of an important daily newspaper of science and technology, got 
me through to aP new friend NF3, Mr. WDL, the boss of a private consulting institute. 
Mr. WDL told his department manager, Mr YQZ, to arrange me several cases in high-tech. 
Mr YQZ gave me a list of five entrepreneurs. I visited four, because the last one's 
headquarters is in Tianjin City, about 200 miles away from Beijing. One of the four cases I 
investigated is a Taiwanese, which was thus not counted in my 38 cases. 
All together I mobilised 12 friends to help access 38 cases. Only four of the proposed 
guanxi are among these who helped. Guanxi in government did not help. The failure of the 
proposed paths provided me with a chance to introspect guanxi. 
6.7 Why did the proposed paths fail? 
I asked myself why government guanxi didn't work? There may be several reasons. 
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Firstly, the government has not much control over individual entrepreneurs. As found in 
Chapter 3, with the development of marketisation, resources at the hands of government 
become fewer, entrepreneurs are no longer economically, politically and socially 
dependent on the government as Walder (1986) describes. Instead, entrepreneurs stay away 
from the government organisations and resort more to the market. The connection between 
individual entrepreneurs and government is thus becoming weaker. As the research 
conducted by the International Finance Corporation (2000) finds private entrepreneurs 
have to pay the private entrepreneur association fee but the latter can provide nothing to 
the former. The relationship between them exists as member fee. 
Also, with the development of private business and the progress of reform, the restrictions 
imposed on the private sector by the government have been lifted as suggested in Chapter 
2. Furthermore, the government has to promote the private sector to maintain its economic 
growth. Not only have the restrictions been lifted, but also some favourite policies have 
been promulgated. To get rich is glorious (Economist, January 17,2002). The belief in the 
government's influence over private entrepreneurs, on which my proposed research paths 
were based, proved to be out of date. An interviewee argued, 
All companies could snub the government agencies if they had not broken law, though it would be 
necessary to keep good relations with government in case they may "pick shell from eggs" (They can 
always find your problems if they wish). 
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Secondly, bureaucracy may impede the effect of guanxi. The relationship between a 
government department and the semi-government organisation under its auspices is subtle 
and complicated. Wank (1995) sees conflicts among Xiamen Bureau of Industry and 
Commerce, Xiamen Private Enterprise Association and Xiamen Association of Commerce. 
Even in the same tax bureau, the branch for local revenues and the branch for central 
government revenues are not treated equally by the local govenunent, and they are at odds 
with each other (Liu, 2000). 
A4 in the State Bureau of Industry and Commerce (SBIC) promised to find a way to put 
me in contact with the IPEA. But the delicate relationship between BIC and IPEA may 
have constrained him from doing so. He does not know the officials at IPEA himself In 
order to help me, he must resort to officials at Beijing Bureau of Industry and Commerce 
(BBIC), which can help to introduce him to the BIPEA. The SBIC does not have strong 
influence over BBIC, since the officials at BBIC are not appointed by the SBIC; instead 
they are under Beijing municipal government's auspices. I would not like to embarrass my 
friend, and thus I did not urge him to help. 
The SBIC is superior to BBIC merely in terms of professional guidance. The argument that 
relationships with a senior will extend to his subordinates (Arias, 1998) needs further 
contextual examination. Local governments are becoming more and more independent. 
This fact is reflected in many reports on local protectionism or localism, and as a 
consequence, some argue China is on the way to a federation of states (e. g., Wu, 2002). 
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Similarly, some sociologists put forward the term of regional corporatism or local state 
corporatism and argue that economic reform is decentralising power to local governments 
by enhancing their control over resources in their jurisdiction (e. g., Oi, 1995). 
Thirdly, the development of high-tech sectors has somehow changed the relationship 
between the private enterprises and both government and serni-govemment organisations. 
Mr. WYM admitted that members from the traditional industries dominated the BIPEA and 
thus he did not know many private entrepreneurs in the high-tech sectors. The private 
high-tech sectors, in particular the IT sector, are dynamic in the Chinese economy, and 
have a certain influence on the economy. The Chinese government realises the potential of 
the knowledge economy, where the IT sector is one example 27 . As Ms. Tan 
Haiyin, Chief 
Operating Officer at Eachnet. com (China's largest private online auction site), puts it, "We 
are already helping the government -- the regulator -- figure out what's important and what 
should be done. " (China's Online Future, Time, May 15,2000, p 20-22. ). 
Fourthly, it is possible that some guanxi ties I resorted to did not do their best to help me. 
Both Arias (1998) and Hwang (1987) point out that status matters in guanxi relationships. 
Tsang (1998) argues that the value of guanxi depends very much on the status Of the 
partner with whom the guanxi is maintained. In fact, the status of both parties involved in a 
27 It is argued in China that China has lagged far behind in the first chance of development: industrialisation. 
In the era of knowledge economy, China has been provided with a new opportunity to catch up with the 
developed. And many believe that the gap in the IT between China and the developed is narrow. Great 
expectation has been put on the development of IT, the sector has thus won more attention and more support 
from the govemment (e. g., Fan, 2000; Lau, 2000). 
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guanxi is important. Bruun (1993, p98) gives a good example of the importance of the 
recipient by arguing that class and education detennine one's guanxi power and the 
officials do not respect individual businesspeople when they lacked formal education. 
Hwang (1987) argues that the favour allocator will judge the guanxi in the first step, "What 
is the guanxi between us? How strong is our guanxil" (Hwang, 1987, p749). Social status 
labels the pay-off ability, which is one factor to the considerations of the favour allocator. 
But neither Arias (1998) nor Hwang (1987) has realised the dynamic aspect of status. 
Learning about my frustration that I did not get much help from government friends, a 
close friend of mine complained, "You now know what is meant by the saying: 'When you 
leave your position, your tea gets cold. " What he meant is that the change of my social 
status from a young promising central government official to a poor student has devaluated 
me in guanxi relationships. I have become a less worthy guanxi tie to certain people, who 
would thus be reluctant to help me, since I seem to have limited pay-off ability to 
reciprocate favours. Chen (1995) thus points out that there exists avoiding guanxi in guanxi 
relations (cited in Lovett et aL, 1999, p234). 
Although I cannot verify this speculation on my own case, there is some relevant evidence. 
For example, Case 21 mentioned their guanxi, government officials, on whom they relied 
to sell their products would be useless once they retired, since they cannot provide social 
capital any more. Similarly, Tsang (1998) finds that with the downfall of the former 
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Beijing party secretary Chen Xitong, any individuals or companies with good guanxi with 
him and his ring lost their investment. 
6.8 My relationship with those who helped me access Informants 
As explained in the preceding section, four of the proposed guanxi paved the way to some 
informants. They are A9, A 10, A 11, and A 12 in Figure 6.1, which are marked as F3, F4, 
F7, and F12 respectively in Figure 6.2. Who are the other eight? 
Both F1 and F1 I are my former colleagues. F1 I is my peer in terms of rank in the 
government hierarchy. FI used to work in a sub-department under the central government 
ministry where I worked, whose rank was higher than mine. He had quit the job and is in 
business now. 
F2 and F6 are my laoxiang (fellow townsmen). I know them because we come from the 
same county and we studied in Beijing, but we lost contact after graduation. F6 has just 
come back to Beijing to develop his career. I had pretty frequent contact with him because 
of the proximity of our campuses. F2 does his own business in IT in Xiamen, a southern 
coastal city. I met him in a banquet in Xiamen organised by another friend, where I was 
conducting pilot research. Ile relationship between us can be labelled as a "weak tie", 
which has its strength (Granovetter, 1973). The 3rd interviewee provided by F2 rolled the 
snowball to II cases altogether. 
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F5 is a university alumni and a staff at the university where I got my bachelor degree. We 
started to know each other on campus when I was active in several university societies 
while he was responsible for the administration of these societies. 
The 12 friends helping me access interviewees can be categorised into four groups, alumni, 
colleagues, fellow townsmen, and ffiends known from other channels. There are 6 alumni, 
2 colleagues, 2 fellow townsmen, and 2 other friends. 
6.9 How were the Interviews conducted? 
All interviews were arranged in advance by at least two telephone calls. Most interviews 
were started by an exchange of pleasantries. Questions were raised according to the 
pre-designed questionnaire 28 . The questionnaire includes both open end and closed end 
questions. However, I did not always start an interview from the first question in the 
questionnaire; instead, I varied my line of enquiry according to the circumstances. My goal 
was to get them to relate their true stories and anecdotes of business life. The interviews 
were best managed as conversations between two friends so that the interviewees would 
tell their stories in a relaxed atmosphere. 
28 cases studies were conducted in the entrepreneurs' office. 5 of these entrepreneurs 
dined me out after the interviews and provided me with extra interesting information. One 
28 TIc original questionnaire for fieldwork indeed contained more questions. As this thesis focus on 
busines start-up, Appendix C presents only the relevant questions to start-up and the irrelevant are not shown. 
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case was carried out in the entrepreneur's home and one interview took place in my former 
employer's office. The others 8 cases were done either in a restaurant or a cafe bar. 
I spent at least one and a half-hour on an interview. Most of the interviewees did not ask 
how long the interview would take. Though in some cases, the interviewees would accept a 
quick talk of not more than an hour, in fact in no one case did it take less than one and a 
half hours to finish the interview, since we had a good time and we discussed some more 
issues. 
6.10 What is essential to the success of field research? 
Though experiencing difficulties and frustration, I managed to interview 38 cases. In terms 
of the quality of field research and finding, it is a success. What is essential to the success? 
To conduct field research, firstly, it is essential to find an appropriate approach to solve the 
problem of "getting in7 (Yeung, 1995). 1 would not have interviewed 38 without certain 
guanxi. A number of those interviewed stated clearly that it was their guanxi with a third 
party that led them to accept being interviewed. 
However, guanxi does not guarantee success. Guanxi led me to the right door, though it 
sometimes misled me, too. Some guanxi did more than open the door for me, while some 
guanxi stopped at the door, the success of opening the door depended on myself. A good 
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example is in the case of F2, who provided me with one informant, and I managed to 
enhance the snowball effect by increasing the referrals to 12 cases. In general, the 
importance of guanxi lies in the opportunities it provides. 
How to grasp the opportunities provided by guanxi? The point comes to the second 
essential, proper performance, which implies the interactive relationship between the 
interviewee and interviewer. Thus Gold (1985) argues that the technique of establishing 
and manipulating guanxi is guanxi xue. Similarly, Luo (2000) points out that guanxi xue 
are the practical strategies that best ensure to gain advantages in personal relationship. 
This is demonstrated in the case of visiting Mr. WDL. I arrived at NF3 Mr. WDL's office 
at 11: 00 on a Saturday morning. His manner toward me was neither hot nor cold at first so 
that I had wondered if he would help me. After we talked for a while about my research 
and my understanding on entrepreneurship, a smile appeared in his face, when he raised 
his voice, "Now, we have the same opinion, which is at odds with the mainstream theory 
dominated by professor A (at Peking University)". He later helped to arrange several 
interviews. 
This is performance based social capital (Cohen and Field, 1999). If I had not performed 
reasonably well, that is, if I had nothing the informants could learn, they would not have 
bothered to introduce me to their friends further. Before leaving for the field research, I 
equipped myself with broad knowledge in business. Besides attending many courses with 
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MBA students, I forced myself to read some more books on business administration. Being 
interviewed, the informants did not simply waste their time telling me their stories, they 
discussed business in general with me, and some of them sincerely asked me for advice. 
Many of them admitted that I impressed them and they learned something from me. Good 
impression is social capital (Wank, 1999). 
Some guanxi only provides information, a form of social capital (Coleman, 1988). How to 
transfer the potential into reality is crucial. Thus thirdly, the researcher needs to be 
persistent. 
My friend F8, Mr. CSL mentioned the name of NF2 Mr YJJ, a business tycoon in Beijing, 
but he did not have Mr YJJ's telephone number. I finally managed to get his telephone 
number from Beijing Federation of Industry and Commerce, where he is a member. 
Learning from the lesson taught by A13's receptionist, I rang his mobile phone. But I had 
to get my courage up before calling, 
Hi, YJJ. My name is Huang Qihai, an undergraduate enrolled in 1986 in our department (I 
emphasised "our). I am currently reading a PhD in management at a university in the LJK. I 
heard that you have done quite well in your business. I would like to learn from you if you 
could arrange a time to see me ... I know that you are very busy. I can go over to meet you 
wherever you say. Yes, I will be available at any time. 
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His attitude was warin. He said he was rather busy and would like to have a chat during a 
dinner with me, "It is I who can learn from you, and need to learn from you. I can treat you 
and have a talk next week when I have time. " When I called him later several times, he 
was sometimes on a business trip far away from Beijing, sometimes in a meeting. The last 
time when I rang him, he said, "I have a headache with my business now and I am terribly 
busy. Could you interview my classmate Mr WZH? He has done pretty well, too. He must 
have time, I can give you his telephone number and I can tell him in advance. " 
I called Mr WZH the next day and mentioned what Mr YJJ said. But Mr WZH said, "No, 
he did not ring me. But it doesn't matter, since we are alumni. You can call me tomorrow 
morning to affange a meeting, when I may have time in the afternoon. " Mr WZH became 
the 27ýh interviewee. 
As a matter of fact, few interviews were organised smoothly after one phone-call. I had to 
persistently phone most entrepreneurs before they agreed to an interview. The above 
description gives an example of how an opportunity was turned into a successful interview. 
6.11 The nature of the paths and guanxi 
6.11.1 Private and personal guanxi 
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Chapter 4 has pointed out that guanxi is a private and personal relationship. Guanxi exists 
between individuals rather than organisations; hence, guanxi is not housed in organisations 
but in individuals. Government relationship with entrepreneurs is fragmented (atomised). 
In essence, the relationship is a personal relationship between an official working in the 
government and individual entrepreneurs, in particular activists (Walder, 1986). Mr. WYM 
stated that the informants he introduced were his "own savings". Although my friend F1 
assured that Mr WYM would do his best to help me, his effort was confined by the 
atomised structure, because the number of guanxi entrepreneurs he knows is limited. This 
is the weakness of strong ties (Granovetter, 1973) 
6.11.2 The constraints of guanxi 
Guanxi is important in general, as many informants acknowledged that without the 
introduction of guanxi, such an interview would not have been possible. However, this 
does not mean that guanxi has strength with no constraints. Unfortunately, this point has 
never been addressed. The failure of my proposed paths via government guanxi 
demonstrates the disadvantageous side of guanxi. The embedded structure actually 
confined my vision on the possible paths, and hindered my progress of research at the very 
beginning. 
Social capital is not always instrumental for individuals; rather, it may become a constraint 
to individuals' actions and choices (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). An individual's 
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action is both facilitated and constrained by the structure and resources available in social 
networks in which they are embedded (Granovetter, 1992). 
This is also justified in business operation. For example, entrepreneur Mr. CFY (informant 
2) argued some close guanxi had hampered his business. For instance, the official in charge 
of drug wholesale would give an unfamiliar retailer good prices and would take for granted 
to accept some benefits from the retailer for the good prices and quick process of supply. 
But being a former colleague of Mr. CFY, he did not feel comfortable all the time to accept 
kickback from the entrepreneur. When a drug was in high demand, the official would 
supply the unfamiliar retailer for good returns and simply told the entrepreneur that the 
drug was out of supply. Geertz (1963) offers another example of the constraint of social 
capital: one abdicated king in Bali acknowledged that firms were turned into relief 
organizations for close social relations rather than businesses (cited in Granovetter, 1992, 
p7) 
6.11.3 The context of guanxi 
Mr WYM would like to introduce me more informants, but his effort was constrained by 
the weakness of strong ties, i. e., limited number of guanxi entrepreneurs. This example 
highlights the difference between the willingness to help and the ability to help. As pointed 
out earlier, the change of the social status of a person has an impact on the social capital of 
the person's guanxi network. Ue two situations demonstrate that guanxi is contextual. In 
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other words, guanxi provides cooperation, social capital, in specific contexts. Burt (I 997b) 
finds that social capital is not defined by network form alone in all settings. In some 
circumstances, the social capital value of a network is a function of both form and content. 
My status as a PhD student at a UK business school may not be of the interest to the 
government guanxi I resorted to, but it can be attractive to the business guanxi, who would 
like to learn "Western" business ideas. Well prepared, my perfonnance in an interview 
convinced an informant, who felt that a talk with me was not wasting time and was willing 
to pass me to a next informant. In such a context, I interviewed many cases with the 
introduction of new guanxi. 
Rose (1998) argues that understanding the significance of social capital requires attention 
to networks in specific situations. This is because the outcome of the network depends on 
situation. For example, networks used to maintain health produce different outputs than 
networks that produce food or house repairs. 
6.11.4 The contingency of guanxi 
The other side of contextual guanxi is its contingency. It must be noted that guanxi merely 
provides chances for success rather than success itself. To know somebody is a starting 
point. Social capital may become a constraint to individuals' actions and choices (Portes 
and Sensenbrenner, 1993). This is the contingent value of social capital (Burt, 1997a). 
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It was shown that the proposed paths via government guanxi did not work out, while some 
happy accidents had much better results. The consequence of possessing guanxi can be 
either intended or unintended. My friend F2 would have never believed that he had the 
"greatest amounf' of social capital in terms of helping me in the field research, while I had 
never imagined the possibility of the failures of my government guanxi.. In my case of 
doing research by the snowball method of conducting interviews, I have strength in 
knowing many people who "mighf' help me to access interviewees, though this strength is 
not so decisive that an intended outcome follows. Burt (1999) finds the more people 
without redundancy a manager knows, the more chances for him to succeed in business. 
6.11.5 Obligation of guanxi? 
Bourdieu (1986) notes obligations subjectively felt, such as feelings of gratitude, respect, 
and friendship, make social capital transferable for certain ends. But the question is 
"Where does the obligation come from? " It may be taken for granted that parents have 
obligation to raise their children, but why, for instance, in the cases of Mr. YJJ and Mr. 
WZH, did they help? We had no prior relationship of what Bourdieu (1986) calls mutual 
acquaintance and recognition. Accordingly, there should exist no social capital. But the 
background of studying at the same university did generate potential social capital. The 
social capital is based on mutual identification of the university and the fact that we are 
alumni. Fevre (2000) thus advocates paying attention to social identities in introducing the 
idea of social capital, as norms and social networks are complemented by social identities. 
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In the interaction with Mr. WDL, appropriate performance turned potential into the reality 
of help. How to actualise potential social capital is of no small importance. The effort is 
subjective dynamics. Social capital is a static substance. Like gold under the earth, its 
value does not come true until it is found, mined and fined. The subjective dynamics is 
more than the obligation of social capital, which is worthy further research. 
6.11.6 Reciprocity of guanxil 
The interviewees admitted that they accepted me for the sake of the third party who 
introduced me. Clearly, guanxi between the third party and the informants can be conveyed 
(Arias, 1998) to the researcher. The fact implies that the exchange of guanxi is not 
necessarily dyadic. For example, before I entered, the relationship between an informant 
and Mr. WYM is reciprocal as shown below, 
When I was involved, the relationship was changed as follows. 
1+nfot 
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Mr WYM passed me to an informant, who received me because of guanxi between them. I 
owe Mr. WYM for the help, but I do not necessarily owe the infonnant. The relationship 
between Mr WYM and me is reciprocal, and so is that between Mr WYM and the 
informant, while that between the informant and me can be exempted. In other words, I do 
not necessarily reciprocate the informant; instead, I am expected to reciprocate Mr WYM 
for his help, while a favour of Mr. WYM is due to the informant for my sake. It must be 
pointed out that the introduction by Mr WYM and the interaction with the informant have 
provided both of us with the base to establish guanxi with each other. The establishment of 
guanxi will be examined in Chapter 8. 
6.12 Conclusion 
The self-reflective snowball sampling methodology describes the first hand experience of 
conducting research, and reveals the relationship between the researcher and those who 
paved the way for the researcher. The use of guanxi enables the researcher to 'get in' and 
roll the snowball. The methodology has some inherent problems. The criticism is one of 
bias caused by closeness to the subjects (Yeung, 1995). However, the analysis of the paths 
to access research is itself intriguing. In addition, it provides a self-reflective perspective to 
consider the concepts of guanxi and social capital. 
This chapter reveals that my existing cadre guanxi did not help me much in my field 
research. It indicates that having a guanxi network does not necessarily produce intended 
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outcomes. Guanxi is contextual and contingent. Also, a change in one's social status has an 
impact on one's social capital. Guanxi network, or, social capital is not simultaneously a 
cause and an effect. Thus it is unwise to equate having a guanxi network with an intended 
outcome. 
This is the case for businesspeople, too. Having cadre-related guanxi does not guarantee 
entrepreneurs to have advantage in business start-up. As pointed out, the contingent value 
of guanxi is contextual and situational. The social capital value of a network is a function 
of both form and content. On the other hand, entrepreneurs without existing guanxi with 
cadres can develop new guanxi as this researcher has experienced. There may be, to some 
extent, difference between guanxi that helped the researcher conduct fieldwork and guanxi 
that is useful for business. For example, obligations in the former are less than the latter. 
Guanxi for business may involve risk and interest consideration, and thus needs longer 
time to build up. Nonetheless, this experience points to the potential for entrepreneurs to 
outweigh the possible disadvantage of having no cadre guanxL 
Both the concepts of guanxi and social capital found in the field research are much richer 
than the available literature. For example, guanxi is contextual and contingent. Guanxi has 
constraints on actions. These are for the first time addressed in this thesis. In the 
following chapters, some other rich contents of guanxi and social capital, in particular how 
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Chapter 7 
The Enterprises, their entrepreneurs, and their start-up capital 
Chapter 3 found no statistical evidence to support the power conversion theory, which 
claims that cadre related entrepreneurs have an advantage in business start-up. It 
suggested that further qualitative research is needed. This chapter investigates in depth 
how private entrepreneurs in the IT sector financed their business start-ups. It firstly 
looks at what businesses the interviewed entrepreneurs are in. Then it examines the 
backgrounds of the entrepreneurs. Lastly, it investigates the main sources for start-up 
capital and the underlying different types of guanxi. The preceding chapter described 
how the case studies were conducted. It argued that having cadre related guanxi does 
not necessarily lead to success; instead, newly developed guanxi can be useful. 
7.1. What businesses are the enterprises in? 
The thirty-eight firms interviewed can be divided into two groups: IT29 and non-IT. The 
30 
majority, thirty cases , of the interviewed companies are 
in the IT sector, and the other 
eight are in other high-tech sectors. This happens to be consistent with the industry 
structure of Zhongguancun high-tech park (Figure 7.1). In Zhongguancun, information 
technology industry accounts for 68.2%; optics-machinery-electronics integration 
29 IT (information technology) encompasses all forms of technology used to create, store, exchange, and 
use information in its various forms (business data, voice conversations, still images, motion pictures, 
multimedia presentations, and other forms, including those not yet conceived). 
30 There are two cases in this category whose main businesses are not in IT, Case 2 and Case 30.1 was 
introduced to visit them for their businesses in IT. Case 2 is mainly a pharmacy retailer; however, it has 
invested and developed software in drug shop management. In Case 30, Mr YJH invested RMB 
1,500,0000 earned from his main business in restaurant in an on-line property service company in 1999. 
As a director to the Internet company, the entrepreneur is not optimistic about its operation and has 
started to concentrate himself on a newly opened restaurant named localfbod. com. Conversations with 
them were focused on their business in IT, but topics about their main businesses could not be avoided all 
the time. 
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industry takes up 10.1%; new materials, new energy and environmental protection 
industries constitute 11.5%; bioengineering and new medicine industries make up some 
8.8%; and the others share is 1.4%. IT industries of Zhongguancun hold a big domestic 
market share. The sale volumes of hardware, software and IT service took up 5.5%, 
40.0%, and 46.9% respectively of the total in China in 1997 (Luo and Zhao, 1998). 





Source: Luo, and Zhao (1998) 
The thirty-eight cases do not distribute evenly in all the high-tech sectors and may not 
well represent every sector of high-tech. Since IT industry takes the lead in 
Zhongguancun High-tech Park, this analysis will focus on the thirty cases in the 11' 
sector. IT is categorised into hardware, including PC, PC components, and PC 
peripheries, software, networking security, e-commercc, and communication 31 . The 
distribution of the cases is given in Table 7.1. 
31 How to categorise the sub-areas of IT can be enlightened by the 16th International Federation for 
Information Processing World Computer Congress, whose theme was "Information Science and 
Technology after 2000". The congress' topics were focused on communication, chip design automation, 
information technology in education and business, software, signal processing, intelligent information 
processing and information security 
The International Federation for Information Processing World Computer Congress was hailed as one of 
the most prominent events of the international information technology society, The 16th World Computer 
Congress was held in Beijing from August 21 to 25,2000. International Federation for Information 
Processing (IFIP), founded in 1960 under the auspices of UNESCO, now has nearly 100 members 
including the United States, Britain, Germany and Japan. The Chinese Institute of Electronics joined the 
IFIP in 1980 (China DailIv, November 25,1999; August 21,2000, and August 22,2000). 
0 IT 
0 optics 




Table 7.1 The distribution of the cases 
IT Non-I 
Distribution of the T 
cases in sectors 
28+2 8 
Distribution of the Hardware Software Network E-commerce Communication 
cases in the rr security 
10 2 5 3 
There are ten companies in hardware 32 . They do manufacturing and trading business 
in 
PC and PC peripheries. 
Another ten interviewed companies are in the software business. Two of them develop 
and install integrated circuit card (IC) systems, and as well manufacture IC cards. The 
other eight of them design application software from learning, property management 
multi-media software for estate display, to restaurant management, government 
information management, and enterprise resources planning software. 
Two companies do network security business. They have products for network safety, 
such as firewall. 
Five companies are engaged in e-commerce business. Two of them provide online car 
sales and car-related services. One within this category is mainly a sport portal, which 
also supplies technological support to some other web sites. One of them is an online 
housing broker. The last one in this group builds online platforms for drug transactions. 
32 The categories are based on the current main businesses of the companies in terms of revenue. Most 
companies remain in the same businesses as start-up. However, some companies have changed. 
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Three of the interviewed enterprises do business in the communication area. One of 
them designs and installs railway signal system. Another enterprise provides network 
access and backbone infrastructure design; it also offers implementation for 
telecommunication services. The last one is engaged in optic fibre products for 
communication. 
7.2. Fast growth of the IT sector 
Stable economic growth and a large population make China a prominent market in the 
world. 71be vast domestic market has played a key role in supporting the high-tech 
industries. Compared to leading technologies in the world, the Chinese new and high 
technological level still falls behind. However, by developing technologies that fit in 
with the demands of the domestic market, the Chinese high-tech industries have 
survived and are robust. 
Expanding rapidly from its humble beginnings, the Chinese IT industry has grown 
tremendously over the past two decades. The increase in computer sales and computer 
related product sales are the best evidence. During the 1991-1997 period, the rate for 
sales volume jumped by more than 40% every year. 
As the overall economic growth rate decreased in 1998, the growth rate of computer 
sales slowed down to 13.8% (see Figure 7.2). The total sales volume of PCs grew about 
26 times from RMB 5.6 billion (US$ 670 million) in 1990 to RMB 170 billion (about 
US$ 20 billion) in 1999, an increase of 14.9% from 1998 (China Daily, 20 October 
2000). In 2000, the figure was expected to increase by 17.6% to reach RMB 200 billion 
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(about US$ 24 billion). 
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Data source: China Software Industrial Association (1998), "Chinese Software Industry and Market" and 
chinaonline. com 
Table 7.2. Software and Information Services Market in China (1996-1998) 
1996 1997 1998 
Software Total sales (USS100 
million) 
11.1 13.5 16.8 
Increase 35.3 21.7 23.2 
Information 
Services 
Total sales (USS100 
million) 
13.6 17.8 22.5 
Increase 46.8 31 26.4 
Total Sales (US$ 100 
million) 
24.7 31.3 39.2 
Increase 41.4 26.8 25 
Source: China Software Industrial Association (1998), "Chinese Software Industry and Market". 
The software market in China is growing at a rapid pace, too, along with the PC market. 
The total Chinese software market is growing by 20-30 percent per year. In 1998, the 
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rate of increase of software and information service was 23.2% and 26.4% respectively, 
which is higher than the 13.8% rise in the computer market (details are shown in Table 
7.2). It means the importance of software and information services is growing in the IT 
market. 
In 2000, the software market was predicted to create a RMB 20 billion-plus (about US$ 
2.4 billion) demand. Application software will occupy 60% of the market with systems 
software 10%, leaving the remaining 30% to supporting software (China Daily, 20 
October 2000). 
Beijing is China's largest market for IT products with a good market build-up effect. 
Many enterprises in Zhongguancun are known for their scientific and technological 
products with good quality. The famous "Electronic Street" in Zhongguancun is the 
largest collection and distributing center of IT products in northern China. The software 
sales of Zhongguancun constituted 40% of the total sales in the whole country in 1997 
and 43% in 1998. 
The growth of the interviewed IT companies has also been rapid. Most of the 
interviewed enterprises started up with low capital and developed rapidly. They all have 
expanded their assets to over RMB one million, except some newly established 
companies. In several cases, the enterprises have assets of more than RMB 10 million. 
The explosive expansion of Case 5 is a good example. 
Case 5 is a leading provider of total Internet infrastructure solutions and software 
products in China. Initially, three Chinese technology expatriates set up an ICP (Internet 
content provider) company in 1993 in the USA, with the aim at bridging information 
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between the West and China. In 1995, its operations were moved to China with $US 
500,000 venture capital as its start-up capital. By March 31,2000, according to the 
company's report, they had net revenues of US$5.5 million in the first quarter, 
representing a 77% increase over net revenues of US$3.1 million for the same period in 
1999. Software revenues for the quarter were US$1.8 million, representing 33% of total 
net revenues and a 33% increase over the same period in 1999. Network solutions 
revenues were US$3.7 million, an increase of 118% over the same quarter of 1999. 
Gross revenues were US$22.9 million during the first quarter, a 340% increase over 
gross revenues of US$5.2 million of the same quarter last year. In March 2000, the 
company announced its initial public offering in NASDAQ. The 5,750,000 shares 
issued by the company raised a total of US$138 million (Table 7.3). 
Table 7.3 Rapid Expansion of Case 5 




Revenues of the 
first quarter of 2000 5.5 1.8 3.7 22.9 
(US$ million) 





7.3. Who are the entrepreneurs? 
7.3.1. Family background 
Among the thirty entrepreneurs interviewed in the IT sector, only five were born in 
Beijing. All the other twenty-five are immigrants from other areas across the country. In 
terms of family background, five of them come from peasant families, thirteen are from 
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cadre families, and the other twelve come from worker families. Among those from 
cadre families, three entrepreneurs have middle rank cadre parents (Table 7.4). 
Table 7.4 family backgrounds of the entrepreneurs 
Peasant worker cadre 
13 
5 12 ordinary middle 
1 10 3 
More than half of the entrepreneurs (seventeen out of thirty) come from peasant and 
work families, who do not seem to have much social capital from endowment (Wank, 
1999). Do the other thirteen from cadre families have some advantage from their family 
background? The answer will be clear later. 
7.3.2. Young male entrepreneurs with higher degrees 
Twenty out of the thirty firms are comparatively new, set up in the 1990s. Four of them 
were established in 2000. The remaining two enterprises set up before 1990, Case 2 in 
1986 and Case 33 in 1988 respectively, were not in the IT sector when their businesses 
began, instead, one was in restaurants and the other in drug sales. They recently stepped 
into the IT sector when they had been successful in the traditional sectors. Consistently, 
the entrepreneurs are fairly young. Twenty three of the interviewees are in their thirties, 
with most of them in their early thirties. The other seven are younger than thirty years 
old. 
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The entrepreneurs have good educational backgrounds. Only one entrepreneur, who 
firstly started up his shop in drug retail in 1986, has education at college level. Thirteen 
of them have bachelor degrees. The rest hold degrees higher than bachelor, with thirteen 
master degrees, two doctorate degrees, and one doctorate degree candidate who dropped 
out for business. Twenty of the entrepreneurs studied engineering subjects, four majored 
in sciences, and the remaining six were trained in art and social sciences. 
Among the thirty interviewed entrepreneurs, only one is female. This does not deviate 
from the 1995 national survey on private enterprises analysed in Chapter 3, which finds 
that 90.6 per cent of entrepreneurs are men. The gender division in the private sector is 
still significant. 
Table 7.5 Comparisons of Age and education 
Entrepreneurs in 





general (1999 CESS 
survey) 
Age <30 30.4% 8.4 n. a. 
3040 69.6% 37.7 n. a. 
>40 0 52.9 n. a. 
Degree < Middle-school 0 81.6 15.3 
College 3.3 13.1 40.1 
Bachelor 43.3 4.5 34.8 
Master & Doctorate 53.4 0.8 9.8 
Comparisons with some similar surveys indicate that the IT sector tends to be 
dominated by well-educated young men (Table 7.5). About 96.7 per cent of the 
interviewed entrepreneurs hold bachelor or higher degrees. The national entrepreneur 
survey (CESS, 1999) finds that 44.6 per cent of the entrepreneurs across all types of 
182 
ownership have such degrees, and only 6.3 per cent of the entrepreneurs in private 
sector hold such degrees (1995 Private Enterprises Survey). The education opportunities 
for the new Chinese generation are rising, but for those who are older than thirty, 
struggle for university education was commonplace. This is verified by the figure for 
1997, when there were only 25.7 college students per 10 thousand of population (A 
Statistical Survey of China, 1998). 
It may not be appropriate to generalise the education background for all the 
entrepreneurs in the IT sector from this small sample case study. However, the 
comparisons above suggest that the entrepreneurs in the private IT sector have far better 
education than the general run of entrepreneurs in the private economy. It also can be 
true that entrepreneurs in IT are better educated than entrepreneurs overall. Education 
provides the entrepreneurs human capital, which is created by changes in persons that 
bring about skills and capabilities that make them able to act in new ways (Coleman, 
1988), or, cultural capital in both objectified state and institutionalised state (Bourdieu, 
1986). Perhaps equally importantly, the education background provides them social 
capital in terms of trust for their businesses, in particular in getting start-up as discussed 
later. 
The entrepreneurs in IT are much younger 33 compared with all entrepreneurs in the 
private sector. All those entrepreneurs interviewed in IT are under forty years old, while 
more than half of the entrepreneurs in the private sector are over forty years old. The 
33 The advantages of age and education are also reflected by the enthusiasm of young and well-educated 
people in the Internet. According to a CNNIC survey (China National Network Information Centre, 1999), 
the majority of the Internet subscribers, 77.5 per cent, are younger than thirty years old, only 6 per cent of 
the subscribers are over forty years old. In terms of education, nearly sixty per cent of the Internet 
subscribers have degrees of bachelor and above, only fourteen per cent of them received below or 
equivalent to higher school education. 
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age advantage is more significant when compared with the entire population of 
entrepreneurs across all sectors. According to the national entrepreneurs survey (CESS, 
1999)34, only 9.4 per cent of the general entrepreneur population are less than thirty-five 
years old, with about 32.5 per cent of them aged between thirty-six and forty five years 
old, and nearly 60 per cent of surveyed entrepreneurs older than forty-five. 
7.3.3. Work experience 
Five entrepreneurs directly entered private business right after walking out of campus, 
but all of them had done some part time work related to their current businesses while 
they were studying. The rest, twenty-five of the 30 entrepreneurs had worked before 
starting up their own businesses. Among the twenty five, six have experience in 
government departments, with four as government officials, and two working in 
government financial institutions before going for business, and the remaining nineteen 
having experience in companies or research institutes (Table 7.6). With their education 
background mainly in engineering and sciences, most entrepreneurs were engineers. 
Table 7.6 Work experience for the entrepreneurs 
Goverment 6 
Non-govcmment 19 
No work experience 5 
Seven out of the 30 interviewed entrepreneurs had done moonlighting before they 
started their own businesses. Among them, two were full-time state employees; the 
34 Because CESS (1999) has different age cohorts from the 1995 national private enterprise survey and 
my case study, the data is not appropriate to be list Table 7.5. 
184 
other five were full-time university students. The five student entrepreneurs actually 
spent more than half of their time on their businesses before graduation. 
7.4. How private entrepreneurs in IT financed their start-ups 
According to Churchill and Lewis (1983), finance is extremely important at the start. 
However, as was found in Chapter 2, in China, the private enterprises' start-up and 
capacity for survival and growth are constrained by lack of capital! None of the formal 
financial channels is available to the private sector. The following sections examine 
how the private IT companies financed their business start-ups under such an adverse 
situation. 
Two of the thirty firms were set up in the 1980s. Four were set up lately in 2000. The 
rest twenty-four firms were registered in the 1990s. Although several companies were 
registered as collective or state owned firms C'wearing red hat' ) at the beginning, they 
had changed their ownership since the government issued a regulation requiring all the 
red hat firms to show their real private ownership by 1998. Among the 30 interviewed 
companies, only one is registered as a sole proprietorship business, the other 29 are 
corporate limited companies. The registration itself implies that such a firm does not 
belong to a single person. It also indicates that the investment came from more than one 
person. T'he concern is thus focused on the most important sources of start-up capital 
here. 
7.4.1 The average registered capital for IT companies 
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Among the interviewed firms, the lowest registered capital at start-up was RMB 30,000 
for case 2, which was registered as individual economy (getihu) in 1986 (Its current 
registered capital is RMB 500,000). The highest registered capital is RMB 30 million of 
a company set up in 2000. The medium of registered capital is RMB 2 million. The 
mode of registered capital is RMB 500,000. 
In general, companies in hardware and software businesses tend to have low registered 
capital. The registered capital of most cases in hardware and software businesses is 
close to the mode. Companies in e-commerce seem to have much higher registered 
capital. The two companies with the highest registered capital are in this group. 
7.4.2 Where did the registered capital come from? 
Table 7.7 The most important source of registered capital 
Number of cases Average registered capital 
(mode) 
Personal savings 9 RMB500,000 
Help from relatives or 
friends 
6 RM13500,000 
Investment from others 15 RM131,000,000 
There are various sources for registered capital. Table 7.7 shows the most important 
sources of registered capital for the entrepreneurs. Nine entrepreneurs claimed that they 
had their own savings as the registered capital. Six entrepreneurs admitted that their 
relatives or friends helped them with the registered capital. In the remaining fifteen 
cases, the registered capital was investment from other channels, which includes 
investment from other partners of their businesses, such as, relatives, friends, and other 
186 
partners. In these fifteen cases, the entrepreneurs hold some percentage of shares in their 
companies either for cash contribution, or technology/management contribution, or the 
mixture of the two. 
No case was found to have loans from a bank. The finding from the field research 
convincingly supports the argument about the difficult financial situation for private 
enterprises. 
The firms with investment from others tend to have higher registered capital than the 
other two sources, with a mode of RMB I million, compared with the same mode of 
RMB 500 thousand for those relying on help from friends and relatives and self-savings. 
Moreover, the companies with more than RMB I million and the highest registered 
capital are all in the group of investment from others. In contrast companies with less 
than RMB 500 thousand and the least registered capital cluster in the former two 
groups. 
7.4.3 Gap between registered capital and real capital 
Theoretically, registered capital should be available at business start-up. How could the 
entrepreneurs have such high start-up capital? This seems particularly problematic for 
the entrepreneurs relying on self-savings, because the average income for Chinese is 
low. Even for the lowest start-up capital of RMB 30,000 in case 2, it is 6 times of the 
average annual income for a city and town resident, which was RMB 5,189, and 10 
times of the average annual income of RMB 2,999 for a resident living in the 
countryside in 1997 (A Statistical Survey of China, 1998). As they are generally young, 
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it is unlikely that most of them have large accumulations for registered capital. How did 
they obtain such a huge amount of capital then? 
Further investigation finds that there is a gap between registered capital and real 
available capital at business start-up for most cases. This is in particular true for the 
fifteen entrepreneurs who depended on their own savings and on the help from either 
friends or relatives. As pointed out previously, in these cases, they tended to have lower 
registered capital. As a matter of factý they also had much lower manageable capital at 
hand when they started up their businesses. In some cases, available capital was very 
significantly lower than the registered. In case 31, the entrepreneur had about RMB 
20,000 of his own at hand when he started his business, however, the registered capital 
for his company was said to be RMB 300,000. The registered capital is 15 times of the 
real capital in this case. 
Most of the other fifteen companies with investment from others did not have this 
problem and they had similar amounts of manageable capital and registered capital. 
However, in some cases, registered capital was also exaggerated. For example, in case 
30, the entrepreneur obtained RMB 150 thousand investment to start his business, but 
his firm was said to have RMB I million registered capital. 
7.4.4 How to fill the gap? 
The question arises, why does this gap exist? The government had a minimum 
requirement for registered capital, RMB 300,000 for a company, and RMB 500,000 for 
a trading company. To meet the registration requirement of the government is the first 
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step of business entry. Furthermore, the amount of registered capital has also a symbolic 
implication to the size and trustworthiness of a company. According to the entrepreneurs, 
to their understanding, the more registered capital, the bigger a firm looks like, and thus 
the trustworthier it appears. 
How did the entrepreneurs manage to register without sufficient start up capital? A 
common tactic used by most of them is termed "passing the account", i. e., one 
entrepreneur borrows money from friends or relatives and deposits it into his own 
accounts. Iben, after finishing the registration procedure, he returns the money 
immediately. A second method is to borrow some notes from friends or relatives as 
assets, which can be considered as part of registered capital. That is the reason when 
talking about the sources for registered capital, I used "help from friends or relatives" 
instead of "money from friends or relatives" in Table 7.7. A third method is to take some 
valuable goods, such as computers, into account as registered capital. 
To have enough registered capital is an important step for a business. This helps to get a 
license from Bureau of Industry and Commerce that grants a firm legal status to operate 
a business. However, registration is like a ticket for entry, whether he or she will win or 
lose in the business field is far from known. 
In a sense, registered capital is a game between the entrepreneurs and the government 
administration agency. Though not all the entrepreneurs had as much registered capital 
as required by the government they did start up their business and develop quickly. It is 
not strange that most of the entrepreneurs don't think registered capital so important to 
business. This implies generally low entry requirement in the IT sector, and accordingly 
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low start-up capital. Indeed, several of them had start-up capital of RMB several 
thousands. As informant 21 admitted, "As long as your business opens, you will 
eventually have revenues. In general, return is high. You can reinvest the profit. Tbough 
sometimes slowly, your business rolls ahead. " This is in particular true for the 
companies engaging in contracted projects, such as software system design and 
integration. When a contract is signed, they will get the first installment of payment by 
the customer. It is not essential to have a big sum of cash for business start-up. 
Such a reality has led to the change in the requirement for start-up registered capital. For 
According to China Economic Times (May 11,2000), Beijing lowered registered capital 
to RMB 30,000 (US$3,628) for establishing high and new technology enterprises in its 
Zhongguancun High-tech Park. The city also relaxed substantially its restrictions on the 
ratio of invisible assets. Beijing municipal government published a series of relevant 
policies, including the following: 
1). High and new technology limited companies will be allowed to register if they have 
more than RMB 30,000 in registered capital. They will be allowed to transfer this 
registered capital into China in installments over two years. 
2). The ratio of invisible assets as capital will be increased. Industrial property rights 
and non-patent technologies assessed as capital now may account for up to 60 percent of 
a company's total registered capital. In the past, the maximum percentage was only 35 
percent. 
7.4.5 Help from relatives and friends 
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In the six cases with help from relatives and friends, there are two forms of help. One is 
as described earlier, friends and relatives provide the entrepreneurs with money only for 
the purpose of registration, i. e., to meet the registered capital requirement by the 
government. In this case, the entrepreneurs do not actually use the borrowed money in 
business. After the registration procedure is over, the entrepreneurs return the money. 
The procedure is termed "passing account" (guo zhaing). Three entrepreneurs operated 
in this way. Unlike the passing account strategy, the other three entrepreneurs used the 
borrowed money for both registration and operation at start-up. This is the other form of 
help from relatives and friends. 
In terms of the relationship between the entrepreneurs and the lenders in the six cases, 
there are two types of guanxi. In five cases, the entrepreneurs had long-term close 
guanxi with the lenders before business. Traditional Chinese values, such as filial piety, 
paternalism, and personalism, help maintain extended family structure and strong 
family bonds, which can be used to pool resources for the start-up and survival of 
business (Redding, 1990; Zheng, 1997). Unlike the five cases, in the remaining one case, 
the entrepreneur Mr. ZG did not have long term and close relationship with the lender, 
an estate boss. Mr. ZG only started to know the boss, when he worked for AT &T to 
build a network system for the boss. This means that Mr. ZG had known the boss for 
less than one year when he borrowed money for "passing account" to register his 
business. 
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Table 7.8 Two types of guand in helping start-up registered capital 
Guanxi Time Rule Trust How to 
produce 
Family and Long term Affection, Characteristics-based Endowment, 
friend obligation Saving 
Mr ZG case Short term Trust & Performance based Investment 
investment and saving 
The two difference types of guanxi between the entrepreneurs and the helpers in fact 
denote two forms of social capital as shown in Table 7.8. In the five cases, help was due 
to affection and obligations, a form of social capital (Coleman, 1988). In the cases of Mr. 
ZQ apparently, affection and obligation were not the lender's prior concern since they 
had not had a close relationship in advance. Instead, it is trust and investment that were 
considered. On the one side, Mr ZG is trustworthy. The trust came from the interaction 
between Mr ZG and the boss. More accurately, the performance of Mr ZG in conducting 
the programme for AT &T and further interactions that followed gave the boss the 
impression of his trustworthiness. This is so-called performance based social capital 
(Cohen and Fields, 1999), or process-based trust, compared with characteristics-based 
trust (Zucker, 1986) in the other five cases. Mr ZGs educational background with a 
master degree from a reputed university also grants him trust and social capital from 
restricted membership (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Social capital serves as a kind of 
collateral, which those who have no access to the ordinary capital markets can use 
(Loury, 1977). On the other side, for the boss, lending him money to register a company 
is an investment to produce obligation credit, a form of social capital (Coleman, 1988). 
Such an investment seems, to some extent to take the risk of Mr ZG's default in 
repayment. But in fact, the risk is very low, since the relationship between Mr ZG and 
the boss is not a simply dyadic one between him and the boss; instead it involves a 
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network, including the company colleagues whom Mr ZG used to work with, which 
potentially sanction him from opportunistic behaviour (Coleman, 1988). Trust can 
dramatically reduce what economists call transaction costs-costs of negotiation, 
enforcement and the like (Fukuyama, 1995a). Mr ZG is indebted to the boss, for as 
Arias (1998) points out favours are banked. 
7.4.6 Sources of real capital 
It was found that three entrepreneurs in the group who relied on help from friends and 
relatives for registered capital borrowed money simply for the sake of registration 
procedure and did not actually put the money into the business. In reality, they relied on 
self-saving for real start-up capital. The finding thus requires further investigation into 
the sources of real capital at business start-up, which is more crucial to business 
operation. When talking about the most important source of available real capital at 
business start-up, only two entrepreneurs depended on money from family and one 
entrepreneur relied on borrowing from friends; altogether twelve entrepreneurs 
confessed that they had to rely on themselves. Fifteen entrepreneurs received investment 
from others (Table 7.9). 
Table 7.9 The most important source of real available capital at start-up 
Personal 
savings 
Borrowing from friends & 
family 
Investment from others 
12 3 15 
Much research (e. g., Bhide, 1992; Bourke, 1994; Mulholland, 1997; Kellard and 
Middleton, 1998; Redding, 1990; Wong, 1985) suggests that family is a most important 
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source of finance for business start-up. But the field research suggests that family 
finance does not appear so important in the Chinese private IT sector. Only two out of 
the thirty cases actually depended on family finance for start-up. This implies the need 
to research beyond family, because most Chinese families do not have extra 
accumulations of wealth after decades of socialism (Wank, 1999; Clark, 2000). 
Further, between the two entrepreneurs relying on family finance, one comes from a 
peasant family; the other is from an ordinary cadre family. An entrepreneur might be 
able to raise some money from Auntie Li -- a rich relative with a soft spot for her 
entrepreneurial cousin - but this requires that the entrepreneur is really lucky enough to 
have someone like that in the family. In this field research, no hard evidence supports 
the assumption that cadre family background provides advantage in start-up finance. 
7.4.7 Personal savings for start-up 
Table 7.10 How to accumulate for start-up 
The source of accumulation Number of cases 
Getihu (Individual economy) 3 
Working in companies 5 
Moonlighting 4 
There are several ways for the twelve entrepreneurs to accumulate capital as shown in 
Table 7.10. Three entrepreneurs accumulated their start-up capital from getihu 
(individual economy) operation. Five entrepreneurs saved money from their work in 
companies. The remaining four entrepreneurs' accumulations mainly came from their 
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moonlighting 35 activities, which occurred while two of them were working at state 
units, and the other two were studying at university. 
Interestingly, three out of the four moonlighting entrepreneurs operated businesses by 
using the licenses of collective enterprises before formally registering their own firms. 
The entrepreneurs paid certain fees for the use of business licenses. The activities are in 
fact a form of leasing 36 . But they did not have a contract for the leasing. Contract for 
such leasing is impossible and illegal, since the three entrepreneurs, as formal public 
employees or full-time students, were not eligible for leasing. But guanxi relationships 
between the entrepreneurs and the heads of the collective firms helped to arrange such 
transactions without a contract. From the providers' perspective, they could trust these 
entrepreneurs because they had known each other before. Informal institutions, such as 
particularistic social relationships (North, 1981) can supplement or substitute for legal 
structures in ways that reduce uncertainties and costs in economic transactions (Kollock, 
1994). For the entrepreneurs, with such licenses at hand, their business operation 
became legalised. Moreover, their businesses were run under the guise of either 
collective or state owned ownership, which provide a form of social capital, trust from 
customers, within the environment of general discrimination and distrust against private 
businesses. In this sense, for the entrepreneurs with rented licenses, the availability of 
guanxi, with which the licenses were bound, is crucial to their accumulations of capital 
for start-up. 
35 According to a survey conducted by the Urban Survey Team of the State Statistics Bureau of China, 
more than half of the income of city residents was from moonlighting, while job-related income made up 
44.5 per cent of their total income in 1999 (Hua Sheng Overseas Chinese Newspaper, April 3,2000). 
36 According to Shen et aL (1996), there are three types for leasing collective firms: total capital leasing, 
partial capital leasing and intangible capital leasing. In the last category, a collective firm only "leases" its 
intangible capital, such as firm title, business license, and credit. 
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7.4.8 Investment from others 
In the 15 cases that had investment from others as start-up capital, guanxi between the 
entrepreneurs and the investors can be sorted into two categories. Nine of the 
entrepreneurs had already known their investors before business start-up, the remaining 
six entrepreneurs only started to know their investors for the purpose of investment with 
the introduction by friends (Table 7.11). 
Table 7.11 Guanxi between the entrepreneurs and the investors 
Known before start-up Introduced by friends for investment 
9 6 
relative colleague customer oth r 
1 3 2 3 
In the six cases, guanxi between the entrepreneurs and the investors can be termed weak 
ties (Granovetter, 1973), but linked by common third parties. The intermediaries are 
social capital for the entrepreneurs, providing them with the information of capital 
source, and more crucially, verifying their trustworthiness to the investors. 
Nine entrepreneurs already had guanxi with their investors. One entrepreneur obtained 
investment from his relatives, three entrepreneurs had investment from their former 
colleagues, and two entrepreneurs transformed their customers into investors. Among 
the remaining three entrepreneurs, one attracted investment from a fellow-townsman, 
with one from former classmates, and the last one from friends. 
These nine cases have one thing in common with the six cases that received help from 
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friends and family, i. e., the existence of guanxi prior to their business start-up. However, 
there are several differences. As was pointed out previously, the companies with 
investment from others tend to have much higher registered capital. More importantly, 
since it is investment, rational consideration is the main concern for the investors; on the 
other hand, the investors have to share the risk of business with the entrepreneurs. This 
contrasts sharply to borrowing from relatives and friends for start-up capital, where 
affection and obligation are the main factors that influence the decision of the lenders. 
The investors want the lowest possibility of risk and the highest possibility of return. 
While for the lenders, their concern is whether the borrowers will return the money. 
Though both settings involve trust the nature of the trust is different. To the lenders, 
trustworthiness of the borrowers is the most important. However, to the investors, it is 
not only the good intent and credibility of the entrepreneurs that allow the investors to 
trust in them; the entrepreneurs must be perceived as being competent as well. Mishira 
(1996, cited in Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, p252) puts four aspects of trust: (1) belief 
in the good intent and concern of exchange partners, (2) belief in their competence and 
capability, (3) belief in their reliability, and (4) belief in their perceived openness. 
Because guanxi is based on known people, reliability, morals and capability are known. 
Social networks functions as a lens or prism though which the qualities of actors are 
inferred by potential exchange partners (Podolny, 2001). This is in particular true in the 
two cases where the entrepreneurs obtained investment from their former customers, 
who themselves are operators of big private businesses. One of the entrepreneurs clearly 
said, "He (the investor) sees that our cooperation can make money, and I am able to 
make money for him. Thus he invested in this company. " 
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7.5. Conversion of public finance? 
Wank (1999) believes that money and other commodities, and the resources shifted 
from the public for commercial profit constitute the prime accumulation for business 
start-up. Entrepreneurs who have influential family background were advantaged in 
deriving start-up assets from public resources, either receiving start-up financial capital 
by bank loans from state banks or as money from public units, or accumulating financial 
capital by leasing wholesale firms. Field research does not find such cases of 
transferring public finance backed by family background. There is one case, which is 
more or less close to Wank's (1999) account. Before formally registering his own firm, 
Mr WZH in case 27 had done moonlighting with a computer trading company. Later he 
and his former classmates set up a collective company under the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences. They got a financial injection indirectly from a state owned company, where 
his classmate's father served as the general manager. The father invested a sum of 
money in another big collective enterprise, from which, Mr WZH's firm "borrowed" 
part of the investment as working capital. Although they returned the total amount of 
money they borrowed, such an injection was clearly important to the business of Mr 
WZH and his classmates. When Mr WZH formally set up his own firm due to a dispute 
over business with other partners in 1993, he invested his own savings as registered 
capital. No doubt, besides his moonlighting income, the accumulations in this 
"collective" business contributed mostly to Mr WZH's start-up. 
The stories of the fifteen cases receiving investment are more complex than Wank's 
(1999) finding. According to the ownership of investmentý the sources of investment in 
the fifteen companies can be divided into two groups: private and public. Eleven 
198 
companies had investment from private finance, i. e., from private businesspeople that 
sought new opportunities for their money; while the remaining four companies obtained 
public financial support from state owned enterprises. The fact that the majority of the 
cases obtained investment from private channels reflects the importance of private 
capital37 in the IT sector. More importantly, the accumulations of private property 
demonstrate the development of the reform and its consequence, the emerging of a 
wealthy class (Liang, 1997), which in turn will have political economy implications for 
the Chinese society that need further research. 
Table 7.12 compares the difference in private and public sources between the fifteen 
entrepreneurs with government experience and without. Four out of the six 
entrepreneurs with government experience received public investment, and the 
remaining two received private finance. This contrasts sharply to the entrepreneurs 
without government experience, none of whom received any public investment. Simply 
looking at the association between the sources of start-up finance and the background of 
the entrepreneurs, the first impression is that this confirms an obvious advantage in 
converting public resources. 
Table 7.12 investment channels and work experience 
Government Non-government 
Private 2 9 
Public 4 0 
3' According to the projections of the Chinese government, the total of China's private capital is expected 
to account for 66.5 percent of the nation's overall investment during 2001-2005 (China Reform News, 
March 3,2000). Further, China has enormous potential for private investment. The saving deposits of 
residents amounted to RMB 6 trillion, in addition to RMB I trillion in cash, compared with about RMB 3 
trillion saving deposits of enterprises in 1999 (China Reform News, January 12,2000). 
This source investment can be termed informal finance. There are some other forms of informal financing, 
such as usury found in my pilot research, and credit association (see, for example, Tsai, 2000). 
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However, one case shows a contrary story to Wank's (1999) conversion of public 
finance. When expanding in 1996, case 29 received 40 per cent of its RMB 10 
million-registered capital, that is, RMB 4 million, from a state owned company. But 
later the entrepreneur was at odds with the general manager of the state owned company 
in how to operate the business. In 1998, they went to court and the entrepreneur had to 
pay RMB 5 million to the state owned company. The two-year "interest" the 
entrepreneur paid for the RMB 4 million "loan" is RMB I million! 
In fact, in all the four cases with investment from public finance, the ownership of 
capital is clearly defined. Moreover, the percentage of public capital investment is less 
than fifty percent. This can be understood in the context of progress in China's reform. 
Because of the regulations imposed by the government, state owned enterprises must be 
responsible for their own gains (Guthrie, 1998); on the other hand, mixed ownership has 
emerged, which was not imaginable before and in the beginning of reform, when there 
was clear boundary, and indeed, strict hierarchy between the private and the public. 
7.6. Condusion 
From the field research, it is found that there are several channels of finance for the 
private enterprises in the Chinese IT sector. Compared with the general population of 
private enterprises discussed in Chapter 2, private firms in the IT sector are less likely to 
rely on personal savings (12 out of 30,40 per cent compared with 57 per cent for 
general private firms) and family (only 3 out of 30,10 per cent, compared with 28 per 
cent for general private firms). Though like general private firms, they still have 
difficulties in access to formal finances, such as bank loans, they have more 
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opportunities to obtain investment (15 out of 30 cases, 50 per cent), which was only 2.6 
per cent for general private firms in the 1995 survey. 
Without formal channels of finance available to the private entrepreneurs, the private 
entrepreneurs have to resort to informal channels via guanxi. All the paths to get finance, 
whether investment was from other entrepreneurs, from personal savings, or from 
borrowing, have one thing in common, i. e., money was transferred through certain 
guanxi. In all the fifteen cases that got investment from others for start-up, the 
entrepreneurs either knew the investors themselves, or knew the investors via 
introduction by some friends. In the cases where the entrepreneurs had savings from 
moonlighting, they operated with leasing licenses from guanxi. During the enterprise 
registration procedure, though the entrepreneurs had to rely on themselves for real 
working capital, help from relatives and friends was essential. All these point to the 
importance of informal financial arrangement via guanxi. To some extent, it is guanxi 
that provided almost all the entrepreneurs with registered capital, as well savings for 
some, and investment for the others. 
Different types of guanxi resorted to for start-up finance define the relationships 
between the parties involved, on the one hand; they also denote the application of 
different norms to such guanxi. Some types of guanxi, such as family relations, close 
friends, offer financial support mainly because of affection and obligation; while other 
types of guanx! take actions based more on rational consideration than obligation, which 
are what some researchers term "instrumentalism" (Gold, 1985). Nonetheless, all types 
of guanxi provide the entrepreneurs with certain forms of social capital. 
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As a form of social capital, trust is not only the credibility and good intent of the parties 
involved; it is also about the ability to be relied upon. Accordingly, trust is produced in 
different ways, such as performance-based trust and characteristics-based trust. All these 
findings enrich the social capital concept. 
Further, in response to the discussion about power conversion theory, it is found that 
guanxi resorted to for business start-up finance is not necessarily cadre guanxi as the 
power conversion theory assumes. Furthermore, family, including cadre families, does 
not play a very important role in financing private IT company start-ups. There is 
evidence that the entrepreneurs with government experience have greater access to 
public financial source. This can be interpreted as the advantage that cadre 
entrepreneurs take, as the power conversion theory argues. However, this is not the 
simple conversion of public assets as some research suggests. Although the 
entrepreneurs without government experience seem to have disadvantages in this aspect, 
they receive finance from private channels, as an alternative. The different channels 
may partially be due to the different embedded structures (Granovetter, 1985) of the 
entrepreneurs, where the entrepreneurs with government experience are more likely to 
have contacts with state owned firms, and thus their seeking of financial capital is 
confined in the state sector, while the entrepreneurs without government experience 
tend to sort their problem out outside government in their private domain. 
The finding in this chapter again points to the complexity of guanxi and social capital. 
Guanxi can be of different types and strengths. Guanxi are thus not necessarily cadre 
guanxi. For example, customers can become trusted guanxi and investors. Different 
norms underlie different types of guanxi, which are another variable contributing to the 
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contingent value of guanxi and social capital. Thus guanxi or social capital is not a static 
property of an individual; instead, it is dynamic. The existence of guanxi will not 
automatically produce an advantage, equally, for entrepreneurs with and without cadre 
guanxi. 
This chapter looked at different types of guanxi used for start-up finance. The next 
chapter will examine the role of guanxi in finding customers at business start-up. More 
importantly, the dynamic aspect of guanxi and social capital, i. e., how different types of 
guanxi are brought into being is the main concern. 
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Chapter 8 Guanxi in finding customers 
The previous chapter considered how different types of guanxi helped in financing 
business start-up. All these social relationships provide the entrepreneurs with social 
capital. This chapter examines another most important aspect of business start-up: 
finding customers. It looks at how the entrepreneurs found their customers via different 
types of guanxi at business start-up. How different types of guanxi come into being, or, 
how social capital is produced, is the focus of this chapter. 
8.1 The importance of customer at business start-up 
Customers are critical to every business. Even in e-business, customers are becoming 
ever more demanding of products and service (Treleaven, 2000). Like fmance, 
customers are another most important aspect for business start-up (Churchill and Lewis, 
1983). According to Bevan et al (1989), getting/finding clients were among the greatest 
worries for people setting up businesses in the UK. Also, it is the most feared for 
entrepreneurs in Poland and constrains their business development (Erutke and Vallee, 
1997). 
8.2 The main sources of customers at start-up 
How did the private entrepreneurs in the IT sector manage to deal with this most 
important aspect of business operation at their start-ups? Again, guanxi played a vital 
role in finding customers at the beginning of business. The main sources of customers 
for the thirty entrepreneurs are shown as Table 8.1. 
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Table 8.1 The main sources of customers 
Known Introduced Ordinary customer 
8 14 8 
According to the strength of the relationship between the entrepreneurs and their main 
customers, there are three main sources: known people as customers; customers 
introduced by someone else; and the ordinary customers attracted by either 
advertisement or shop. People known for a certain period of time are strong ties, while 
people introduced by a third party are weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) at the very 
beginning. Ordinary customers can be termed strangers; their relationship to the 
entrepreneurs are instrumental ties; while the other two categories, both strong and 
weak ties, are guanxi (Hwang, 1987). 
Among the thirty cases, eight entrepreneurs mainly relied on people they had already 
known as their main customers at start-up. In this case, entrepreneurs have known their 
customers before they start their own business. This is in line with Arias' (1998) finding 
that guanxi is prior to and a prerequisite to the business relationship. 
In two out of these eight cases mentioned above, the entrepreneurs did not have a stock 
of computers in advance when they set up computer trading companies. When the 
guanxi customers confirmed their purchases, the entrepreneurs simply resorted to a 
supplier for computers and handed them over to the customers. The gap between the 
price provided by the supplier and the price they sold was their profit. One entrepreneur 
joked at himself by saying, "My business sounds a carrying business, in a short distance. 
Sometimes, we took PCs from the next door to my company (who had the stock) to my 
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office. My customers came over to my office to collect the goods. " This is the paradigm 
for a computer trading company, in particular in the beginning of the booming of a 
computer product market, when people did not know much about computers and 
information about computers was not widespread in the early 1990s. Kornai (1992) 
argues that a legacy of the planned economy is its vertical channels for information 
flows on supply and demand between the centre and locales within the state structure. 
For the entrepreneurs, the asymmetric information in the market provided them with 
opportunity to seek profit. Social networks are a conduit or pipe for information and 
resources in the market (Podolny, 200 1). Information about the known people's need for 
computers and the trust from known people are two forms of social capital (Coleman, 
1988). The social capital of the entrepreneurs helps the transactions to proceed. 
Twelve out of the thirty entrepreneurs had most customers introduced by guanxi. In this 
circumstance, the entrepreneurs do not know their customers in advance. In order to sell 
their products, they ask existing guanxi, including relatives, former colleagues, Eriends, 
and fellow townsmen, etc. to help them find customers. Guanxi can extend beyond the 
relationship between two parties (Arias, 1998), the customers and the intermediary. The 
existing guanxi are likely to have close ties with the customers, while the relationship 
between the entrepreneurs and the customers are weak ties (Granovetter, 1973). As has 
been shown in Chapter 6, weak ties can also help roll the snowball. Similarly, weak ties, 
which are embedded in networks that do not overlap with those of the entrepreneurs, are 
more likely to have different information and have the strength of providing the 
entrepreneurs with new information and opportunities. 
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More importantly, weak and strong ties are not absolute and static. Weak ties can be 
developed into strong ties. In fact, several entrepreneurs admitted that some of their 
known customers were stranger customers at the first stance and they became good 
friends in the following business transactions, who in turn help introduce new customers 
to the entrepreneurs. Such a transformation will be examined in the coming sections. 
In the remaining ten cases, most of the customers were "stranger" ordinary customers, 
that is, the entrepreneurs did not know these customers at all. They were either attracted 
by the advertisements of the products or by the shops the entrepreneurs ran. The 
relationship between the entrepreneurs and the customers is not guanxi at the first stance 
of business transaction. These instrumental ties are based on achieving specific goals, 
existing between people who interact with each other on a short-term basis, such as a 
salesperson and a customer (Hwang, 1987). 
In fact, two firms in this group can also be counted in the category of relying on 
introduced customers. The two firms produced and sold education software to higher 
schools at start-up. They placed advertisement on some popular education magazines to 
publicise their products. Afterwards, they started to ask their guanxi network to 
introduce them to school teachers. If they could not find anyone to bridge them over to a 
school, they went for door-to-door sales. Some schools contacted them directly to 
enquiry about or buy their products. However, in order to guarantee a transaction, they 
often tried their best to find out some guanxi, who could bridge them over to the 
targeted customers, usually school principals, who make decisions. 
As Chapter 7 suggested, five cases out of the thirty are in E-businesses. Four of them 
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relied heavily on guanxi for getting customers at start-up. The entrepreneurs in these 
four cases stated that the Internet only provides them with a platform to operate 
business, which is like a stage for performance. The practices behind the stage are much 
more crucial to the success of a performance. The other Internet housing company is 
having trouble attracting customers, perhaps partially due to not cultivating a 
well-prepared guanxi base. The interviewed entrepreneurs call this 'guanxi resources 
integration'. Thus, Han (2000) comments that even to the surprise of many 
business-to-business dot-com start-ups, touting disintermediation as their main value 
proposition, existing channels dominated by guanxi vendors have not been wiped out as 
expected. You may do business online now, but you end up using the same old 
middlemen. Perhaps, this is most ironic to E-commerce. 
To summarise, it is found that fewer than one third of the cases had known customers 
(eight out of thirty cases). This reflects the weakness of strong ties (Granovetter, 19973), 
i. e., the number of known people as customers is limited. The entrepreneurs were more 
likely to rely on customers introduced, the weak ties (Granovetter, 1973). However, the 
intermediary who introduced the customers to the entrepreneurs are existing guanxi! 
Hence, at least two third of the cases (twenty two out of the thirty cases) mainly relied 
on direct guanxi (known people) and indirect guanxi (introduced by known people) to 
get their customers at start-up. This once again justifies the importance of guanxi in 
business start-up. Informant 31 argued that a business could survive without guanxi, 
provided high quality of product and competitive price, but the business came at the 
cost of very low margin. Further he revealed: 
If you treat the head of your danwei customer in a sauna house, the atmosphere is changed. Everything can be 
discussed (You can talk very frankly, and the head does not need to bide his intention). He may say, "Well, the 
price of RMB 1,800 is too low, I can offer you a price of RMB 2,600". Then the gap of RMB 800 is kickbacks. 
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Actually RMB 1,800 is a good price for my business. 
8.3 Mass product versus project and their customers 
An interesting finding is that when the entrepreneurs produce or provide a mass product, 
they are less likely to rely on guanxi. As chapter 7 describes, there are 10 finns in PC 
trading business that produce and sell PCs and PC peripheries, which are mass products 
to individuals. In five out of the ten cases, the entrepreneurs' most customers were 
ordinary strangers, instrumental ties (Hwang, 1987). Contrasting sharply, only three out 
of the other twenty cases, whose products were more likely for customers other than 
individuals, i. e., a danwei (work unit), mainly a public buyer, relied on ordinary stranger 
customers. A danwei is usually a big buyer. Though the number of such buyers is small, 
the sales volume can be big. In other words, if the customer is a big buyer, guanxi is 
extremely important. This tendency can be seen in the comparison shown in Table 8.2. 
Table 8.2 Different guanxi with main customers at start-up 
Known Introduced Ordinary customer Total 
PC firms 2 3 5 10 
Other 
firms 
6 11 3 20 
Total 8 14 8 30 
Most of the entrepreneurs define guanxi as a reciprocal relationship with officials in 
charge of projeCtS38. Unsurprisingly, the entrepreneurs, who sell products to danwei, 
38 A danwei, for example, may have a so-called office automation project, which needs both PCs and 
software. Though data on danwei buying power is not available, the estimated government procurement 
gives a clue. According to China Business Times (August 15,2000), in general, government 
procurement amounts to about 10 per cent of a country's GDP. In 1999, the Chinese government 
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regard guanxi with them extremely important. The danwei officials make decision on 
what product they will buy. In the office, publicly, these officials appear to be "gongshi 
gongban", doing official business according to official principles, and they seem not to 
let personal consideration interfere with their execution of public duty. But after the 
businessmen get familiar with them, everything can be under consideration. The head 
officials are crucial, since they are decision makers. However, this does not mean that 
the other related officials are not importan09. The entrepreneurs or their agents (such as 
sales representatives) must keep good relations with all of them, though costs of 
keeping different relations vary and they must cater to the differentiated interests of the 
officials. 
In a similar vein, Staniszkis (199 1) terms the advantage the cadre entrepreneurs take as 
political capitalism. In the companies run by the cadre entrepreneurs in East Europe, the 
main customer is not the consumer market but state industry. Profits are derived from 
the exclusive access to attractive markets, information and supply made possible by the 
dual status of the nomenklatura owners. Unlike Staniszkis' (1991) finding, the Chinese 
officials in power realise their personal profit by turning power over goods into 
kickbacks without operating their own firms. In a sense, the entrepreneurs and the 
officials become agents to each other and they have a division of labour. 
For case 21, guanxi relations for their business are comparatively stable at the moment 
since the officials will stay in their posts for about three years. Thus informant 21 joked 
purchasing was about RMB 1000 billion. The Chinese government mainly purchases goods, projects and 
services. 
39 A very interesting relevant case was published in Business Week (September 30,1996). A leading 
salesman of Boeing Company, Lee Hsiung-Fei, knew everyone on the Chinese side, from line mechanics 
to pilots prior to the delivery of the first 767 airplane. When pilots, engineers and managers flew to 
Seattle to take delivery, he took them sightsccing, shopping, and hosted them in his home. According to 
his experience, he said, "It is important to get to know the airline at every level, down to the foot 
soldiers". 
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that the time for them to be in positions was almost the same as the life cycle of the 
company's product. These officials are in their 50s, nearly retired age. What will happen 
when they retire is unknown yet to the company. It is argued that in China, those 
officials and managers in their late 50s are more likely to be found guilty of corruption 
or briberyýo, hence the term as "59 phenomenon"41. These officials know their power 
will have expired when they retire and thus grab money before losing power. For the 
entrepreneurs, this type of guanxi is useless once they retire, since they cannot provide 
social capital any more. 
8.4 Different ways of having guanxi 
As found previously, known people as customers and the intermediary resorted to for 
customers are guanxi, and the majority of the firms, i. e., twenty-two out of the thirty 
cases, relied on guanxi to sell their products at start-up. Further, it is found there are 
different types of guanxi relied upon for the operations, which include classmates, 
fellow townsmen, relatives, colleagues, former customers, friends' friends, and so on 
and so forth. Accordingly, there are different ways of having such guanxi. Some of them 
are from endowment, with some from savings, some from investment, some from 
subcontracting, and the rest from newly building up. 
40 The Berlin-bascd anti-corruption non-profit organisation, Transparency International, has compiled a 
10-point Perception of Corruption Index of capturing the perceived level of bribery in various countries. 
The index, released annually, pulls together existing polls of international businessmen and financial 
journalists on their assessment of corruption in different countries. In 2001, Finland was listed on the top 
as the least corrupt country at a score of 9.9 out of 10. Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan had a score of 
9.2,7.5 and 5.9 respectively. The Mainland China was put near the bottom of the list with a higher level 
of corruption at an average score of 3.5 with Indonesia at a score of 1.9 (Transparency International 
Perception of Corruption Index, 200 1). 
41 For example, a model entrepreneur of a state owned store in Zhuhai City near Hong Kong has been arrested after 
allegedly accepting RMB millions in bribes. The entrepreneur Zhang, aged 57, had been labelled Zhuhai's 
"iron-woman" by the media. Ile anti-corruption investigator said many senior cadres, such as Zhang, were 
threatened by the retirement plan and were tempted to solicit private gains in the years before their retirement (South 
China Morning Post, November 21,2000). 
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8.4.1 Endowment of guanxi 
Wank (1999) has explained that guanxi from endowment are the social relations by 
virtue of birth into a family of a particular social class. Family background endows 
some entrepreneurs with certain types of guanxi with strong obligation. Consanguineous 
ties and family friends are in this category. An obvious example of this route of guanxi 
is seen in the members of the so-called "princes" party, the offspring of elite central 
officials (Tho and Ho, 1997). 
Chapter 7 has found that few entrepreneurs were born in Beijing and most of the 
entrepreneurs come from ordinary families far outside Beijing where their firms are 
located. The entrepreneurs born in Beijing sometimes could access their endowment 
guanxi for help. For example, they asked their relatives to help introduce customers. 
Those born beyond Beijing do not have much social capital from endowment. Instead, 
they mostly rely on guanxi from other channels. 
8.4.2 Savings of guanxi 
A second route of guanxi is savings, which are mainly acquired through life experiences. 
In other words, this type of guanxi is accumulated during the time of common 
experiences or common background. An example of this source of guanxi is classmates. 
As Chapter 7 suggests, almost all of the interviewed entrepreneurs have university 
education background. Also, almost all of them admitted that they received help from 
their classmates in business start-up and they most frequently contacted their classmates, 
including classmates at an early age. 
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After years of studying together, two individuals have known each other very well. 
They not only share the same background of education and study experience; they may 
also have common hobbies. Classmates become a sort of close guanxi. However, it 
must be noted that not all classmates can be regarded as guanxi. It is true that there 
exists relationship among all classmates, but surely not all of the classmates would treat 
each other as guanxi. For example, two classmates do not get along well during the 
years of study, and neither would define the counterpart as guanxi. As Burt (1997b) 
finds, difficult colleagues are rarely chosen for personal relations. 
The existence of relationships linking individuals is objective. Further, guanxi is a 
subjective perception of the parties involved. It is based on mutual recognition of the 
relationship between the two parties. Bourdieu (1986) thus argues that social capital 
involves durable obligations subjectively felt. 
This type of guanxi usually has existed before an entrepreneur's business start-up 
(Wank, 1999). The pre-business guanxi, based on common life experiences, is often 
affection-motivated and has hardly anything to do with economic considerations at the 
beginning. This is especially true before people have decided their careers. The younger 
the age when a type of guanxi is set up, the purer it is. In reality, it cannot be ruled out 
that people deliberately cultivate guanxi for a future business career. Pre-business 
guanxi does not necessarily exist for purposes of economic gain, but it can be utilised 
for economic gain. Since pre-business guanxi is more likely to be affection based, 
obligations are more likely to be concerned, and accordingly economic gains may not be 
the priority of the concern. When an entrepreneur was asked if he paid interest to his 
friend who lent him money for business, he laughed: "We have never thought of this, as 
213 
we are good friends. " 
8.4.3 Guanxi from investment 
To some extent distinct from guanxi based on savings, guanxi relationships from 
investment are more likely to come into being for the purpose of business. Also, they 
are more likely to be termed business guanxi, compared with guanxi from savings. The 
first step, or, the basis for this type of guanxi, is to establish guanxi. Then, investment is 
needed to develop and maintain guanxi. 
8.4.3.1 Establishing guanxi 
Guanxi is a relationship of mutual recognition, as pointed out earlier. Guanxi commonly 
refers to friends, schoolmates, colleagues, and other acquaintances, which come from 
long time of interaction. Interaction between two individuals can lead to the 
establishment of guanxi. But where is the starting point of guanxt? Something in 
common acts as an intermediary for further interaction. The intermediary can be 
common experience, common background, and so on so forth, in a word, something in 
common. 
The two parties can find something in common to start up their guanxi. For instance, 
when two individuals meet in certain settings, they may talk about where they come 
from, particularly if they are familiar with each other's accent. If they share the same 
dialect the distance between them suddenly is shortened. Laoxiang, fellow townsman, 
becomes an important intermediate linking two individuals together. Laoxiang is 
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actually a flexible term for people from the same area. Geographically, the area can be a 
village, a town, a county, and even a province, and sometimes, it can be larger. In 
general, the closer geographically the hometowns of the two individuals, the closer they 
feel, and the more potential they will establish guanxi. 
Similarly, another common reason for establishing guanxi can be alumni associations. 
The two individuals have not necessarily known each other before, and actually they 
may not have studied together during the same period. 
If the opportunity of face-to-face interaction is not provided, introduction of a third 
party can bridge the gap. The logic is often " My friend's friend is a friend of mine, 
too. " 
These are the most common bases for the entrepreneurs to establish social guanxi with 
someone they did not know before. The three common bases act in essence as an 
instrument to verify the reliability of both parties. When trust is built, guanxi tends to be 
closer, and further interactions ensue. 
If entrepreneurs possess no basis for guanxi, but anticipate the need to request a favour, 
they may attempt to develop personal relations based on some other common 
experiences, such as common tasks and/or mutual enjoyments. Alternatively, joining 
certain associations can lead to knowing people and building guanxi (Odgaard, 1992). 
Bourdieu (1986) has also pointed out that people will consciously join certain clubs that 
provide social capital. However, belonging to the same association does not produce 
social capital as some social scientists optimistically assume, instead, the formal 
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associations may only be a small factor in the production of social capital or trust (Lyon, 
2000). Nevertheless, belonging to the same association builds the basis for further 
interaction, which may lead to guanxi. Indeed, it is possible to consider every basis of 
guanxi to be a form of common experience. 
An obvious practical difficulty in the formation of the basis of common experience is 
that there is no well-defined extent and type of experience that constitutes an adequate 
basis. Since the existence of trust is the essential criterion, regardless of the nature of the 
common experiences, common experience is indeed an excuse for building up guanxi. 
Whether real guanxi can be established and counted on needs further test in filture 
interactions, in business terms, business transactions. As Falk and Kilpatrick (2000) 
observe, a precondition to building social capital is the existence of sufficient numbers 
of interactions of a particular quality. 
8.4.3.2 Developing and maintaining guanxi 
The basis of common experience or background only provides potential for setting up 
guanxi. Mutual recognition of a basis for guanxi is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for the existence of a guanxi relation. Social guanxi is dynamic, whose 
strength depends more heavily on interaction, unlike family (blood) guanxi, which is 
given and exists for sure. Once a basis for guanxi has paved the way for an opportunity 
to build guanxi, it must be nurtured by interpersonal interactions so that guanxi 
relationships can be activated. Rusbult (1980,1983, and 1987) finds that the stability of 
a relationship depends on costs and benefits at present, and also on investments made in 
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the past and the degree to which support was given and received over time (cited in Van 
Duijnet at, 1999, pl9l). 
Documented research has pointed out the importance of gift-giving in guanxi exchange 
and investment (e. g., Walder, 1986; Solinger, 1989; Yang, 1989 and 1994). Further, 
Yang (1989) argues that the gift economy is one of the three modes of exchange in 
China, along with the state distributive economy and commodity economy. 
Nevertheless, investment in guanxi does not simply mean gift-giving or money. 
Bourdieu (1986) notes that the investment implies expenditure of time and energy, 
which in turn means direct or indirect expenditure of economic capital. To develop and 
maintain guanxi, investment is more than gift-giving. Time and efforts are also needed. 
There are some basic rules for the interactions. 
First of all, it does not have to be based on money. Money talks, but money does not 
work in every setting, and sometimes, money has counter-productive result. For 
example, if money is offered soon after help, guanxi tends to be understood as money 
guanxi, or, "fee-for-service" guanxi (Luo, 2000). The impression is that the guanxi is or 
a one-time deal, which is not different from the exchange between two strangers. 
Guanxi ties will not last long. Informant 21 warned, "Presenting money inappropriately 
can result in distancing your guanxi and you. " 
In a similar vein, Davies et aL (1995) point out that exchanges between guanxi need to 
be handled sensitivity as Western businessmen are in danger of overemphasizing the 
gift-giving and wining-and-dining components of a guanxi relationship, thereby coming 
dangerously close to be perceived as meat and wine friends, which is a Chinese 
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metaphor for mistrust. In the case where manipulative intent becomes apparent to the 
gift or favour receiver, the present may be refused or devalued and the manipulation 
fails to achieve its instrumental intent (Smart, 1993). Also, gift-giving may be viewed as 
briber/2. 
Informant 32 gave a vivid metaphor about the delicacy of such interactions, "Don't let 
spring know of planting willows ". The appropriate approach for interaction must be 
considered according to circumstances. For instance, treating someone with decency 
while others treat him/her unfairly could result in a good relationship. 
Also, it starts with and builds on the trustworthiness of the individuals. If an 
entrepreneur promises something, he must do it to show his trustworthiness. Mutual 
trust promotes close interactions, and thus guanxi is strengthened. It is also the case for 
a company. If a company promises certain things and delivers as promised, the 
company is showing trustworthiness and the counterpart would be more inclined to deal 
with them in the future. Informant 22 Mr WXQ's story, which is about why a university 
professor became his regular customer and introduces new customers, demonstrates this 
point. 
Some years ago, he popped in my shop to enquire about buying a home used computer. I 
happened to be on duty in the counter that day. I answered every question be asked patiently and 
clearly, though he only said that he would like to know more about computer and showed no 
sign of buying a computer. Several days later, he came back again and bought one. He is 
satisfied with our computer quality and service. More importantly, he believes that we are 
trustworthy, as we promise something, for example, quick service, we definitely deliver it. Now, 
42 For further discussion about the relationship between gift-giving and bribery, and thus Guanxi and 
corruption see Luo (2000) and Wang (2000). 
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the professor introduces not only his friends and colleagues but also some laboratories to buy 
PCs herc. " 
Indeed, the trustworthiness of a company is built on the conduct of the individuals. A 
company's image can come from conduct of every individual of the company, good or 
bad. Bearing this in mind, the entrepreneurs pay attention to the trustworthiness and 
reliability of the employees when they recruit. 
It is also important to remember that frequent contacts with each other foster 
understanding and emotional bonds. A critical social capital of trust, not just obligation, 
is created through the repeated exchange of gifts and favours. Ganqing (feeling) is an 
important element in guanxi. The closer in emotional bond, the more obligations are felt 
in guanxi, and the more help can be expected from such guanxi. In practice, such 
contacts involve expressions of concern for another's welfare and well-being through 
shows of human sentiment (Wank, 1999). Informant II had a good comment on how to 
maintain Guanxi: 
Firstly, do not forget to bother your guanxi. This is the best way to keep in touch with guanxi. 
Secondly, do not forget to help him or her, that is, repay the favours you have received. 
Finally, the norm of reciprocity must be obeyed. The principle of renqing that underlies 
most guanxi ties suggests that favourism is often followed by a strong expectation of 
reciprocity (Hwang, 1987). The return of favours is certainly needed for further guanxi, 
but it must be returned in the right time and the right form, say, "a friend in need is a 
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friend indeed". For gift-giving 43 ,a form of reciprocity, the common time for 
entrepreneurs to reciprocate their guanxi ties is some important holidays in China, such 
as Spring Festival, Mid-autumn Festival, when either cash or gifts can be offered to a 
guanxi tie. The gifts can be presented either to the guanxi tie himself/herself or to other 
members of the guanxi family. Social life is a constant give-and-take. The latent 
function or purpose of the gifts is to establish the obligation to engage in social 
interaction and to uphold those obligations entailed in such interaction (Mauss, 1969). 
Subcontracting is another important way that the entrepreneurs in the case studies 
developed guanxi. 
8.4.4 Subcontracting guanxi 
According to Mieghem (1999), the word subcontracting has been used for nearly two 
hundred years. The term refers to the practice of one company (the subcontractor or 
supplier) providing a service or good for another (the contractor, buyer, or 
manufacturer). Typically, subcontracting is the situation where the contractor "procures 
an item or service that is normally capable of economic production in the contractor's 
own facilities and that requires the contractor to make specifications available to the 
subcontractor" (Day, 1956, cited in Mieghem, 1999, p954). 
Such subcontracting exists in the business operations of the interviewed private 
entrepreneurs, too. Some small software companies do not have the ability or reputation 
to secure big system integration contracts. They keep a close relationship with certain 
43 Yan (1996) classifies gift givings in a Chinese village into three categories: expressive gift giving on 
ceremonial occasions, expressive gift giving in non-ritualised situations, and instrumental gift giving 
(cited in Wang, 2000, p550). 
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big companies, who have such projects and subcontract some products needed in the 
whole projects, such as software, to the small ones. The small companies have guanxi 
with the big ones. In fact, in several cases, the guanxi persons in the big companies are 
stakeholders in the small ones. 
As well, some interviewed companies do not have the ability to produce everything for 
their customers; they subcontract what they cannot provide to some other companies. 
Guanxi is an important factor in the consideration of such subcontracting, that is, they 
tend to subcontract the service or product to guanxi, which benefits both sides. 
The above-mentioned are similar to the standard practice of subcontracting, and 
accordingly they gain similar benefits, such as the value of flexibility (Friedman, 1977), 
enabling enterprises - to cut costs and spread financial risks (Colling, 1995). 
Subcontracting or outsourcing creates great opportunities but also new types of risks, 
including loss of control over a subcontractor or supplier. With guanxi, such 
subcontracting has not the risks. This is because guanxi is based on a long-term 
relationship, of which, trust, in terms of the ability to rely on, is important. Thus the 
most successful outsourcers find it absolutely essential to have both close personal 
contact and rapport at the floor level and political clout and understanding with the 
supplier's top management (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994). 
Unlike the above-mentioned two circumstances, where the existing guanxi is the 
precondition of subcontracting and the contents of subcontracting are products and 
services, to subcontract guanxi is to utilise the guanxi of another when the entrepreneurs 
themselves lack such guanxi. In this case, Guanxi is the subcontract content. 
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Subcontracting renders the subcontracted process "someone else's problem" (Colling, 
1994). 1 call this subcontracting guanxi. 
This is because the entrepreneurs cannot always have guanxi covering many areas 
where they plan to do business. Even if they have guanxi in the target areas, the existing 
guanxi may not work all the time, as is pointed out in Chapter 6, guanxi is contingent 
upon situations. A possible solution is to build new guanxi. However, guanxi is in 
general a long-term oriented relationship, and building guanxi is a lengthy process. The 
entrepreneurs cannot wait till guanxi is set up. The strategy is to subcontract guanxi. 
This is in particular important for those firms that do trans-regional businesses, where 
the entrepreneurs themselves either have no guanxi or have no time to develop guanxi. 
Agents are a common choice for subcontracting guanxe 
4. The need for guanxi is 
subcontracted to agents who have strength in this respect. People of such strength head 
the branches or offices. Product sales are expanded to many places where branches or 
offices are located. From this aspect a guanxi marketing approach is used. In essence, it 
is guanxi that counts. Guanxi is subcontracted and expanded; as a consequence, 
products are sold. Similarly, Luo (2000) argues that sales force marketing strategy has 
become increasingly popular and effective. The activity, which heavily depends on 
guanxi, has three forms: direct dispatching of marketing personnel, setting up regional 
sales office, and selecting sales representatives from outside of the firm on a 
commission basis. 
44 Increasingly, multinationals are recognising the advantages of guanxi available to Hong Kong 
entrepreneurs and are using them as middlemen, brokers, and subcontractors as a more efficient way of 
entering the Chinese market (Pomfret, 199 1). 
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In the case of subcontracting guanxi, cost considerations are the entrepreneur's concern, 
but the absence of necessary input of guanxi for sales is the main reason. There are a 
variety of practices of subcontracting. The first is similar to internal subcontracting 
within the firm, where a person with such guanxi resources is employed as a member of 
the firm. The entrepreneur pays the person salary, plus a certain percentage of bonuses 
from sales. The more the sales, the more the bonus. In the second case, the 
subcontractor gives the contractor a price for its product, the contractor itself sets the 
sale price to customers, and the balance between the two prices is the contractor's 
guand reward. In this circumstance, the subcontractor does not invest in the contractor, 
and the contractor sometimes does not need an office. A third way is that both the 
subcontractor and the contractor invest certain amount of money according to contract 
to set up an office, and the two parties share the profits. In all the three circumstances, 
the subcontractor provides product and services after sales. 
An ideal agent is an existing guanxi tie, or introduced by an existing tie of the 
entrepreneur. But this is not necessarily the case. Instead, it can be found through 
advertisement. Nonetheless, certain guanxi resources are required for an agent so that 
the entrepreneur's product can be sold on the basis of the resources. In the 
advertisement description, it is clearly stated, "the applicants must have broad Shehui 
guanxi (social relations) ". 'Me agent can use his or her direct or indirect social network 
to promote products. As a result, guanxi-based selling can produce impressive 
marketing performance even when the product itself is not competitive (Luo, 2000). 
Because the relationship between the contractor and the subcontractor is not well built, 
rather, it is mainly interest based, the subcontractor is very cautious at the beginning. 
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The subcontractor will try to verify the trustworthiness of the contractor via many 
channels, and a formal contract will be signed. Meanwhile, the subcontractor tends to 
bind the contractor into the business by requiring certain investment from the contractor. 
As reliability can only communicated through action (Sobel, 1985). When the 
performance of the contractor demonstrates its reliability in a certain period, the 
subcontractor will invest more and rely more on the contractor. Successful experiences 
identify good partners and permit increases in the scale of exchange (Sobel, 2002, p 150). 
Performance strengthens guanxi, and further co-operation follows. 
8.4.5 Symbolic guanxi: linking to the elite 
Private entrepreneurs like to have guanxi with the elite, since the elite are in 
advantageous positions. However, the elite are in the higher positions of social 
hierarchy, and are thus not always easily accessible for the entrepreneurs. Building 
guanxi with the elite is difficult. As is found, guanxi is a relationship of mutual 
recognition by the both sides involved. Without subjective recognition from both sides, 
there exist no obligations. The party in the advantageous position has no duty to help 
the other. But this does not jeopardises the entrepreneurs to take advantage of linking to 
some elite, though there is no real guanx! between them. They can set up symbolic 
guanxi with the elite after a face-to-face meeting, provided with evidence of such a 
meeting between them. 
One entrepreneur hangs a very big framed picture taken with the CEO of the chip giant 
Intel on his PC shop. This is a mute testimony to his credibility in business. The picture 
acts as a third authoritative party to issue him credentials, which gives consumers a 
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reliable signal. Similarly, Unicom-Sparkice, a joint venture in the IT sector in Beijing, 
prints company fliers displaying the signatures of Prime Minister Zhu Rongji and 
President Jiang Zemin alongside those of Bill and Hillary Clinton. In China, such 
signature collections function as endorsements of talismanic import (CNN, January 19, 
1999). 
It is common that companies post pictures of the elite, in particular government VIPs, 
who have visited them, or calligraphy by such VIPs, as credentials to prove what they 
claim, and an instrument to promote their products. The higher the rank of the VIP and 
the more famous the VIP, the better the result is. This is because of the long history of 
officialdom-dominated civilisation in China (Bruun, 1993). The government has to ban 
such publications again and again, considering the activities ruin the VIPs' and 
government's images. 
In fact in such circumstances, the entrepreneurs do not have personal relationship with 
the elite. For example, though the entrepreneur I interviewed did meet the CEO of Intel 
once, the relationship between him and the CEO is not guanxi as we discuss it here. He 
knows the CEO, as many other people, but the CEO does not know him, and has no 
obligation at all to help the entrepreneur. Thus, I call this kind of relationship symbolic 
guanxi, linking the entrepreneurs to the elite, rather than connection or guanxi with the 
elite. Nevertheless, such guanxi promotes the entrepreneurs' product sales. 
It is not the meeting with the elite or shaking hands with the elite that is the condition 
for building such symbolic guanxi; instead, it is the symbolic themselves, such as 
photos taken with the elite that demonstrate the relationship. The entrepreneur might 
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have not the chance to meet the elite, but they can link themselves to the elite. For 
example, business boards carrying the elite's calligraphy commonly seen in China, help 
link the entrepreneur with the elite. Entrepreneurs can get handwritings of elite via 
certain channels. In some cases, entrepreneurs have to pay for such handwritings either 
to the elite or the channels. The handwriting of a former vice governor of Jiangxi 
province was displayed by many businesspeople, and the governor received 
considerable money for such writing (China Daily, March 12,2000). 
8.5 Conclusion 
Again, the field research in the private IT sector suggests that in another most important 
aspect of business start-up, finding customers, guanxi plays a pivotal role. This finding 
does not support the argument that with the progress of reform, the importance of 
guanxi is declining (e. g., Guthrie, 1998). As found in Chapter 6, guanxi is contextual. It 
can be true that guanxi is not important in certain contexts. For example, as found 
previously, when their products are mainly for the mass market. Also, guanxi is not 
essential any more in getting everyday living goods such as food (Yang, 1994). The 
general argument that the importance of guanxi is waning is not appropriate. Guanxi 
still plays a very important role as suggested above and in Chapter 7. 
This chapter finds that there are many ways of having different types guanxi. As power 
conversion theory suggests, being bom into a cadre family or being a cadre can provide 
entrepreneurs with social capital. But these, endowment of guanxi and savings of 
guanxi, are simply two of the channels that produce social capital. Guanxi from 
endowment is not elective, other types of guanxi, in particular from investment and 
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subcontracting, are consciously created and developed. The practice of guanxi, the art of 
guanxi, provides entrepreneurs with potentials when guanxi has a competitive 
advantage in business. 
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Part 4 Conclusion 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
9.1 Themes of the thesis 
This thesis contributes to an understanding of private enterprise start-ups in China. In 
addressing this central question, it critically examines and utilises social capital theory. 
As there is no available research focusing on business start-up in the Chinese private 
sector, this thesis starts with some broad relevant literature for guidance. In the 
theoretical part of the thesis, after clarifying the concept of cadre, the thesis tests the 
dominant power conversion theory by analysing a national survey data on Chinese 
private enterprises. Further, it explores the reasons why there is no statistical evidence to 
support the argument that cadre-related entrepreneurs have an advantage in business 
start-up. It goes on to examine the two key concepts of social capital and guanxi and 
points out some weaknesses in the current literature. The case study part of the thesis 
aims to fill in some of the main deficiencies in the existing literature on social capital 
and guanxi. It studies how guanxi helped the researchers conduct fieldwork and 
businesspeople in the private IT start up their businesses. It further examines how 
guanxi and social capital are produced. 
This chapter concludes the thesis. It draws together the threads of the previous chapters 
Then it suggests some areas for ftirther research opened up by this study. Lastly, it 
speculates some ftirther implications of this research. 
9.1.1 Background 
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This thesis presented the background of this research in Chapter 2. As the private sector 
was under-researched, compared to state owned enterprises, township and village 
enterprises, and foreign direct investment It looked at the policy changes, operation 
environment and the development of the sector. It suggested that the private sector has 
played a more and more important role in the Chinese economy and social life. 
9.1.2 Testing power conversion theory and cadre 
As there exists no systematic research focusing on business start-up in the Chinese 
private sector, this thesis started with an examination of the relevant literature on 
post-communist societies in Chapter 1. According to the dominant power conversion 
theory, during the transition from socialism to capitalism, power accumulated during 
state socialism is converted into assets of high value in a market economy. Cadres are at 
an advantage not only in starting up but also in operating companies, because they can 
transfer state assets into quasi or real ownership for business. Also, they can use their 
social relations (networks) to get access to credit and valuable information. 
Entrepreneurs bom into cadre families can take similar advantages into business. As a 
consequence, entrepreneurs who have been a cadre or have cadre connections are more 
successful. 
Following the logic of power conversion theory, this thesis proposes two hypotheses 
that should hold in empirical data. Entrepreneurs with cadre background or close cadre 
social relations should be more likely to have much higher start-up capital. They should 
also be more likely to finance their start-ups from public funding. 
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The test of the hypotheses is based on an analysis of the unpublished 1995 national 
survey data set on private enterprises in China. In Chapter 3, in line with the power 
conversion thesis, the social background and the social relations of an entrepreneur, 
including the entrepreneur's father, spouse, closest relatives and closest friends, are 
examined. These variables are coded as a dichotomy: cadre and non-cadre. For start-up 
financing, variables used are: 1) the registered capital at business start-up; 2) the real 
assets at start-up; and 3) the main sources of start-up registered capital. Cross-tabulation 
analysis and the Chi-square test are utilised to examine the association between the 
entrepreneurs' background variables, i. e., their social origins and social relations, and 
business advantage variables, i. e., the registered capital and real assets at start-up, and 
the main sources of finance. 
A surprising finding from the analysis is that being a cadre or having close cadre 
connections does not seem to have significant advantages in private enterprise start-up 
financing. In other words, statistically, being a cadre and having close cadre social 
relations does not tend to be associated with higher registered capital and real assets at 
business start-up. Neither do they seem to be more likely to have finance from public 
sources, such as bank loans and money from public units. 
It is noted in Chapter 3 that it is essential to give a clear definition for the key term of 
cadre in testing the power conversion theory, as it has several meanings in different 
contexts in China. 'Me argument that cadre related entrepreneurs have an advantage in 
private business operation is not convincing without a well-defined cadre concept. 
In one usage, cadre refers to the personnel in government, Party, business enterprises 
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and service establishments, including technicians and teaching personnel (Vogel, 1967). 
Thus cadre can be understood as a class in contrast to worker and peasant. In another 
usage, people refer to anyone in a position of power as a cadre (Manion, 1985). 
Technicians and teachers, who are also titled cadres, are unlikely to have redistributive 
power of resources. It is the cadres in government who are in charge of the allocation of 
the resources in short supply (Walder, 1986). Thus a good definition of cadre should 
reflect the positional power in the hierarchy or the power of allocating resources of a 
cadre. 
A cadre, for the purpose of testing the power conversion theory, is defined as someone 
reaching a certain position of power. The cadre category includes not only someone at 
the very top of the communist hierarchy but also everyone who reached some position 
of power, ranging from chief prefecture and county level officials down to village heads, 
who have the power of allocation of resources. Based on the clearly defined cadre 
concept, the analysis of the 1995 national survey on China's private enterprises does not 
support the general power conversion theory. Nor is this theory supported even if cadre 
is defined in a more restrictive manner to refer to those high level positions. It thus 
suggests that further qualitative research investigating how private entrepreneurs start 
up their businesses is needed. 
9.1.3 Social capital and guanxi 
It is argued that the logic of the power conversion theory is in the frame of Bourdieu's 
(1986) social capital theory. As Bourdieu (1986) notes, dominant social classes can use 
their privileged access to the three forms of capital, namely, economic capital, cultural 
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capital and social capital, to make strategic conversion of one kind of capital to another 
in order to solidify their class position. According to Bourdieu (1986, p248), social 
capital refers to the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, 
and derived from the network of relationships possessed or created by an individual. In 
ordinary language, social capital can be termed connections (Bourdieu, 1993, p 160). 
However, the power conversion theory is too simple (Szelenyi and Kostello, 1996, 
p1093). With the conceptual apparatus of Bourdieu, one may interpret the theory as 
meaning that there are few or no limits to the conversion of cadre status into economic 
gains (Szelenyi and Szelenyi, 1995, p616). It pays much attention to those entrepreneurs 
with a cadre background or close connections with cadres but neglects how the 
entrepreneurs without such a background or connections survive and develop their 
businesses. Such a theory ignores the creation of social capital and the constraints of 
social capital. Besides being a cadre and coming from a cadre family, people can have 
other ways to possess and produce social capital. 
It is argued that guanxi is a Chinese version of social capital. Guanxi are personal 
relations that can be resorted to for certain ends based on the norm of reciprocity. Like 
social capital in the West, guanxi has an instrumental function, and can be used for 
personal ends. 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the two concepts of guanxi and social capital and the 
relationship between them. It is argued that the two concepts overlap with each other. 
There are three main versions of social capital theory, represented by Bourdieu, 
Coleman and Putnam respectively. Guanxi and the concept of social capital in the three 
233 
main streams have common ingredients. Nevertheless, there are some differences 
between the two terms. Guanxi is closest to Bourdieu's (1986,1993) notion of social 
capital, which is mainly looked at from the relational dimension of social capital. 
It is further argued that there are several main weaknesses in the available research on 
both guanxi and social capital. In researching China, researchers mostly look at guanxi 
with government and government officials. Although governments play a critical role in 
the transition, focusing almost solely on changes in the government organizational 
hierarchy and on the fate of the cadre elite, such research overlooks the pursuit of power 
and plenty through guanxi by other economic actors in societies. Research on 
transitional economies needs to move beyond the limits of state-cadre centred analysis 
(Nee, 1996, p947). 
Secondly, the available research implies that guanxi and social capital always have 
positive outcomes and treats social capital and guanxi as simultaneously a cause and an 
effect. However, social capital is not always instrumental for individuals; it may become 
a constraint to individuals' actions and choices. 
Thirdly, the existing research on social capital, like the power conversion theory, mainly 
analyses existing social capital and positive outcomes but ignores how social capital 
comes into being. As Bourdieu (1986) argues, social capital is not necessarily naturally 
given; instead, it can be the product of investment by individuals who consciously or 
unconsciously aim at establishing or reproducing such social relations. Nevertheless, 
Bourdieu has never applied his theory in empirical research. It is believed that research 
on guanxi can contribute to social capital theory in terms of how social capital is 
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brought into being. 
9.1.4 The role of guanxi in private business start-ups in the IT sector 
Aiming at finding out how the Chinese private entrepreneurs start up their businesses, 
this thesis shifts to the in-depth qualitative research in the form of case studies in three 
chapters, Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. The case studies concentrate on what 
types of guanxi the entrepreneurs of the private IT companies in Beijing Hi-tech Park 
resort to and how they utilize different types of guanxi for their business start-ups. The 
most recent field study in the private IT sector presents much richer multi-dimensional 
concepts for both guanxi and social capital. 
As an initial attempt to focus on business start up in the Chinese private sector, this 
research finds that guanxi plays an important role. The importance of guanxi is 
examined in terms of its role in the two most critical aspects of business start-ups: 
financing and getting customers. It is found that there are several channels of business 
start-up financing in the private IT companies: personal savings, borrowing from friends 
or relatives, and investment from others. Without formal channels of finance available 
to the private entrepreneurs, they have to resort to guanxi for start-up finance. Guanxi 
resorted to for their start-up include relatives, friends and those introduced by known 
people, etc. 
In the other critical aspect of business start-up, finding customers, the majority of the 
firms, relied on guanxi to sell their products at start-up. They either relied on known 
people to become customers or resorted to intermediaries to access customers. Both 
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known people and the intermediaries are guanxi. 
9.1.5 Production and creation of social capital 
There are different types of guanxi, which include classmates, fellow townsmen, 
relatives, colleagues, former customers, friends' friends, and so on and so forth. There 
are several ways for different types of guand to come into being. Some types of guanxi 
come from endowment by virtue of birth into a family or a particular economic class or 
bureaucratic rank. Some types of guanxi are acquired through life experiences that 
predate the entrepreneurial career in childhood, education, work and political 
experiences. It is worth pointing out that political experience is simply one of the 
experiences that can lead to the acquirement of social capital. It is true, as Rona-Tas 
(1994) argues, cadres obtained a wide network of connections through party 
organisations. A cadre family background provides an entrepreneur with endowment 
connections. But this does not mean that being a cadre is the only chance for connection 
savings. Being a cadre and coming from a cadre family, which, the power conversion 
theory believes, provide entrepreneurs with social capital advantage are only two of the 
channels that produce social capital. 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 8 have suggested that people have several other strategies to 
produce social capital when they themselves lack advantageous social relations. Guanxi 
can come from establishment and investment. Something in common between two 
individuals can be the basis for building up guanxi. The common bases for the 
establishment of guanxi include alumni, fellow townsmen, and the introduction of a 
common intermediary. Also, joining certain associations can lead to knowing people 
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and building guanxi (Odgaard, 1992). However, there is no well-defined extent and type 
of experience that constitutes an adequate basis. Common experience becomes a 
nominal category. Thus, Wank (1999, p174-175) argues that Chinese social networks 
have great institutional flexibility in extending claims based on family solidarity to 
persons outside the immediate family and authority because they are objects of 
veneration. Based on these preconditions, people interact with each other sufficiently in 
a particular quality (Falk and Kilpatrick, 2000) and invest in each other to building 
social capital in order to gain future access to different resources. Also, as was shown in 
Chapter 8, the tactic of subcontracting can solve the problem of one's own lack of 
guanxi by transforming it into 'someone else's problem' (Colling, 1995). In addition, 
entrepreneurs like to link themselves with the elite. Pictures taken with the elite and 
signature collections of the elite, in particular, of important government officials, 
establish symbolic guanxi with the elite, which function as endorsements of talismanic 
import. 
Thus, the simple model of business success, according to the logic of power conversion 
theory (Figure 1.1), should be modified as in Figure 9.1. Entrepreneurs, in particular, 
those that have been cadres, can access resources via the cadre connections as Figure 
1.1 suggested. Alternatively, they can resort to different types of guanxi for resources 
needed for business operation. The guanxi network of an entrepreneur can directly help 
access resources, which are not necessarily in the hands of cadres. The network may 
include cadres who have control over resources. Cadres who control these resources 
may not be members of the network itself, but the network can also bridge the 
entrepreneur over to them, if needed. 
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Figure 9.1 A more complex model for entrepreneurs to success 
N Cad.. 0- resources--lo- business success 
As the available research suggests, guanxi from endowment and savings can provide 
entrepreneurs with social capital and access to resources. However, guanxi can come 
from other strategies, such as investment, subcontracting, and linking to the elite. 
Moreover, there can be others (represented by the ? box in Figure 9.1), which have not 
been found in this limited research and thus are worth future research. 
9.1.6 Two-dimensional guanxi 
Granonetter (1973,1974) and many other researchers have studied the "strength" of 
strong and weak ties. However, these two types cannot encompass the strengths of 
different types of guanxi. Some types of guanxi are neither weak nor strong ties. 
It is not easy to measure the strength of guanxi. Burt (1997b) finds managers, like 
people in the general population, do not distinguish relations on a single dimension of 
strong versus weak. They distinguish on orthogonal dimensions of intimacy and 
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activity. There exist many types of ties, for example, emotional closeness, frequency, 
and time of knowing each other, support, discussion, and influence. The combination of 
the two dimensions, the strength, and the use of guanxi (activity), provides us with a 
good perspective to understand guanxi in business as shown in Figure 9.2. 
Figure 9.2 The continuum of guanxi and the use of guanxi 
Totally interest based Totally affection based 
In economic decisions, it is assumed that there are two extreme types of relationship 
between two individuals. One is totally interest based, while the other is totally affection 
based. The former is in line with rational choice in economics. The latter can be found 
typically in family relationship, where a father never considers the price of what he 
offers to his son. Totally interest based relationships, which are purely instrumental, and 
also usually short and unstable, are not guanxi. Guanxi mostly lies beyond the end of 
totally interest based relationship in the continuum of the two ends, with both interest 
and affective elements. Mixed ties are another term for most types of guanxi, which are 
likely relationships between people who know each other and expect to interact with 
each other on a long-term basis. Moreover, in such ties, people seek to influence others 
by renqing (Hwang, 1987). 
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Similarly, in the use of guanxi by an individual, there is a continuum between active and 
inactive. The interaction between the strength of guanxi and the activity of guanxi is 
demonstrated in Figure 9.2. Some types of guanxi are in box a. They may not be strong 
ties, but they are active in providing social capital. Some types of guanxi can be strong 
ties and also provide social capital actively, which are likely located in box b. Both box 
c and box d include guanxi, either weak ties or strong ties, which are not activated by an 
individual for personal ends. However, the individual may make such ties active when 
needed. 
The strength of guanxi can be developed. Also, inactive guanxi can be made active. 
Furthermore, guanxi ties in the four boxes are not static. They can be developed into 
each other. For instance, a weak tie in box a can be developed into box b as a strong tie 
with the function of active investment as suggested in Chapter 8. Similarly, an active 
strong tie in box b may become an inactive strong tie in box d, because, for example, 
two good friends have lost contact for years. The convertibility of different types of 
guanxi depends on an individual's subjective dynamics. The convertibility of different 
types of guanxi and the effort of an individual are the dynamics of social capital. 
9.1.7 Guanxixue 
An individual's access to social resources is instrumentally important (Lin et al., 1981; 
Lin, 1982). But if we conclude that guanxi is nothing but manipulative tactics used to 
gain profits and other desired goals, we fail to understand guanxi. Immediate 
instrumental purpose is subordinated to the greater aim of developing relationships that 
may serve as resources for future use over long periods of time (Smart, 1993). This is 
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the art of guanxi, or guanxi xue. 
The Chinese use guanxi xue to express their concern with the tactics of guanxi 
construction and cultivation, which best ensure personal relationship building, 
utilization and development (Yang, 1994). Guanxi xue implies skill, subtlety, and 
cunning, as conveyed by the English word "artfulness". It places an emphasis on the 
binding of power and emotional and ethical qualities of personal relationships (Luo, 
2000). Nowadays, no one will say, "Mr X is my guanxi". Instead, Mr X will be 
introduced to others as saying "Mr X is my friend". This is perhaps partially because the 
government condemns guanxi practice and partially because guanxi has an instrumental 
denotation, while the term friend sounds to have an emotional element in the 
relationship. 
Besides the emotional element there are some basic rules in guanxi xue. Firstly, guanxi 
is mostly a long-term relationship. Secondly, frequent contacts with each other foster 
understanding and emotional bonds. Thirdly, it starts with and builds on the 
trustworthiness of the parties in guanxi ties. Fourthly but not lastly, the principle of 
renqing that underlies most guanxi ties suggests that favoritism is often followed by a 
strong expectation of reciprocity. Based on the norm of reciprocity, the repeated 
exchange of gifts and favours creates not only obligation but also a critical social capital 
of trust. 
Moreover, it is argued that trust is an important element in guanxi relations. As a form 
of social capital, trust is not only the credibility and good intent of the parties involved 
but also is often considered as the ability to be relied on. Because guanxi is mostly 
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based on known people and networked people, their reliability, morals, and capability 
are known. Social networks function as a lens or prism though which the qualities of 
actors are inferred by potential exchange partners (Podolny, 200 1). 
9.1.8 Multi-dimensional guanxi and social capital 
Guanxi is multi-dimensional, and so social capital. The richness of the concepts of 
guanxi and social capital were explored in the case study chapters, in particular Chapter 
6, the self-reflective autobiographic account of field research methodology. The chapter 
described how the researcher utilised a guanxi approach to "roll the snowball" in 
conducting field research. It also analysed the relationship between the researcher and 
those who were supposed to help and those who helped roll the snowball. 
This first hand experience suggests that social capital is not always instrumental for 
individuals; rather, it may become a constraint to individuals' actions and choices 
(Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). For example, the embedded guanxi network of the 
researcher had in fact confined his vision in designing possible paths to access 
interviewees and indeed hindered the progress of field research at the beginning. Thus, 
it is not true that people seem to act with benefits from guanxi and social capital but 
without any constraints, as most available research on guanxi and social capital would 
lead us to believe. Social capital can also have negative outcomes. Realising thii aspect 
of guanxi, Mr Mark Fagan, the CFO, investor liaison and chief media trouble-shooter of 
Sina. com, the largest Chinese portal, was quoted as saying, "It is far more risky today in 
allying yourself politically with someone in the government, than just pursuing the 
private-enterprise profit motive" (CNN, January 19,1999). Negative consequences of 
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social capital in the same process also deserve attention for a balanced picture of the 
forces at play (Portes, 1998). 
Furthermore, it is suggested that guanxi is contextual and contingent. For example, the 
change of the researcher's social status has impact on the social capital of his guanxi 
network. Thus, understanding the significance of social capital requires attention to 
networks in specific situations. Burt (1997) points out that in some settings, the social 
capital value of a network is a function of both form and content. Similarly, Rose (1998) 
argues that social capital is contingent and situational. For example, networks used to 
maintain health produce different outputs than networks that produce food or house 
repairs (Rose, 1998: 19). 
9.1.9 Power conversion theory in retrospect 
When we look at the power conversion theory in retrospect, we are clear that cadre 
background and close connections with cadres are in fact only two of the channels that 
produce social capital. Besides the social capital from endowment from a cadre family 
and from savings during one's political experience, there are other alternatives, such as 
investment and subcontracting, which provide people with social capital and access to 
resources. There is evidence that the entrepreneurs with government experience have 
greater access to public financial source, which partially supports the power conversion 
theory. However, this is not the simple conversion of public assets as some research 
suggests. The clearly defined ownership of investment might have, to some extent 
prevented the private entrepreneurs who received public finance from converting the 
money into personal property. 
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Although the entrepreneurs without government experience seem to have disadvantages 
in this aspect, they receive finance from private channels, as an alternative. The 
different channels may partially be due to the different embedded structures 
(Granovetter, 1985) of the entrepreneurs, where the entrepreneurs with government 
experience are more likely to have contacts with state owned firms, and thus their 
seeking of financial capital is confined in the state sector, while the entrepreneurs 
without government experience tend to sort their problem out outside government in 
their private domain. All Chinese live in a web of social relations. Families, kinship 
networks, neighbours, alumni, colleagues, and friendship circles are the communities in 
which they grow and on which they depend. Therefore, there is a need to look at 
connections more broadly, other than being confined to the examination of the closest 
connections with cadres. 
Entrepreneurs born in cadre families and having been cadres may have an advantage in 
business, but transferring social capital into economic capital is a complex process. 
Social capital does not equate to an intended outcome. Tbus Wank (1999, p87) notes 
that having bureaucratic connections does not in itself guarantee profitability. 
Entrepreneurs without such social capital can overcome this problem by creating social 
capital. Meanwhile, social capital of both cadre entrepreneurs and non-cadre 
entrepreneurs is contingent upon contexts and contents. For example, the researcher's 
own experience has showed that his social capital with government officials did not 
help much in his fieldwork. Instead, it constrained his action at the very beginning. In 
this sense, there is not an absolute advantage that cadre entrepreneurs can take. On the 
other hand, entrepreneurs without cadre experience are not necessarily in a 
disadvantageous position. Social capital, which bridges the two competing theories of 
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the circulation of elites and power conversion, is the area and process that both of them 
must consider. 
9.2 Areas for further research 
The findings of this thesis have also opened up some areas for further investigation, 
which are beyond this limited thesis. These include firstly, areas around the question if 
cadre related entrepreneurs have an advantage and secondly, further research on social 
capital. The first one contains some interrelated questions. Why cadre related 
entrepreneurs have not been found to have an advantage in business start-up? What is a 
best indicator for the measurement of such an advantage? Will cadre related 
entrepreneurs have an advantage after the implementation of China's privatisation 
policy9 The second one includes other possibilities of producing social capital and 
comparative research on social capital in other cultures. 
9.2.1 From cadre related entrepreneurs advantages to cadre advantages 
The 1995 survey on private enterprises analysed in this thesis could not include private 
firms run by cadre related entrepreneurs but under the guise of state owned or 
collectively owned firms. The data was collected before the Chinese Communist Party 
introduced a top-down privatisation policy in 1997 (Financial YlImes, December 8, 
1997). These limitations of the data may have restricted the ability to find the 
advantages that cadre related entrepreneurs can take. 
Some research has suggested that entrepreneurs who have close connections with 
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government have benefited from this later top-down privatization. For example, Li 
(2000) finds that being a standing member of People's Congress in Hanchuan City 
provided the private entrepreneur Mr. Liu Xingkun with benefits in business. Being in 
the prominent political position, he bought a bankrupt state owned plastic factory at half 
of its real value of about RMB 10 million. This cheap take-over facilitated quick 
expansion of his businesses, and enhanced his business reputation. Li (2000) thus 
assumes that private entrepreneurs can expand their resource mobilizing ability if they 
take part in political activities, such as being a head of a village, a member of People's 
Congress or Political Consultative Committee. It is worth pointing out that this 
entrepreneur was a peasant and his success in business led him to be selected as a 
member of the county's People's Congress, which provides him with social capital. This 
is not a simple one-way of transferring social capital into economic capital; rather, 
economic capital and social capital are mutually convertible. The president of Feilong 
Group, one of the most influential pharmaceutical companies, remarked on the 
relationship between private enterprises and the government, "Every enterprise hopes to 
build up a connection with the governmenf' (cited in Wong and Sun, 2000: 123). This 
indicates another aspect of the complexity of social capital. 
Also, the finding that there is no significant advantage for cadre related entrepreneurs is 
limited to business start-up. Many ways are open for entrepreneurs to achieve primary 
accumulations of capital during the transition, as suggested in Chapter 2. These include 
those who had their primary capital accumulations from illegal activities. For example, 
Lai Changxing, the mastermind of the biggest smuggling scandal in China, made a 
fortune from smuggling (Xinhua News Agency, September 5,2001). Later, 
entrepreneurs started to invest their money in legal activities. During the process, the 
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illegal history of primary accumulations was covered up. A fashionable slogan in the 
private sector is: Do not ask the origin of the hero(ic) entrepreneur (Zhu et aL, 1999). 
This can contribute to the similar possibilities for both cadre related entrepreneurs and 
non-cadre related entrepreneurs to have the highest start-up capital found in Chapter 2. 
There are several ways for cadres to gain during the transition. One is to go for private 
businesses, but this involves risk. Others can outperform them in business operation 
(Nee, 1989,1991). Two other channels have no risk, at least not business risk. Cadres' 
ability to gain control over lucrative assets could vary by the characteristics of assets 
and enterprises. It is possible that they can convert public assets into private, or get 
more out of their effort because of their power and connections (Walder, 1996, p 1063). 
A second choice is to remain in the office and support family members to operate 
business, as Staniszkis (1991) writes that the power in industry and the state 
administration is linked with activities on one's own account in a private company. This 
is also the choice for the "princelings" - relatives of high-ranking officials or party 
members in China (Tho and Ho, 1997; Wank, 1999). A third alternative is concealed: 
power for money, such as kickbacks and bribery. They can even have shares in a private 
company, which are so-called "power shares" (Wank, 1999, pl0l). Cadres can get rich 
together with private entrepreneurs, shoulder to shoulder, without giving up their 
government positions. 
Yu (1998) argues that an upstart rich group is emerging in China's transition. Unlike the 
ordinary rich people, such as honest private entrepreneurs, who get rich by their hard 
work leading to capital accumulation, the upstarts reap staggering profits from scratch. 
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Their wealth comes from illegal activities, such as smuggling. Corrupt government 
officials hide themselves in this group. Their activities are concealed and thus it is very 
difficult to investigate the number and wealth of this group. A reporter from the state-run 
Central Television said he shelved a documentary project about the rich in China because 
few wanted to be interviewed and most of them made their first million by breaking the 
law (Washington Post, March 17,2002). To investigate such a population and their 
activities is most challenging to social scientists. Though difficult, such research is 
desirable. 
9.2.2 Creation of social capital from other perspectives 
This thesis is simply a starting point for understanding the role of social capital in 
business and the dynamics of social capital. As argued previously, there are other 
possibilities that produce social capital, which are beyond this research. For instance, 
Tsui and Farh (1997, p5 8-59) find that an individual may be favourably inclined toward 
people who are demographically similar, even though these people are otherwise 
strangers at an interpersonal level. Demographic similarities or differences affect 
interpersonal relationships and individual reactions through the process of 
categorisation and identification. Relational demography provides people with a basis 
and potential to create social capital. There may be other social, cultural, economic and 
psychological factors that may influence over social capital. Further conceptual and 
empirical research is desired. 
9.2.3 Research on guanxi and social capital can contribute more 
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No one could dispute that social capital is multifaceted (Sobel, 2002, p144), as this 
research has demonstrated. However, a single research cannot capture the many faces of 
social capital. Comparative research can contribute greatly to social capital and its role 
in business. 
Similar phenomena to guanxi in business exist in many developing countries. They have 
local names such as pratik in Haiti, suki in the Philippines, onibara in Nigeria, casera in 
Peru, sedaqa in Morocco, and blat in Russia (Granovetter, 1993; Rose, 1997 and 1998; 
Lyon, 2000). In the West, people say that it is not what you know but whom you know 
that counts. In the labour market personal ties play an important role in finding desired 
jobs (e. g., Lin et al., 1981; Sander and Nee, 1996). In the United States, almost every 
university careers services gives advice on how to use personal networks to find a job. 
Universities in the UK have started to follow suit. Even in Silicon Valley, the start-up 
financing of many IT giants was based on informal social networks (Cringley, 1996). In 
recent years, growing interest has been developed in the concept of relationship 
marketing among both academic and practitioners, where the notion of relationship is 
similar to guanxi (Riley and Chernatony, 2000; So, 2000). 
According to North (1981), institutions are a set of rules, compliance procedures, and 
moral and ethical behavioural norms designed to constrain the behaviour of individuals 
in the interests of maximizing wealth. Tlere are two sorts of institutions: (1) formal 
institutions based on universalistic rules and procedures; and (2) informal rules and 
particularistic social relationships based on shared identity such as family, kinship, and 
social network. Informal institutions such as norms of social relations help to create and 
maintain a stable situation where trust can be built and transaction costs reduced. 
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Informal institutional arrangements can supplement or substitute for legal structures in 
ways that reduce uncertainties and costs in economic transactions (Kollock, 1994), as 
many transactions are so complex that law cannot possibly cover all contingent 
circumstances (Moore, 1994). Thus even in well-institutionalised countries, informal 
arrangement based on social relations can play a role. 
Granovetter (1992: 273) argues that economic institutions do not emerge automatically 
in response to economic needs. Rather, they are constructed by individuals whose action 
is both facilitated and constrained by the structure and resources available in social 
networks in which they are embedded. The social relations, which affect economic 
action, are always present (Granovetter, 1985). Thus, some modem economists attempt 
to take account of social influences in economic action and decision (e. g., Richardson, 
1972; Williamson, 1985). 
What are the similarities and differences in the phenomena across countries? Dodd and 
Patra (2002) have taken an early effort. Their comparison between Greek entrepreneurs 
and that of other countries, Canada, Japan, Italy, Northern Ireland, Sweden, the UK and 
the USA, suggests that not all national entrepreneurs network in the same way and that 
generic behaviour across borders cannot be assumed. What are the factors contributing 
to the differences? What are the similarities and differences between the developed and 
the developing? Research on these questions can not only contribute to the richness of 
social capital but also to business operation in practice and to theories of institutional 
economics. 
9.3 Implications of this research 
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This thesis has at least two implications for research. Firstly, guanxi is still important in 
many aspects of business. Accordingly and secondly, the Chinese system of business 
seems to be developing toward network capitalism. 
9.3.1 Guanxi in the era of "new economy" 
According to some researchers (e. g., Walder, 1986; Solinger, 1989), in the Chinese 
planned economy era, the centralised distribution gave officials a monopoly on the 
allocation of goods and services. Citizens had to cultivate guanxi with officials to obtain 
these scarce resources. In the state owned enterprise sector, the use of guanxi by the 
managers could help get supplies in shortage and keep production continuous (Child, 
1996); The removal of government bureaucratic regulations on access to raw materials 
left state owned enterprises solely reliant on guanxi networks to ensure that supplies of 
raw materials arrived in a dependable manner (Whitcomb and Li, 1996). However, 
some researchers maintain that the development of market activities has led to the 
declining utility of guanxi in Chinese business. They insist that markets give citizens 
access to resources that lie outside the purview of officialdom, that exchange relations 
in the market economy increasingly depend on the quality of goods and services rather 
than guanxi, and thus the market economy institutionalises new norms of legality that 
replace particularistic and reciprocal guanxi (e. g., Guthrie, 1998). 
Being the symbol of Chinese high technology, Zhongguancun High-tech Park 
undertakes the task to absorb and deliver global advanced technology, to foster 
emerging industries, and to play a demonstration role to other domestic Science Parks 
(Wang, 2000). As suggested in Chapter 6, IT industry is dominant in Zhongguancun 
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Park. To a large extent, the IT sector in Zhongguancun represents the development of 
66new economy" in China with several characteristics. Firstly, the IT is a newly 
developing sector, as found in Chapter 6, most companies were set up in the 1990s and 
2000s. Secondly, the sector is most market oriented. They are developed under the law 
of market with little government interference. Thirdly, the government does not provide 
them with any financial support (e. g., The Great Wall Institute of Enterprise Strategy, 
1996). The facts from this most advanced segment still suggest the importance of 
guanxi networks, for example, in financing business start-up and finding customers. 
New economy is not only a term of fashion but also a myth to many. The crux of the 
new economy is the idea that the development of information technology creates high 
productivity growth without unemployment and inflation. Krugman (1998) comments 
that new economy is nothing new, but simply technological changes in the Untied 
States. 
The first hand field research has also indicated that the so-called new economy is not 
new at all in term of ways to finance start up and find customers. Even more ironically, 
Internet companies, E-businesses, have to rely on guanxi to find customers. Taking the 
important role of guanxi in the start-ups of the Chinese private IT companies into 
consideration, the IT sector, whose technology is the basis of the new economy, is also 
built on conventional paths. The networks that are crucial to the start-ups are not the 
networks of information technology but of guanxi. Similarly, Hong Kong based portal 
tom. com, listing to thunderous applause and a quadrupling of its share price on its first 
day of trading in March 2000, lay claim not to content but to its connection with Hong 
Kong's premiere tycoon, Li Ka-shing (Kalathil, 2000). The Internet, the virtual world, is 
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embedded in social and institutional forces that exist in the "real world" (Drake et aL, 
2000). 
9.3.2 The Chinese tradition of networking 
The roots of networking as an institutionalized practice are ancient and extensively 
developed in China (Boisot and Child, 1996). Hwang (1987) believes that the 
instrumental use of guanxi persisted in Chinese society because of cultural and 
structural factors. It is true. Particularly, the connection between bureaucracy and 
business has long existed in Chinese history. This is probably because of the superior 
status of bureaucracy in the Chinese society, where bureaucracy has dominated and is 
4eemed as formal hierarchy (Brunn, 1993). Understandably, at the turn of the 21st 
century, a majority of the successful overseas Chinese entrepreneurs attempted to 
disguise bourgeois wealth with the prestige of purchased degrees, titles and brevet posts 
(Godley, 1981). Brunn (1993) comments that modernization and development in China 
seem to have taken place alongside a strong continuity in fundamental ideologies, 
values and orientations among the social groups within the locality, all of whom seek to 
establish and utilize connections to the bureaucracy. Wank (1999) looks at the 
patron-client ties between private entrepreneurs and officialdom as "commodifying 
communism". But indeed, the connection between bureaucracy and business is not the 
legacy of communism alone (Huang, 2001). Godley (1981) points out further that, 
generally, Chinese business tended to be carried out under the protective cover of 
lineage government or religious community, and was connected to patronage networks 
provided by government officials. Redding (1990) and Zheng (1997) also find that 
overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia have carefully built networks into the government 
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and military power bases for their business. 
9.3.3 Guanxi as a competitive advantage for overseas Chinese 
According to Boisot and Child (1996), research on Sino-foreign joint ventures suggests 
that overseas Chinese investors are more likely to establish business relationships 
through friendship ties or other informal contacts than are Western investors. 
Increasingly, multinationals are recognising the advantages of guanxi available to Hong 
Kong entrepreneurs and are using them as middlemen, brokers, and subcontractors as a 
more efficient way of entering the Chinese market (Pomfret, 1991). 
Nearly 85 per cent of cumulative foreign direct investment in China from 1979 to 1993 
has come from sources in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao, Singapore and Thailand, with 
the proportions attributable to this group, essentially made up of the ethnic Chinese 
diaspora, rising over the period (Christerson and Lever-Tracy, 1997). Guanxi networks 
have played a major role in facilitating FDI flows to China (Wang, 2000). Lee Kuan 
Yew, Singapore's elder statesman, identified guanxi as an important advantage that 
overseas Chinese can make use of as they compete against western rivals for business 
operation in China and claimed that guand capability would be of value for a least the 
next twenty years (Far Eastern Economic Review, December 2,1993). 
9.3.4 Functions of guanxi 
Because of high institutional uncertainties in China, guanxi has economic legitimacy, 
which constitutes a substitute for institutional support for business. It reduces 
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operational uncertainties, including political uncertainty, and enhances economic returns 
(Luo, 2000; Tao and Ho, 1997). Similarly, Faure (1994) points out that guanxi networks 
build up trust. These networks of trust serve to reduce uncertainty and transaction cost. 
With the progress of reform, a rational-legal system is being constructed (Guthrie, 1998). 
However, the role of guanxi will not disappear, as many transactions are so complex 
that law cannot possibly cover all contingent circumstances (Moore, 1994). Informal 
institutional arrangements cannot only substitute for but also supplement legal 
structures in ways that reduce uncertainties and costs in economic transactions (Kollock, 
1994). For example, a survey in Shanghai finds that though individual economy 
operators (getihu) accepted formal law requirements about formation and enforcement, 
the effects of traditional norms of informality also remained in evidence. In response to 
questions about the formation of loan obligations, 50 per cent of getihu indicated that 
they would respond to the debtor's refusal to pay by seeking a mutual friend to remind 
the debtor to perform. While the vast majority, 71 per cent of getihu respondents, said 
they would repay a debt in order to protect their reputation, and only 14 per cent 
indicated that legal duty would be the reason for repayment. The elements of social 
capital that involve guanxi operate as a complement to formal law (Potter, 2000). 
Also, guanxi establishes a link for the flow of information on resource supply and 
demand, reducing information cost, promoting business effectiveness; Guanxi can spur 
the development of new market channels and render protection against contextual 
hazards (Luo, 2000; Tao and Ho, 1997). Similarly, Granovetter (1974) emphasizes the 
importance of weak, bridging ties. Burt (1992,1999) terms weak ties structural holes. 
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In conclusion, it is critical to make clear what role guanxi plays when we discuss its 
importance or unimportance. Guanxi is not needed any more to obtain daily needs as 
Walder (1986) finds. Neither is it important in the procurement of most raw materials. 
On the contrary, the instrument used to acquire goods in the shortages of the past is now 
utilized to sell goods in the competitive market. Also, guanxi becomes the path and 
instrument to re-organise resources, as suggested by the interviewed entrepreneurs. 
Furthermore, guanxi can supplement or substitute legal structures in ways that reduce 
uncertainties and costs in economic transactions. In similar vein, Podolny (200 1) points 
out that beyond the benefit of conveying market stuff between two market actors, social 
networks also work as an information cue on which others rely to make inferences 
about the underlying quality of one or both of the market actors. Hence, it may be more 
appropriate to say guanxi plays a less important role in certain aspects with the process 
of marketisation and the development of the Chinese economy, but it is still active in 
other ways. 
The Beijing enterprise managers believed that the quality of guanxi was more important 
than the price charged or any contractual conditions (Child, 1996). In Tianjin, according 
to a report (2-1anjin Daily, June 2,1999), managers spend 60 to 70 per cent of their time 
and energy on guanxi cultivation. In the similar vein, a survey on private entrepreneurs 
(Zhao, 1998) in Bejing, Shanghai and Guanzhou reveals that they list guanxi with 
customers as of the first importance in business. Guanxi with suppliers comes second, 
followed by guanxi with employees and shareholders. Guanxi with government is 
regarded as fifth important. These results represent the continuity and change of guanxi. 
9.3.5 Guanxi and WTO 
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China is now a member of the VVrTO, which is mainly a legal mechanism to ensure a 
free and transparent market, and solve trade and investment disputes between members 
(China Daily, October 23,2001). The impact of the entry on domestic industries will 
further drive China towards a market economy. More structural readjustments are 
needed if China is to adapt to the requirements of the WTO. Legal transparency, equal 
treatment and trade liberalization are all needed (China Daily, December 11,200 1). 
Undoubtedly, China will have to speed up reforms in all economic fields and adapt itself 
to the world trade system. On the other hand, all the countries with an interest in the 
huge market will have to understand the Chinese business system, of which guanxi is an 
important element. China's economy is big in every way (EM, April 24,2002). The size 
of the Chinese economy is likely to climb, in world rankings, from its current position 
as the sixth largest to the second largest by 2030. Such an economy stands to offer 
exciting business and capital market opportunities to foreigners over the next 10 years 
or so, said economists with global investment bank Lehman Brothers (China Daily, 
February 5,2002). The Chinese government can adjust its policies and liberalise the 
Chinese market, such as lowering the tariff level, canceling import quotas and non-tariff 
barriers, and allowing foreign companies into the state monopoly sectors, e. g., 
telecommunications, banking, insurance, securities and tourism. However, neither the 
WTO nor the Chinese government can totally change the business practices embedded 
in the informal institution. As guanxi is a culturally embedded feature of economic and 
political life in China (Child, 1996) and economic action is characterised by four kinds 
of "embeddednese--cognitive, cultural, social, and political (Zukin and DiMaggio, 
1990, p5). It is impossible for the WTO or the Chinese government to change all the 
four aspects of embeddedness in a short term. 
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9.3.6 A path-dependent transition 
At first it appeared as if the fall of Communism brought with it the end of history and 
that all societies were converging around models of liberal capitalism (e. g., Fukuyama, 
1992). Burawoy (1992) has pointed out that there is no guarantee that Eastern Europe or 
the post communist states are sailing smoothly toward modem capitalism. Stark (1992) 
criticizes the assumption that post-socialist societies are progressing towards a 
well-defined end, some clear, or ideal, type of market capitalism teleological. Some 
transition theory measures the degree of success of transition by contrasting concrete 
East European or Chinese economies with pure models of market capitalism, as if it 
were possible to build capitalism by design. In fact socioeconomic change under 
post-socialism should be understood as a path-dependent transformation, which is a 
process of readjusting existing institutions to the changing socioeconomic environment. 
The role of guanxi in business is likely to have strong path-dependent effects in the 
process (Stark, 1992). For example, guanxi networks have become an important channel 
for firms in China to enter the international markets. Based on the data of several 
sources, Christerson and Lever-Tracy (1997) find that China's manufacturing firms are 
typically linked to global markets through Hong Kong and Taiwanese trading 
companies and buying agents. These firms take orders from multinationals and then 
coordinate production to a group of contractors in China. This arrangement is often 
based on guanxi, such as ethnic and kinship ties. 
Furthermore, in the globalisation of economic activities, the ethnic Chinese firms in 
Southeast Asia gain competitive advantage from the formation of this 
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culturally-embedded guanxi networks (Yeung, 1999). These personal and business 
networks add scope and depth to the family firms. By being part of such guanxi 
networks, family firms are tied to other family firms. Therefore, by combining, they 
reach beyond the limitation imposed by their size, both geographically and 
economically (Hamilton, 1996). 
9.3.7 A network capitalism 
Boisot and Child (1996) argue that a new capitalist system with Chinese 
characteristics-network capitalism is emerging. Within a frame of information 
codification and diff-usion, Boisot and Child (1996) identify the nature of the system of 
industrial governance and transaction in China's economic development. They argue 
that the emergent features of China's economic order, namely, the business system, the 
nature of market arrangements, the form of capitalism, and the role of government in the 
system, suggest that China's institutional form is network capitalism. 
Modem capitalist economies should not be reduced to only one of their constitutive 
parts: markets are but one of a multiplicity of coexisting coordinating mechanisms in 
modem capitalism (Stark, 1992). Market orientation should be distinguished from 
market coordination. A broad variety of institutions of non-market coordination are 
compatible with high performance market orientation (Stark, 1996). Various researches 
indicate that there are sectors where the most competitive forms of economic 
coordination are neither market nor statist but new forms that are labeled as networks, 
alliance and interfirm agreements. We have only begun to understand and identify them 
(Stark, 1992). The evidence presented in this thesis points to the new form of economic 
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systems. 
For decades, capitalism was defined vis-A-vis socialism and vice versa. Capitalisms 
must be defined and compared vis-A-vis each other (Stark, 1996). The spirit of Chinese 
capitalism rests with the ability of Chinese to network together to form a relatively 
coherent socio-economic group to survive discrimination in the host Southeast Asian 
countries (Redding, 1990). Ross (1999) suggests that the market model for China is 
communitarian capitalism. The Chinese government claims that it is building a socialist 
market economy. Despite this dispute, a network business system is evident in China, 
which may remain as an important mechanism for the economy and society in the 
foreseeable future. Furthermore, best-selling prognosticator Naisbitt (1997) predicts that 
a collaborative network of Chinese entrepreneurs, from China and overseas will 
increasingly gain economic power and outperform the West and even Japan. Time, and 
future research will tell whether this observation still holds true in the coming years. 
260 
Appendix A: Statistical Analysis 
Table AM start-up registered capital 0 respond power Crosstsbulstlon 
res power 
mon-cadre codre Total 
start-up -1150000 Count 860 480 1340 
registered % vAthin respond power 56.2% 47,41% 52.7% 
capital 150001-600000 Count 402 288 690 
% vAthin respond power 26.3% 284% 27.1% 
500001-1180000 Count 142 120 262 
% vAthin respond power % 11.8% 10.3% 
: 111180000 Count 127 125 52 
% vAthin respond power 0.3% 12.3% 9M 
Total Count 1531 1013 2544 
% vAthIn re-trx)nd Pnwfw 1M0% 100.0% IM13% 





Pearson Chi-Square 23. W 3 . 000 
Likelihood Ratio 23.826 3 . 000 
Linear-by-Unear 23 539 1 . 000 Association . 
N of Valid Cases 2544 
a. 0 calls (. 0%) have expeclod oDunt I*" then S. Tho 
minimum oxpocled oDunt is 100.34. 
Table A11.3 Directional Mossurms for start-up registered capitail *respond power 
Vokle 
As, "::;? 
Bid V "M T "N Big 
Nominal by Lambda 6ymmom . 000 . 000 Nominal start-up registered 
. 000 MO COP4181 Dependent 
respond power 000 000 Dewtdent . . 
Goodman and Kruskel ift start-up registered 004 . 002 
C 000 
capital Dependent . . 
-pond p- 
DPDWeM . 009 . 004 Od 
a. No[ assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals two, 
c. Based on chi-square apprcwAm&Uon 
Table AIA Symmetric Measures for reglatered capital 
respond power 
Value 
Nominal by Phi . 097 . 000 Nominal Cramees V . 097 . 000 Contingency CoeMolent . 097 . 000 
IN of Valid Caqes 2544 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis. 
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Table A2.1 starl-up real assets * respond power CroWsbulatk)n 
res Dower 
nc)n-eAdr* mdre TolM T 81 
start-up -c-200000 count W5 446611 1265 I 
real assets % within respond power 55.9% 488% 3.1% 
20DO01 -600000 Count 322 236 58 558 
% whhln respond power 224% 25 % 3 
600001-2000000 Count 211 147 358 
% within respond power 1447% 1. 150% 
; -2000000 Count 102 100 202 
% wNhln respond power 7.1% 106% 05% 
Total Count 1440 944 2384 
% within re-imnd power 1000% 





Pearson Chi-Square 115.67220 3 . 001 
Llkellhoocl Ratio 15.536 3 . 001 
Unear-by-Unear 13.159 1 Association 
N of Valid 
0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minlmum expected count Is 79.99. 
Table A2.3 Directlonal Measures for start-up real assets * respond power 
value 
Asymp. 
Sid rrmp Approx T Approic Sig 
Nominal by Lambda Symmat"O . 000 . 000 .6 Nominal start-up real Ases 000 . 000 Dependent . 
respond power ODO . 000 
b b 
Dependent 
Goodman and Kruskal b start-up real asse 
. 003 . 001 . 00d Dependent 
respond power 
. 003 . 001, Detpendont 
a. Not assuming the nun hypothesis. 
b. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero. 
C, Based on chi-square approximation 
Table A2.4 SymmetrIc Measures for start-UP real assets 
respond power 
Value Ap"x. Sig 
Nominal by Phi . 081 . 001 
Nominal Cramers V . 081 . 001 
Conflngency Coefficient . 081 . 001 
N of Valid Cases 2384 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis. 
262 
Table AM start-up registered Capital * father power CMIstabulation 
father 3ower 
nom-cAdre cadre Total 
start-up -150000 Count 878 349 1227 
registered % wNhIn father power 55.2% 46.3% 52.4% 
capital 150001-500000 Count 401 235 636- 
% whhln father power 25.2% 31.2% 27.1% 
500001-1180000 Count 160 79 230 
% wnhln father power 10.1% 10.5% 102% 
3.1180000 count 151 90 241 
% within father power 95% 120% 10.3% 
Total Count 1590 753 2343 
% within father Deywaf 100.0% 100.0% 100ý0% 
Table A3.2 Chl-Squars Tests for start-up registered 




Pearson Chl-Square 17.5196 3 . 001 
Likelihood Ratio 17.451 3 . 001 
Linear-by-Linear 10.415 1 . 001 Association 
N of Valid Cases 2343 
a. 0 calls (. 0%) have expected count less than S. The 
minimum expected count is 76.81. 
Table A3.3 Directional Measures for start-up registered capital - fallww pmw 
V860 
Asymp. 
Sld FrIDP "it T "it gig 
Nominal by Lambda Symmetric . 000 . 000 Nominal stiart-up registered 000 . 000 capital Dependent . 
father power Dependen 
Goodman and Kruskal U start-up registered OD4 002 
capital DependeM j . 
father vower Doorende -007 1 
M4 I 
a, Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Cannot be computed becau" the asymptotic standard am equisle zero. 
c. Based on chi-square approximation 
Table A3.4 Symmetric Measures for start-up registered capital 
father power 
Value Approx. Sk]. 
Nominal by Phi . 086 . 001 Nominal Crameet V . 080 . 001 
Contingency Coefficient . 088 . 001 
N of Valid Cases 2343 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis. 
263 
Table A4.1 start-up real assets I father power Crosstsbulatim 
father xmw 
non-cadre cadre Total 
Start-up -200000 Count 830 334 1164 
real assets % within father power 55.4% 47.9% 53.0% 
200001-600000 Count 329 ISO Soo 
% within father power 22.0% 258% 23.2% 
600001-2000000 Count 215 117 332 
% within father power 144% 10.0, % 1 
)-2000000 Count 124 Go 190 
% within father power 8.3% 9.5% 87% 
Total Count 1498 697 2195 
% withln father rAywer 1100AM 100.0% 100-0%-- 





Pearson Chi-Square 10.732' 3 . 013 
Likelihood Ratio 10.721 3 . 013 
Unear-by-Linear 7.305 1 . 007 Association 
N of Valld Cases 2195 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
m1nImum expected count Is 60.33. 
Table A4.3 DirecOormil Measures for Wart-up real assets ' NOW power 
Vskjo 
Asymp. 
Sid F"d AMwow T ApMic Sig 
Nominal by Lambda Symmetric AW . 000 sl 




father power . 
000 w 
Goodman end Kru" t start-up real assets 
. 003 . 
002 
Dependent 




a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Cannot be computed because Ove asymptotic stwxiwd effor equals zero. 
c. Based on cli-squars approximation 
Table A4.4 Symmetric Measures for start-up real assets 9 father 
power 
Value Sig 
Nominal by Phi . 070 . 013 Nominal Cramers V . 070 . 013 
Contingency Coefflclent . 070 . 013 
N of Valid Cases 2195 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard enw assuming the null 
hypothesis. 
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Table A5.1 start-up registered capital I spouse power Crosetabulation 
SDOU Dower 
non-cadre cadre Total 
start-up C0150000 Count 911 370 1281 
registered % within spouse po wer 53.0% 526% 
- 
533% 
capital 150001-500000 Count 470 177 647 
% within spouse po wer 27.7% 25.1% 26,9% 
500001-1180000 Count 166 79 245 
% within spouse po wer 98% 11.2% 10.2% 
: 1,1180000 Count 152 78 230 
% within spouse po wer 0.9% 11.1% 96% 
Count 1 1699 704 2403 
% within ar"j" rx 100-0% 10T0% 
Table A5.2 Chi-Square Tests W start-up registered 




Pearson Chi-Square 4.6750 3 . 197 
Likelihood Ratio 4.606 3 . 203 Linear-by-Llnear 
Association 2.382 1 . 123 
N of Valid Cases 2403 
0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than S. The 
minimum expected count Is 67.38. 
Table A8.1 start-up real assets I spouse power Crosslabulation 
BDOU power 
nom-cadre cmdre Total 
start-up -200000 Count 871 335 12R" 
real assets % within sp ouse power 54h2% 51.3% 
-53.4% 200001-600000 Count 379 151 530 
% vvithin spo use power 23.6% 23.1% 23.5% 
600001-2000000 Count 230 104 334 
% vAthin spo use power 4141% 1. % 148% 
)-2000000 Count 127 63 190 
% within spo use power 1 7.9% 96% 8.4 
Total Count 1 1607 653 2260 
% vAthin spo u-te power 1000% 1 Mo% 





Pearson Chi-Square 3.2730 3 . 351 Likeflhood Ratio 3.222 3 . 359 Linear-by-Llnear 
Association 3.063 1 . 080 
IN of Valid Cases 2260 1 
0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count Is 54.90. 
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Table A? A start-up registered Capital * CIOOM r*Wgv@ POWW CMmdsbulsdO" 
doom W ive 
"on-cadre c&** Total 
stail-up c. 150000 Count 562 648 1210 
register*d % vAtNn doed 
capital relefive power 
$42% 52.7% 514% 
150001-500000 cot" 274 346 622 
% vAtNn doed 26 6% 26 2% 27 5% relative poww . . . 
5=111-11160000 Count 93 132 225 
% vAft doest 9 0% 10.7% 9 9% rel&tK* power . . 
2-1180000 Count 105 103 206 
% vvidiin doed 110 11% 64% 92% refatlv* power . . Total Count 1036 1229 226, 
% vANn do*d 1000% 100.0% 00 0% 1161 relatt" power . 
Table A7.2 Chi-Square Tests for start-up registered 




Pearson Chi-Square 4.3561 3 . 226 
Likelihood Ratio 4.360 3 . 225 
Llnear-by-Llnear 
Association . 003 1 . 956 
IN of Valid Cases 2265 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minlmum expected count Is 95.14. 
Table A8.1 start-up real assets * doest relative power Crosstabulstlon 
ccloest rrel I Ive power 
non-cadre cadre Total 
start-up -200000 Count 538 oil 1155 
real assets % within cloest 
relative power 
54.8% 53.5% 54.1% 
200001-600000 Count 228 262 490 
% within cloest 23.2% 22.7% 23.0% 
relative power 
600001-2000000 Count 132 188 320 
% within cloest 13 5% 16.3% 15.0% 
relative power . 
>2000000 Count 83 Be 169 
% within cloest 8.5% 7.5% 7 9% relative power . 
Total Count 981 1153 2134 
% within cloest I 100 0% 100.0% 100.0% relative rx)wfw . 
Table A8.2 Chi-Square Tests for start-up real assets 




Pearson Chi-Square 3.777' 3 . 281 
Likelihood Ratio 3.794 3 . 285 
Linear-by-Linear 
. 263 1 . 606 Association 
N of Valid Cases 2134 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) hove expected count Is" than S. The 
minimum expected count Is 77.69. 
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Table A9.11 start-up registered capital I dosest friend power Crosstabutatlon 
closest fri nd power 
non-cAdre cadre Total 
start-up -1150000 Count 420 a14 1234 
registered % within closest 
capital friend power 
57.0% 51.1% 53.0% 
150001-500000 Count 203 434 637 
% within closest 27 5% 27.3% 27.4% friend pKmW . 
500001-1180000 Count 57 182 239 
% within closest 7.7% 11.4% 10.3% friend power 
201180000 Count 57 162 219 
% within closest 7.7% 10.2% 9.4% friend power 1 
Total Count 737 1592 
% Within closest 100 friend power 
Table A9.2 Chi-Square Tests for start-up registered 




Pearson Chl-Square 13.1858 3 . 004 
Likelihood Ratio 13.613 3 . 003 
Linear-by-Llnear 11 035 1 . 001 Association . 
N of Valid Cases 2329 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count Is 69.30. 
Table A9.3 Directional Measures for start-up registered capItW * Closest MwW PWW 
Value 
Asymp. 
SId Ermf T Approu 9 
Nominal by Lambda Symmetric . 000 . 000 














. 006 . 
003 . 004' Dower DOPMWIPM 
a. Not assuming the null hypott-wesis. 
b. Cannot be computed because Ow asymplotic standard am Male zwo. 
c. Based on cN-squars approwmation 
Table A9.4 Symmetric Measures for start-up registered capital 
closest friend power 
Vakie Approx Sig 
Nominal by Phi . 015 . 004 Nominal Cremsea V . 075 . 004 
Contingency Coefficient . 075 . 004 
N of Valid Cases 23213 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard *nor assuming the null 
hypothesis. 
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Table A10.1 start-up real assets 'closest friend po~CroostabulsOon 
closest Mend powef 
non-cadre cadre Total 
start-up -200000 Count 411 761 1172 
real assets % within closest 
friend power 
58.8% 50.8% 53.4% 
200001-600000 Count 149 367 516 
% within closest 21.3% 24.5% 23 5% friend power 1 . 
600001-2000000 Count 104 230 334 
% within closest 14 9% 15 4% 15 2% friend power . . . 
D, 2000000 Count 35 139 174 
% within closest 5 0% 9 3% 7 9% friend power . . . 
Total Count 699 1497 2119 
% within closest 
ý 
friend power 
100.0% 100.0% 4 4 100.0% 
Table At 0.2 Chi-Square Tests for start-up real assets 




Pearson Chi-Square 18.8188 3 . 000 
Likelihood Ratio 19.715 3 . 000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 14.453 1 . 000 
N of Valid Cases 2196 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than S. The 
minimum expected count Is 55.39. 
Table A10.3 DirecOonal Memoures for slart-up real "sets * closest hiwW power 
value 
Asymp. 
Sid FrmP "K T 
Nominal by Lambda symmetfic . 000 . 000 
b 








.b power Dependent 
Goodman and Kruskal to start-uP Mail 111114* 
. 003 . 
002 wi , DePend" 
I ý 
clo"st kland 
. 009 . 004 
1 
006, 000 PCYAW DPP"MO 
- 
. 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic steridard enw viusis two. 
c. Based on chi-square approximation 
Table A110.4 Symmetric Measures for start-up real assets 
closest friend power 
Value Approx. Sig, 
Nornlnal by Phi . 093 . 000 Nominal Cramees V . 093 . 000 
Contingency Coefficient 
. 092 . 000 
N of Valid Cases 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the nun 
hypothesis. 
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Table Al 1.1 main sources of start-up capital 0 respond power Crosstabulation 
res power 
non-cadre cAdro To4mi 
maInsources famlly&foend Count 431 286 717 
of start-up % wNhln respond po wer 27o@% 27.6% 271% 
capital personal savings Count 892 570 1462 
% within respond po wer $7.5% $5.3% 56.7% 
public finance Count 198 145 343 
% within respond po wer U. 01% , 
1 . 1% 13.3% 
others Count 29 29 58 
% within respond po wer to% 2*8% 22% 
Total Count 1550 1030 2580 
% wnhln respond v "Pf 10MCM 100-0% 100.0% 
Table At 1.2 Chi-Square Tests for main sources of 




Pearson Chi-Square 3.780' 3 . 286 
Likelihood Ratio 3.726 3 293 
Linear-by-Linear 1.317 1 . 251 Association 
N of Valid Cases 2580 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count Is 23.16. 
Table At 2.1 main sources of start-up capital * father power CroastabulatIon 
father vower 
non-cadre Wre Total 
main sources family & friend Count 440 236 676 
of start-up % vAthin father power 27.2% 31.1% 284% 
capital personal savings Count 936 401 1337 
% within father power 57.8% 528% M2% 
public finance Count 214 go 312 
% within father power 13.2% 12.9% 1 13.1% 
others Count 30 25 55 55 
% within father power 19% 3.3% 2.3% 3% 
Count 1620 760 2380 23M 
]: 
%wilhInfatherpower IMOO% I C)a ý0% ý 
Table A12.2 Chi-Square Tests for main sources of 




Pearson Chl-Square 9.7406 3 . 021 
Likelihood Ratio 9.464 3 . 024 
Unear-by-Unear 1 . 667 Association 
N of Valid Cases 2380 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count Is 17.56. 
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Table A113.11 main sources of start-up capital* spouse pow Croastobulation 
9 power 
non-cadre eAd;; Total 
main sources family & friend Count 414 192 
of start-up % within spo use po wer 27.5% 26.7% 27,3% 
capital personal savings Count gas 409 1394 
% within sp ouse 57.2% 56.9% 57.1% 
public finance Count 231 93 324 
% within spo use po wer 13.4% 129% 133% 
others Count 31 25 58 
% within spo use po wer Ilia% 3.5% 2.3% 
Total Count 1721 ? to 2440 
% within arx )u-te r ~r IM0% 100.0% IM0% 
Table At 3.2 Chi-Square Tests for main sources of 




Pearson Chi-Square 6.4378 3 . 092 
Likelihood Ratio 5.983 3 . 112 
Linear-by-Linear 
1 422 1 233 Association . . 
IN of Valid Cases 2440 
0 cells (. 0%) have expected count Im than S. The 
m1nimurn expected count Is 16.50. 
Table A`14.11 maln mources of start-up capital * closet relative power 
Croostabulstlon 
cloest rMe ttys DMW 
non-crAre I CoOre ToW 
main sources family & friend Count 264 361 645 
of start-up %, MtNn cloest 
capital relative poww 
27.0% 28.8% 2&0% 
personal savings Count 602 Toy 1309 
% vAMIn doest 57.3% 66.5% 569% 
relative power 
public finance Count 145 155 300 
% writhin closet 13 8% 12 4% 130% 
relative power . 1 . 
others Count 19 29 48 
% vAtNn cloest 1.8% 2.3% 2 1% 
relative power . 
Total Count 1050 1252 2302 
% vvItNn closet 100.0% 100.0% 1000% 
relative power I --I 
Table A14.2 Chl-Squara Tests for main sources of 




Pearson Chi-Square 2.3240 3 . 508 
Likelihood Ratio 2.330 3 . 507 
Llnear-by-Unear 
Association . 574 1 . 449 
1N of Valid Cases ?wI I 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than S. The 
mInImum expected count Is 21.89. 
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Table AISA main mouross of &W-upcephal Odoeselfri" power 
CrosetabLAstion 
closest P OWW 
non-evicire CO&O Totiol 
main sources family & frienil Count 219 Z_? 656' 
of start-up % vAthln do"d 
capital fria"(1powwr 29.4% 2711% 26.1% 
personal savings Count 419 926 1343 
% vAM closed 
friend poww 562% 51.0% 568% 
public finance C; ount 97 213 310 
% vAthin dosed 
Mand Power 13.0% 13.1% 13.1% 
others Count 10 39 49 
% vvithin closest 1 3% 2 4% 2 1% friend power . . . 
Total Colint 745 1625 23? 0 I 
% Within cloodst 
firl po%w 100.0% 100.0% 10010% 
Table Al 5.2 Chl-Square Tests for main sources of 




Pearson Chl-Square 3.4658 3 . 325 Likelihood Ratio 3.688 3 . 297 Llnear-by-Llnear 
AssocAaflon 1.771 1 . 183 
N of Valid Cases 2370 
0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count Is 15.40. 
Table A16.1 start-up registered capital *alVn(m-cedre Croestabutatk)n 
f" Dower 
non-cadre cadre Total 
start-up -1150000 Count 135 45 ISO 
registered % within respond po wer 57.0% 495% 549% 
capital 150001-500000 Count 61 19 go 
% within respond po wer 25.7% 20.9% 24.4V 
500001-1180000 Count 20 11 31 
% within respond po wer 0.4% 1 WIT. I 
2.1180000 Count 21 to 37 
I 
% within respond po wer 89% 17.6% 11.3% 
Total Count 237 911 3281 
% within re-trond po war - 100 
n% I nn-O% Inn n-L 





Pearson Chl-Square 6.573* 3 . 083 Likelihood Ratio 8.291 3 . 008 Unear-by-Unear 
Association 5.146 1 . 023 
N of Valid Cases N? R I I I 
0 calls (. 0%) have expected count less then S. The 
m1nimurn expected count Is 8.60. 
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Table A 16.3 start-up real assets * all/non-codre Croostabulatlon 
res Power _ 
n(A-cadre c*dW Tot"I 
start-up C. 200000 Count 128 35 163 
real assets % within respond power 55.9% 41.7% $2.1% 
200001-600000 Count 51 24 75 
% within respond power 22.3% 28.0% 24V% 
600001-2000000 Count 35 116 51 
% within respond power 15.3% Igo% 1 16,3% 
3-2000000 Count 15 9 24 
% within respond power 6.6% 10.7% T. Tlj_ 
Total Count 229 84 313 
% within reqpc)nd power 100.0% 
__IMo% 
1000% 





Pearson Chi-Square 5.3314 3 . 149 
Likelihood Ratio 5.298 3 . 151 
Linear-by-Linear 4 474 1 . 034 Association . 
1N of Valid Cases 313 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less then 5. The 
minimum expected count Is 6.44. 
Table A17.1 main sources of start-up capital 0 slYnon-cedre Dosstabulstlon 
res Dower 
non-cadre cadre Total 
main sources family & friend Count 73 32 105 
of start-up % within respond 30.4% 33.7% 31.3% 
capital personal savings Count 139 45 184 
% within respond 57.9% 47.4% 549% 
public finance Count 27 14 41 
% within respond po wer 11.3% 14.7% 12,2% 
others Count 1 4 5 
% within respond po wer . 4% 
4.2% 1 L% 
Total Count 240 95 335 
% within rpgromd ro ". r__ 11010% 100-0% 1000% 
Table All 7.2 Chi-Square Tests for main sources of 




Pearson Chi-Square 8.8508 3 . 031 
Likelihood Ratio 8.046 3 . 045 
Linear-by-Llnear 
. 881 1 . 348 Association 
N of Valid Cases 335 
2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
mlnlmum expected count Is 1.42. 
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Table A118.11 start-up registered capital I all/non-cadre In commeros Croostabulation a 
m power 
non-cadre cadre Totod 
start-up -150000 Count 40 13 53 
registered % within respond power 66.7% 500% 61.6% 
capital 150001-500000 Count 12 5 17 
% within respond power 20tO% 19.2% 198% 
500001-1180000 Count 5 4 9 
% within respond power 8.3% 15.4% 1 
3-1180000 Count 3 4 7 
% within respond power 5.0% 15.4% 8.1% [! ý77 Count 60 26 86 %within resmnd Power 1000% 100.0% 1000% 
D27AI8 a 1.00 
Table A18.2 Chi-Square Toots for start-up roolatered 




Pearson Chi-Square 4.08e 3 252 
Likelihood Ratio 3.830 3 . 250 
Linear-by-Unear 3.837 1 . 050 Association 
N of Valid Cases 
a. 3 cells (37.6%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count Is 2.12. 
b. D27AIS - 1.00 
Table A18.3 start-up real assets I all/non-cadre In commerce Croostmbulation 4 
resDond Dower 
non-cadre I cadre ToW 
start-up -c-200000 Count 39 11 50 
real assets % within respond power 05.0% 458% 59.5% 
200001-600000 Count 12 a 18 
% within respond power 20.0% 2540% 21.4% 
600001-2000000 Count 7 a 13 
% within respond power 11.7% 25,0% 155% 
3,2000000 Count 2 1 3 
% within respond power 3.3% 4.2% 36% 




1% wIlhin re,. qmnd m- - 00-0 oý()% 100-0% 
D27AIS - 1.00 
Table At 8.4 Chi-Square Tests for staft-UP real! 85VIS 




Pearson CN-Square 32610 3 M3 
Likelihood Ratio 3.140 3 . 3? 1 
Linear-by-Linear 2.613 1 . 106 Association 
N of Valid Cases 84 
a. 3 cells (37.5%) have expected count less Pion S. The 
m1nimurn expected count 15.85. 
b. D27AI8 w 1.00 
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Table A118.5 main sources of start-up capital 0 all/non-cadre In commerce Croastabulation a 
r" power 
non-cadre cod;; Tolml 
main sources family & friend Count 27 13 40 
of start-up % within respond p ower 43.5% $00% 455% 
capital personal savings Count 32 9 41 
% within respond p ower 51.6% 340% 4&0% 
public finance Count 3 3 6 
% within respond p ower 48% 115% 68% 
others Count I I 
% within respond p ower 38% 1 -- Total Count 62 26 :: 818 
% within reqrond p ower jc)Oý()% _Jaa 
a. D27A18 - 1.00 
Table A118.6 Chl-Squere Tests for main sources of 




Pearson Chi-Square 4.894' 3 . 180 
Likelihood Ratio 4.906 3 . 179 
Unear-by-Unear 
. 262 1 . 
609 
Association 
NofValld Cases 88 
a. 4 C0113 (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
mlnlmum expected count Is . 30. 
b. D27A18-1.00 
Table A119.11 start-up registered capital I all/non-cadre manufacturing Croostabulatlom 0 
12 
non 
!. i ý% 
71t., 
start-up -150000 Count 42 Is 60 
registered % within respond p ower 48.8% 50.4% 
capital 150001-500000 Count 27 a 35 
% within respond p ower 31.4% 242% 294% 
500001-1180000 Count 7 3 10 
% within respond p ower 8.1% 9.1% 84% 
3.1180000 Count 10 4 14 
% within respond p ower K6% 12.1% 118% 
Total Count Be 33 11119 
% within respond D o", f 1 100.0% 1 100.0% IM0% 
027AI3 - 1.00 
Table A19.2 Chi-Square Tests for start-up regletered 




Pearson Chi-Square - . 6000 3 . 897 
Likelihood Ratio . 613 3 . 
893 
Linear-by-Llnear 
. 033 1 . 
856 
Association 
I NofValfdCases 119 
a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count Is 2.77. 
b. D27AI 3=1.00 
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Table Al 9.3 start-up real assets * all/non-cadre In manufacture CrmtsbulsUon a 
res power 
non-cmdre cadre Total 
start-up w-200000 Count 42 12 54 
real assets % withIn respond power 51.2% 40.0% 482% 
200001-600000 Count 19 11 30 
% within respond poweir 23.2% 36.7% 
600001-2000000 Count 15 5 20 
% within respond power 18.3% 16.7% 1 17.9% 
'12000000 Count 6 2 a 
1 % within respond power 7.3% 6.7% 6.7% 7.1% 
Total Count 82 30 1112 
% within re!; Mnd pow" 00ý 0%. 1 00ý 0% 
D27AI3 - 1.00 
Table AIDA Chi-Square Tests Ibr start-up real ogsVs 




Pearson ChýSquare 2.1130 3 . 549 
Likellhood RaUo 2.041 3 J564 
Linear-by-Linear 
. 163 1 . 687 Assocladon 
N of Valid Cases 112 
a. I cells (12.5%) have expected countless than 5. The 
rnlnimum expected count Is 2.14. 
b. D27AI 3a1.00 
Table A19.5 main sources of start-up capital 'jall/non-cedre In manufacture 
Crosstabulatlon 
resDond Power 
non-cAdre cadre Total 
main sources family & friend Count 23 9 32 
of start-up % within resp ond po w 264 % 20.5% 26.4% 
capital personal savings Count 55 20 75 
% within resp ond po wer 63.2% 62 
public finance Count 9 5 14 
% within resp ond po wer 10.3% 14.7% 110% 
Total Count 87 34 121 
% Within resp ond Po wer 
- 
1000% IMO%- IM0% 
a. D27A13 a 1.00 
Table At 9.8 Chl-Square Tests for maln sources of 




Pearson Chi-Square . 4780 2 . 787 
LIkellhoW Ratio A60 2 . 795 
Linear-by-Linear 
. 121 1 . 722 Association 
NofValld Cases 4 If 
a. I cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The 
mlnlmum expected count Is 3.93. 
b. D27AI3-1.00 
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Table A20.1 start-up registered capital 0 high rank respondont Crosetabutallon 
NO rank s pondent 
non cadis 106county Total 
start-up -150000 Count 1324 16 1340 
registered 
i l 
% within high 53.0% 36.4% 52.7% cap ta rank respondent 
150001-500000 Count 674 Is 690 
% within high 27.0% 36.4% 27.1% 
rank respondent 
500001-1180000 Count 253 4 252 
% within high 10.3% 9.1% 10 3% 
rank respondent . 
2,1180000 Count 244 a 252 
% within high 98% 18.2% 09% 
rank respondent 
Total Count 2500 44 2544 
% within high 100.0% 100.0% 1000% 
rank respondent 1 1 1 _j 
Table A20.2 Chi-Square Tests for start-up registered 




Pearson Chl-Square 6.8300 3 . 078 
Likelihood Ratio 6.363 3 . 095 
Unear-by-Llnear 4 599 1 . 032 Association . 
N of Valid Cases 2544 
a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count Is 4.36. 
Table A20.3 start-up real assets I hlgh rank respondent Crosslabulallon 
h1ah rank spondent 
non cadre *-county Total 
start-up -200000 Count 1249 17 1268 
real assets % within high 53.2% 44.7% $3.1% 
rank respondent 
2DO001-600000 Count 548 10 558 
% within high 23.4% 26.3% 23.4% 
rank respondent 
60DO01-20ODDDO Count 352 6 358 
% within high 15.0% 15.8% 15.0% 
rank respondent 
)-2000000 Count 197 5 202 
% within high 8.4% 13.2% 8.5% 
rank respondent 
Total Count 2345 38 2384 
% within high 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%6] 
rank re-mpondent 
Table A20.4 Chl-Square Tests R)r start-up real assets 




Pearson Chl-Square 1.664' 3 . 645 
Likelihood Ratio 1.544 3 . 672 
Unear-by-Unear 1.356 1 . 244 Association 
N of Valid Cases 2384 
a. I cells (12.5%) have expected ccwnt less than S. The 
minimum expected oDunt Is 3.22. 
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Table A211.11 start-up registered capitol I high rank father Croastsbulation 
Imah to k father 
mm. c. adre *-county Total 
Start-up <. 150000 Count 1178 49 1227 
registered % within high rank father 53.1% 389% 524% 
capital 150001-500000 Count 586 so 636 
% within high rank father 264% 397% 27.1% 
500001-1180000 Count 226 13 239 
% within high rank Is 02% 1 2% 
3-1180000 Count 227 14 241 2 241 41 
% within high rank father 102% 
I 
11.1% 10 % 0% 
1 
Total Count 2217 126 234 3 
% within hiah rank father Inn A% 
Table A21.2 Chi-Square Tests for start-up registered 




Pearson Chi-Square 12.4220 3 . 006 
Likelihood Ratio 11.935 3 . 006 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 3.124 1 . 
077 
N of Valid Cases 2343 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
mInImurn expected count is 12.85. 
Table A21.3 Symmetric Measures for start-up registered capital 
* high rank father 
Value 
Nominal by Phi . 073 . 006 Nominal Cramers V . 073 . 006 
Contingency Coefficient 
. 073 . 006 
N of Valid Cases 2343 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis. 
Table A21.4 start-up real assets I hlgh rank father Crosetsbulation 
NO re k father 
non-cadre 2--county Total 
start-up -200000 Count 1108 66 1164 
real assets % vAthin high rank father 53.3% 48.3% 530% 
200001-600000 Count 474 35 509 
% v6lthin hlgh rank father 22.8% 30.2% 232% 
600001-2000000 Count 315 to 332 
% vAthin high rank fa or 152% 1. % IV 
), 2000000 Count 181 9 190 
% wlthln high rank father 8.7% T. ML 6,7% 
Total Count 2079 116 2195 
% withIn hinh rank father 100.0% -I 
Mo% 
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Table A21.5 Chi-Square Tests for start-up real assets 




Pearson Chi-Square 3.3551 3 . 340 Likelihood Ratio 3.166 3 . 367 Linear-by-Linear 
Association . 033 1 . 856 
N of Valld Cases 2195 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less then S. The 
mInlmum expected count Is 10.04. 
Table A22.1 start-up registered capital * high cadre spouse Cros3tabulation 
high ca re spou". 
ý, -county 
non chief Total 
start-up -150000 Count 1263 is 1281 
registered % within high 
capital cadre spouse 
53.5% 41.9% 53.3% 
150001-500000 Count 632 15 647 
% within high 
cadre spouse 
26.8% 34.9% 26.9% 
500001-1180000 Count 241 4 245 
% within high 
cadre spouse 
10.2% 9.3% 10.2% 
). 1180000 Count 224 6 230 
% within high 9 5% 14.0% 9.6% 
cadre spouse . 
Total Count 2360 43 240 




Table A22.2 Chl-Square Tests for start-up registered 




Pearson Chi-Square 3.01911 3 . 389 
Likelihood Ratio 2.910 3 . 400 
Linear-by-Linear 1 701 1 . 192 Association . 
N of Valid Cases 2403 
a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count Is 4.12. 
Table A22.3 start-up real assets I high caft spouse Crosetsbulallon 
high a 
'"CO-ty 
no" chw Total 
starl-up w-200DOO Count 1185 21 1206 
real assets % vAtNn high 53 3% 55.3% $34% 
cadrespouse . 
200001-600000 Courtl 519 111 $30 
% vANn high 23.4% 280% 23.5% 
cadre spouse 
500001-200000D Count 329 5 334 
% vAthin hlgh 144% 13.2% 148% 
cadre spouse 
1-2000000 Courd leg 1 190 
% vAthln high 85% 2.6% 84% cadre spouse 
Total COMA 2222 38 2M 
% Whin high 
I 
10010% 100.0% 100 0% cadre itmist - . 
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Table A22.4 Chi-Square Tests for start-up real &asets 




Pearson Chi-Square 2.1264 3 . 547 Likelihood Ratio 2.653 3 . 448 Llnear-by-Linear 
Association . 904 1 . 342 
N of Valid Cases 2260 
_j a. I cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count Is 3.19. 
Table A23.11 start-up registered capital I High cadre relative Croestabulation 
High re relative 
B. -county 
non chief Total 
start-up C-150000 Count 1048 164 1210 
registered % within High 
capital cadre relative 
62.9% 57.1% 53.4% 
150001-500000 Count 550 72 622 
% within High 
cadre relative 
27.8% 25.1% 27.5% 
500001-1180000 Count 199 26 2.25 
% within High 10 1% 9.1% 9 9% cadre relative . . 
3,1180000 Count 183 25 208 
% within High 9 3% 8 7% 9 2 cadre relative . . . 
Total Count 1978 287 2265 
I 
% within High 100 0% 100 0% 1000% ý cadre relative 1 . 1 . 
Table A23.2 Chl-Squars Tests kw start-up registered 




Pearson Chi-Square 1.8596 3 M2 
Likelihood Ratio 1.868 3 . 600 
Linear-by-Linear 1 075 1 . 300 Association . 
N of Valid Cases 2265 
a. 0 calls (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count Is 26.36. 





start-up 4-200000 Courd 1007 148 1155 
real assets % vAthin High 
cadre Motive 54.0% 55.2% 54.1% 
200001-600000 Count 430 60 490 
% vAthin High 23 0% 4% 22 23 0% cadre relative . . . 
600001-2000000 Count 278 42 320 
% vvithin High 
cadre Motive 14.9% 15.7% 150% 
3,20DODDO Count 151 Is 169 
% vAft High 6.7% 
cadre relative 
Total Count law 2 6 8 
% imithin High 100.0% 100 .0 % 100 0% cadrq relative . 
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Table A23.4 Chi-Square Togs fbr start-up mal amemots 




Pearson Chl-Square . 7661 3 Am 
Likelihood Ratio . 791 3 AM 
Llnear-by-Linear 
257 1 812 Association . . 
N of Valid Cases 2134 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less then S. The 
mlnlmum expected oDunt Is 21.22. 
Table A24.1 start-up registered capital * high cadre friend Croestabulallon 
high dre friend 
*-oounty 
"on chief Total 
start-up C. 150000 Count 1068 166 1234 
registered % within high 
capital cadre friend 
53.6% 49.6% 53.0% 
150001-500000 Count 547 90 637 
% within high 4% 27 26 9% 27 4% 
cadre friend . . 1 . 
500001-1180000 Count 2W 39 239 
% within high 0% 10 11.6% 10 3% 
cadre friend . . 
), 1180000 Count 
1 
179 40 219 
% within high 0% 9 11.9% 9.4% 
cadre friend . 
Total Count 1994 335 2329 
% within high 0% 100 IW. O% 100.0% 
cadre friend 1 . 1 
Table A24.2 Chl-Square Tests for start-up registered 




Pearson Chi-Square 4.3080 3 . 230 
Likelihood Ratio 4.123 3 . 249 
Llnear-by-Linear 
4 018 1 . 045 Association . 
1N of Valid Cases 1 2329 1 
0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count Is 31.50. 
Table A24.3 start-up real assets * high cadre Idend Croestsbulation 
111011 dre friend 
P-county 
no" chief Total 
start-up -c-200000 Count 1008 164 1172 
real assets % within high 
cadre friend 
63.6% 511.7% 63.4% 
200001-600000 Count 438 78 516 
% within high 23 3% 24 6% 235% 
cadre Mend . . 
600001-2000000 Count 286 46 334 
% within high 15 3% 14.6% 15 2% 
cadre friend . . 
4000000 Count 
1 
145 29 174 
% within high 7 7% 9.1% 7 
cadre friend . . 
Total Count 1879 317 
% within high 100.0% 100.0% 
cadre friend 1 1 
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Table A24.4 Chi-Square Tests for start-up real assets 




Pearson ChiwScluare 1.1998 3 . 753 
Likelihood Ratio 1.172 3 . 760 Linear-by-Unear 
Assodation . 445 1 . 504 
N of Valid Cases 2196 
0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than S. The 
minimum expected count is 25.12. 
Table A25.1 main sources of start-up capital * high rank respondent 
CrosstabulatIon 
high rank s pondent 
non cadre I --county Total 
main sources family & friend Count 710 7 717 
of start-up % within high 
capital rank respondent 
28.0% 16.7% 27.8% 
personal savings Count 1433 29 1462 
% within high 56 5% 69.0% 56.7% 
rank respondent . 
public finance Count 338 5 343 
% within high 13 3% 11.9% 13.3% 
rank respondent . 1 
others 
, Count 57 1 58 
% within high 2 2% 2.4% 2 2% 
rank respondent . . 
Total Count 2538 42 2180 
% within high 100 0% 100.0% n9i; 00. 
rank respondent . 
Table A25.2 Chi-Square Tests for main sources of 




Pearson Chi-Square 3.1218 3 . 373 
Likelihood Ratio 3.365 3 . 339 
Linear-by-Linear 870 1 . 351 Association . 
N of Valid Cases 2580 
I cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is. 94. 
Table A26.1 main sources of start-up capital * high rank father Crosstabulation 
NO ra k father 
non-cadre : --county Total 
main sources family & friend Count 630 46 676 
of start-up % within high rank father 28.0% 36.5% 28.4% 
capital personal savings Count 1276 61 1337 
% within high rank father 56.6% 48.4% 56.2% 
public finance Count 297 15 312 
% within high rank father 13.2% 11.9% . 1% 
others Count 51 4 55 




' % within hiah rank father 000% 1000% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table A26.2 Chi-Square Tests for main sources of 




Pearson Chi-Square 5.0818 3 . 166 
Likelihood Ratio 4.867 3 . 182 
Linear-by-Unear 
Association 11.541 1 . 215 
N of Valid Cases 2380 
a. I cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count Is 2.91. 
Table A27.1 main sources of start-up capital * high cadre spouse Crosstabulation 
high ca re spouse 
>=county 
non chief Total 
main sources family & friend Count 652 14 666 
of start-up % within high 
capital cadre spouse 
27.2% 30.4% 27.3% 
personal savings Count 1368 26 1394 
% within high 
cadre spouse 
57.1% 56.5% 57.1% 
public finance Count 319 5 324 
% within high 3% 13 10.9% 13.3% 
cadre spouse . 
others Count 55 1 56 
% within high 2 3% 2.2% 2.3% 
cadre spouse . 
Total Count 2394 46 2440 
% within high 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
cadre spouse 
Table A27.2 Chi-Square Tests for main sources of 




Pearson Chi-Square . 38011 
3 . 944 
Likelihood Ratio 
. 
388 3 . 943 
Linear-by-Linear 
322 1 571 Association . . 
N of Valid Cases 2440 
I cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count Is 1.06. 
282 
Table A28.1 main sources of start-up capital * High cadre relative Croestabulation 
High re relative 
2--oounty 
non chief Total 
main sources family & friend Count 560 85 645 
of start-up % within High 
capital cadre relative 
27.8% 29.2% 28.0% 
personal savings Count 1145 164 1309 
% within High 
cadre relative 
56.9% 56.4% 56.9% 
public finance Count 263 37 300 
% within High 
cadre relative 
13.1% 12.7% 13.0% 
others Count 43 5 48 
% within High 2 1% 1 7% 2 1% 
cadre relative . . . 
Total Count 2011 291 2302 
% within High 




Table A28.2 Chi-Square Tests for main sources of 




Pearson Chi-Square . 424' 3 . 935 Likelihood Ratio . 434 3 . 933 Linear-by-Linear 
Association . 347 1 . 556 
N of Valid Cases 2302 
0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than S. The 
minimum expected count Is 6.07. 
Table A29.1 main sources of start-up capital * high cadre friend Crosstabulatlon 
high c dre friend 
2--county 
non chief Total 
main sources family & friend Count 572 94 666 
of start-up % within high 
capital cadre friend 
28.2% 27.6% 28.1% 
personal savings Count 1156 189 1345 
% within high 57.0% 55.4% 56 8% 
cadre friend . 
public finance Count 261 49 310 
% within high 12.9% 14.4% 13 1% 
cadre friend . 
others Count 40 9 49 
% within high 2.0% 2.6% 2 1% cadrefdend . 
Total Count 2029 341 23 10 I 
% within high 100.0% 100.0% 1 00 0 
1 
cadre friend . 
Table A29.2 Chi-Square Tests for main sources of 




Pearson Chi-Square 1.300a 3 . 729 
Likelihood Ratio 1.246 3 . 742 
Linear-by-Linear 
727 1 . 394 Association . 
N of Valid Cases 2370 
0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than S. The 
minimum expected count Is 7.05. 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire on Start-ups in the private IT firms 
1. Your Sex: 1) Male; 2) Female 
2. You were born in (year) 
3. Your education 
4. Your enterprise was registered in (year) 
5. How many investors were there when you registered your business 
What were they Cob and position) then? 
6. Your enterprise is registered as 1) sole proprietorship; 2) partnership; 3) corporate 
limited company 
7. What business is your firm mainly in (in terms of revenue)? 
8. The amount of registered capital of your enterprise at start-up: 
9. The amount of real available capital when you started up 
10. Performance of vour enternrise 
1) output 2) sale 3) added 4) other 5) tax 6) other 7) profit 





How did you get primitive capital when you started your enterprise (choose 
three according to the order of importance) 
A. first important FB. second imPortant C. third important 
1) family heritage; 
3) gains from stock or property; 
5) borrowing from relatives; 
7) borrowing from work unit; 
9) others (please specify) 
2) work savings; 
4) overseas investment; 
6)bankloan; 
8) borrowing from other individuals; 
If you choose 5) or 6) or 7) or 8), did you pay interest? 
12. At the beginning of your business, 
Who were your main customers? 
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How did you get to know them? 
13. Ile market coverage of your business in terms of area: 
1) Beijing; 2) beyond Beijing; 3) overseas; 4) others 
14. Please fill in the proper number 
1) occupation 2) character of 3) position 
workunit 
1. technical 1. all people owned; 1. section chief; 2 
profession; 2. 2. township division chief; 3. 
governmental collective; 3. town department chief, 4. 
cadre; 3. collective; 4. head of county or higher; 
enterprise cadre; partnership (among 5. head of enterprise; 6. 
4. ordinary state owned, middle managerial cadre 
worker; 5. military collective, private in enterprise; 7. 
service; 6. and individual); 5. enterprise staff on 
ordinary employee foreign invested; 6. supplying and 
in commerce or private enterprise; 7. marketing; 8. ordinary 
service; 7. individual economy; cadre; 9. head of town 
peasant; 8. 8. fanner household (commune); 10. head or 
professional or or village cadre of village; 11. 
craftsman; 9. collective; 9. no job leaser of state owned or 
individual collective unit; 12. 
economy; 10. military officer; 13. no 
others; 11. no job job 
A. Your father 
mainly is/was 
B. you were 
firstly in year 
C. Before this 
business, YOU 
were 
D. The closest 
relatives are 




F. Your spouse 
currently is 
15. The places where you were bom, live, and work 
1. big city 2. middle city 3. small city 4. town 5. village 




C. your '0 
býsmess 
r 
loc'L tiol 0 location_ 
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16. Who were the most important people in your business start-up? Please list their 
positions, and specify in what aspects they helped. 
17. Consider all of the contacts or connections you have made in your business so 
far, who have been your most valued connection or contacts in the sense that 








How did you know them respectively? 
18. What is the role of guanxi in business, do you think? 
19. How do you reciprocate those who help you in your business? 
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